Reading violence: representation and ethics by Thompson, Allan Campbell
READING VIOLENCE:
REPRESENTATION AND ETHICS
Allan Campbell Thompson
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
November 2007
iABSTRACT
The textual representation of an instance of violence involves three principle 
considerations: a notion of representation, a conception of violence, and an inter-
relationship between ethical and aesthetic evaluations. By investigating these 
considerations within the context of postmodern thought, a more sensitive perception of 
textual representations of violence becomes possible. Any representation, prior to being 
read and interpreted, has no predetermined meaning, and therefore no inherent value. It is 
only through a process of reading that verifiability, the principles of appraisal and 
personal cognition become actualised. As any text is necessarily iterable – subject to 
infinite (re)interpretation within an infinite number of future contexts – any interpretation 
is determined by the intersection of the iterable text and the historically situated reader. 
Violence, which is defined as an act of direct or indirect intentional harm against a 
person’s body or mind or property, may be experienced either as an event, or as a 
representation of an event. In instances of the representation of violence, the ethical 
perspective of the reader is influenced to a large extent by expectations of the text’s 
verifiability, the linguistic register of the text, and the inter-subjective ethical framework 
at the moment of reading the text. The aesthetic evaluation of the narrative, which is 
closely associated with its linguistic features, is also closely related to this ethical 
perspective. However, normative systems of ethics are often inadequate in the face of the 
plurality of meaning and possibilities inherent in representations of violence, and 
therefore a postmodern conception of ethical thought seems most appropriate. Textual 
instances of violence therefore have the potential for representing a multiplicity of 
experiences and ethical responses, without necessarily having to rely upon problematic 
normative obligations of systemisation or duty. A recognition of postmodern ethical 
ambiguity, combined with a flexibility of moral outlook, allows the reader to develop a 
more nuanced approach to the ethical predicaments suggested by the representation of 
violence.
Keywords: postmodern ethics, normative ethics, representation, text, iterability, reader, 
fiction, non-fiction, violence, Holocaust.  
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1CHAPTER 1
PREVIEW
“But does a preface exist?” (Derrida 1981: 9): The question of the role and purpose of a 
chapter devoted to the setting forth and summarising of the material to follow in a text 
points to the tension that necessarily arises between the formal dictates of an academic 
piece of writing, such as a thesis, and the postmodern suspicion of the prefiguring of 
meaning implicit in the inclusion of an introductory chapter. As Derrida suggests, “The 
preface would announce in the future tense (“this is what you are going to read”) the 
conceptual content or significance … of what will already have been written” (1981: 7). 
The preface “falls like an empty husk, a piece of formal refuse, a moment of dryness or 
loquacity, sometimes both at once” (1981: 9). Consequently, rather than attempting to 
assert particular hypotheses prior to their formulation and substantiation in the text that 
follows, this preview (rather than introduction or preface) will include only the rationale 
for the study and a brief outline of its argument. In this sense, this chapter is analogous to 
what Derrida calls the ‘exergue’ in “White Mythology”; it stands “outside the work”, but 
inscribes its effects on that which follows (1982b: 209, Translator’s Note 1).
1. Rationale
This thesis on the textual representation of violence, and the problematics of exploring 
such representation through both ethics and a related aesthetic approach, is in many ways 
a continuation and expansion, on a higher level of theoretical complexity, of the issues 
explored in my research report, The Representation and Aestheticisation of Violence, 
which was completed in 2001 at the University of South Africa.1 The initial impetus for 
1 In the earlier study, the scope of the investigation was necessarily limited. In that study, three main issues 
regarding violence were investigated: the nature of violence; how violence is represented; and the 
aestheticisation of that representation. The argument was primarily concerned with the paradox of 
representing violence for artistic ends, or for purposes of entertainment. It was assumed that an instance of 
violence, be it personal or institutional, direct or psychological, is an occurrence that would result in 
feelings of distress for many people, particularly if they were victims of, or witnesses to, the event in 
2that study derived from an article in Time magazine of June 14, 1999, in which the so-
called “Wilkomirski affair” was analysed. In 1995, Binjamin Wilkomirski published a 
narrative called Fragments: Memories of a Childhood 1939-1948, in which he purported 
to relate memories of his youth spent in Nazi concentration camps. Although the text was 
initially lauded as a powerful and moving work, such approbation was quickly negated 
and even reversed by the revelation in 1998 that the personal claims made about the 
narrative were a fabrication, and that Wilkomirski had never been an inmate of the 
camps. The Time article argued that “the warrant of personal witness increases the impact 
of a book. It is questionable whether Fragments would have caught the world's attention 
had it appeared as a novel. Indeed if read as fiction this volume could be seen as an 
unpalatably sensationalist work, using the Holocaust to exploit the imagery of raw 
horror”. What the author of the article seems to suggest is that any frustration of a 
reader’s expectations of verifiability and veracity in a text will necessarily have the 
consequence of an aesthetic and ethical re-evaluation of the narrative, particularly if the 
modification of perception were to be from the factual to the fictional.
Although the evaluation of the work had altered dramatically, the events depicted, the 
ethical questions raised, and the language employed for the purposes of narration, 
remained wholly unchanged: nothing had been altered by the controversy except the 
perceptions of the readership. Despite the postmodern declaration of the “death of the 
author” by Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault, which argues for the primacy of the 
interpretable text and the corresponding irrelevance of the biographical circumstances of 
the original writer, it seemed as if a large proportion of the readership of Fragments had 
conflated the representation offered in the text with the personal conduct of Wilkomirski. 
The controversy was further complicated by the context of the Holocaust, in which 
extreme and widespread violence was perpetrated on an institutional, psychological and 
personal level. Numerous Holocaust narratives, both fictional and non-fictional, have 
been published, many dealing with the same occurrences and ethical problems as 
actuality. However, the paradox resides in the representation of such instances, and my reasoning was that 
any event may be aestheticised in such a manner that the represented violence may be indirectly 
experienced without distress, and moreover enjoyed, by its potential readers. 
3Fragments. These have both informed and complicated the evaluation of the problematic 
Wilkomirski text.
The issues raised by the Wilkomirski affair in particular, and the textual representation of 
violence in general, are threefold. Firstly, there is the notion of representation and its 
correspondence to an external actuality. The relationship between representation and 
actuality therefore encompasses a consideration of the relations between factual and 
fictional modes of writing, and how these relations affect the perception of the reader of 
the text. Throughout this thesis, the term “actuality” is preferred to “reality”. The reason 
for this is that the “real” is often considered as a fairly inflexible synonym for “the nature 
of things” – in other words, as J L Austin argues, it is implicitly supposed “that ‘real’ has 
a single meaning (‘the real world’ ‘material objects’), and that a highly profound and 
puzzling one. Instead, we should insist always on specifying with what ‘real’ is being 
contrasted … and then usually we shall find some specific, less fatal, word, appropriate to 
the particular case, to substitute for ‘real’” (Austin 1970: 88). Therefore, “actuality”, in 
the less rigid sense of “existing conditions” (Oxford English Dictionary), is employed 
here primarily as a means of distinguishing between a textual representation and the 
prevailing conditions (“appropriate to the particular case”) that provide the conceptual 
framework for interpreting that representation.
Secondly, it is important to take account of the means by which various forms of violence 
(institutional, direct or psychological) are textually represented, including a consideration 
of the aesthetic effects of both figurative and realist uses of language on the reader’s 
response to that text. One of the most important concepts in a study of textual 
representation is the functioning of language in terms of various modes of aesthetic 
evaluation, and the resultant aestheticisation of the text concerned. The field of aesthetic 
enquiry is extremely broad, as evidenced by the Oxford Encyclopaedia of Aesthetics (ed. 
Kelly, 1998), a four volume work which attempts to cover all aspects of the aesthetic, 
including such diverse categories as Feminist, Japanese, and Kantian aesthetics.
Consequently, to establish a single philosophical definition of “aesthetics” is  
problematic. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy offers the following definition (and 
4qualification): “Aesthetics is that branch of philosophy which deals with the arts, and 
with other situations that involve aesthetic experience and aesthetic value. Thus only part 
of aesthetics is the philosophy of art … Contemporary aesthetics is a rich and challenging 
part of philosophy, marked by a high level of disagreement even about what its basic 
problems are” (Honderich 1995: 13). However, in a narrower sense, aesthetics is often 
understood as being little more than the artistically appealing, or the beautiful, within the 
context of a specific culture or historical moment. In the introduction to On Beauty, for 
example, Umberto Eco writes that “our book could be accused of relativism, as if we 
wanted to say what is considered beautiful depends on the various historical periods and 
cultures. And this is precisely what we do want to say” (2004: 12). However, 
“aestheticisation” will be employed in a particular sense throughout this study, and it is 
necessary at this point to clarify what is meant by the term in relation to the investigation 
of ethics and the textual representation of violence. From this perspective, such an 
engagement with aesthetic experience and value is carefully circumscribed in terms of the 
goals and purposes of the current enquiry. 
Any representation, whether fictional or factual, is an aesthetic representation which, 
owing to the limits of language and the nature of the potential reader’s context, is related 
to what it represents through individual (inter)subjective perspectives. Whenever a text is 
written, the language employed may fall within a broad spectrum. The one end of that 
spectrum is inclined towards a pictorial/representational theory of language; that is, the 
text attempts to represent as convincingly as possible the event or person being depicted.2
This would apply to much realist fictional writing, as well to narrative factual texts. In 
other words, the language is utilised in a manner that is as referentially unambiguous as 
possible, even if interpretations of the text are necessarily varied. At the other end of the 
spectrum would be texts that employ a linguistic register that is more specifically 
figurative. Although metaphor is implicit in all texts, this type of writing foregrounds 
language that is not explicitly representational. In other words, the reader of the latter text 
2 The concern with language and representation in modern thought is central to understanding the nature of 
representation, and the focus of this study will be on postmodern thought, particularly in the work of 
Jacques Derrida, with an emphasis on Of Grammatology, “Plato’s Pharmacy”, Limited Inc and “White 
Mythology”, in which notions of language, metaphor and meaning are related to the experience of the 
aesthetic aspect of  textual representation.
5is at a further remove from what is represented than the reader of the realist text.3 It 
should be emphasised, however, that given the potential instability of linguistic meaning, 
the language used for the purposes of representation can never be bound to a single, 
definitive meaning. Nevertheless, the text whose linguistic register places an emphasis on
reference uses fewer rhetorical or figurative strategies; the figurative and linguistically 
complex text includes these strategies in a manner designed to draw attention to the 
representation itself, thereby potentially augmenting the reader’s perception of what is 
represented through various layers of noticeably metaphoric language. Consequently, in 
this thesis, the term “aestheticisation” will refer primarily to the functioning of language 
for (more or less) representational ends, rather than referring to any preconceived criteria 
relating to the beautiful or the appealing. The term “aesthetic” will then refer to the effect 
that such aestheticisation has on a reader’s interpretation of a text.
The third issue raised by textual representations of violence is that of the ethical 
implications of reading such texts. As normative ethical theories are sometimes ill-
equipped to deal with such representations, postmodern theories of ethics provide a 
possible alternative perspective on the problems raised by these texts.4 In order to 
investigate these issues, various theories of representation, violence and the ethical have 
been explored and occasionally juxtaposed in order to develop one of the hypotheses for 
this study, namely that the ethical and aesthetic evaluations of textual representations of 
violence are necessarily interrelated. 
2. Outline
The first two broad areas of discussion outlined above lay the theoretical foundations and 
working hypotheses for the investigation into the ethics of representing violence, with the 
study culminating in a consideration of the implications of a postmodern ethics. It is 
3 In Chapter 5, Section 1.2, an example of each type of text is given: the first is taken from the novel 
Hannibal, by Harris, and is an attempt at realism; the second is taken from Koestler’s Darkness at Noon, 
and is a more aestheticised text. 
4 The various theories examined have been selected according to their relevance to the topic under 
discussion. Although the focus is primarily postmodern, other theories have been considered, where 
necessary, and all have been closely scrutinised, or even re-evaluated.
6therefore constructive at this point to provide an outline of the investigation to follow, so 
that the reader may from the outset develop a sense of the sequence of the argument
before approaching the more detailed discussions within each section. The structure of 
the argument is as follows: Chapters Two to Five focus on issues of representation and 
reception; Chapter Six investigates the differing definitions of the term “violence”, and 
how instances of violence are represented within the medium of a written text; and the 
later chapters are concerned primarily with ethical theory as it pertains to such texts –
firstly from a normative ethical point of view, and then from a postmodern perspective, 
acknowledging various preconditions necessary for any ethical (re)evaluation of the 
representation of violence. It also seems helpful to provide an indication of the main 
theories which will be considered in the course of the discussion, and the sequence in 
which they will be treated. 
The first section considers the problem of textual representation and linguistic meaning 
within a specifically postmodern framework. Various theories of representation will be 
employed in the study, and each will be critically explored at each appropriate stage. 
However, the Derridean discussion of iterability emerges as the approach to questions of 
representation which is most germane to this discussion. This suggests that for any text to 
function coherently as a representation, there must exist the possibility that it may be read 
and re-interpreted in a process of infinite repeatability. The reader, necessarily positioned 
within a specific contextual field, is ultimately responsible for shaping the meaning of a 
text. Using elements of the reader-response theory of Wolfgang Iser, combined with 
Stanley Fish’s notion of an interpretive community, the proposed reader is referred to 
here as a potential reader: in order to read, there must exist a historical, current or future 
reader; in order for that reader to interpret and evaluate a textual representation, there 
must exist an iterable and contextual instance of writing. 
Without such a potential reader, there can be no interaction with a text to produce 
multiple meanings and sets of values. The historiography of Hayden White and the 
philosophy of Paul Ricoeur form the basis for the discussion of the factual and fictional 
texts experienced by the potential reader. Various theories about narrative will be 
7considered, with two in particular being relevant to the reception of the iterable text: the 
notion of null denotation as articulated by Nelson Goodman, and the notion of deferred 
reality as proposed by Jacques Derrida. A crucial point of emphasis is that just as most 
factual texts are dependent upon fictional strategies and aesthetic techniques, so too are 
fictional texts dependent upon contextual re-readings of an extra-textual actuality, as 
experienced through linguistic aestheticisation. 
The second section is concerned with the meaning of the term “violence”, and the means 
of representing instances of such violence, with reference to the theories of Audi, Keane, 
Galtung, Wolff and Arendt. These theories are then evaluated in relation to a detailed 
discussion of a particular representation of violence, namely “The Pit and the Pendulum”
by Edgar Allan Poe. Other texts which are instances of the representation of violence are 
used for illustrative purposes throughout this study. The principal narratives concerned –
Fragments by Wilkomirski, “The Pit and the Pendulum” by Poe, Last Exit to Brooklyn by 
Selby and Country of My Skull by Krog – all clarify or illustrate specific arguments 
within the discussion. Various other texts, both fictional and factual, have also been cited 
in order to supplement and elucidate the arguments developed with respect to the
principal texts. Each text has been chosen both as an instance of represented violence, as 
well as for its relevance to the argument as a whole.  The study then uses the various 
hypotheses about representation, the relationship between fact and fiction and the 
representation of violence as a basis for a further investigation into the ethics of 
representing violence in textual form. 
The third section is concerned with postmodern ethics. Following a critical discussion of 
the normative systems of Deontology and Utilitarianism, the focus of the study returns to 
the postmodern. The ethics of Emmanuel Levinas form the basis of the discussion which 
follows, although Levinas’s thought is re-interpreted through the writings of Derrida. 
However, it is the interpretation of postmodern ethics by Bauman (whose writing is
informed by both Levinas and Derrida) that provides the most practical framework, and 
the ethical pivot, on which to found the discussion of postmodern ethics and the 
representation of violence. The texts used as illustrations in this chapter are all instances 
8of Holocaust narratives, each written from a different perspective. By investigating 
aspects of these texts through Bauman’s guiding assumptions such as ambivalence and 
choice, it becomes clear that the potential reader, by drawing on the possibilities of 
postmodern ethics, is able to enter into an ethical dialogue with a representation of 
violence that cannot be oversimplified through the imposition of normative criteria. The  
study concludes that only the potential reader who is able to re-examine such 
prescriptions critically can effectively evaluate such a narrative, both aesthetically and
ethically.
9CHAPTER 2 
TEXTUAL REPRESENTATION AND MEANING
1. The Notion of Representation
Any discussion involving the notion of textual representation is complicated by numerous 
theoretical implications regarding the nature and definition of the term representation. 
The endeavour to attain an authoritative definition must necessarily be frustrated from the 
outset by the multitude of possible and potential understandings and applications of the 
word. For instance, in the conventional usage of everyday practical language, 
representation is often considered as the assignment of a role or function to an object or 
individual, who is designated as representative of a larger whole: s/he (or it) represents a 
company, an ideology, an event, or a school of thought. A differing, and more subtle and 
complex, understanding of representation is found in the suppositions of idealist 
philosophy, where representation develops into the negation of any absolutist claims to 
epistemological certainty regarding knowledge of the Kantian nouemon, the unknowable 
thing-in-itself: “On the path of objective knowledge, thus starting from the 
representation, we shall never get beyond the representation, i.e., the phenomenon. We 
shall therefore remain at the outside of things; we will never be able to penetrate into 
their inner nature, and investigate what they are in themselves, in other words, what they 
may be by themselves” (Schopenhauer 1958: 195). Yet another understanding of 
representation is that of formalist or New Critical readings: a textual representation is a 
means to aesthetic appraisal, by which the reader may evaluate and understand the text in 
terms of its content, form and use of language, without a specific relation to any external 
referent.1
1 “The new Critics … insisted on the presence within the work of everything necessary for its analysis; and 
they called for an end to a concern by critics and teachers of English with matters outside the work itself” 
(Guerin and Labor et al 1992: 72).
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However, such evaluations are based less on what is represented than on how it is 
represented, with the consequence that pre-conceived notions of canonicity and 
valorisation may become more significant than the representation. The most obvious 
example of this is the continuing dominance of the Shakespearean canon in English 
literature, based largely upon historical convention and institutionalisation: “The issue of 
the value accorded to Shakespeare’s works cannot be disentangled from the values that 
people have found within these works … Shakespeare provides the best specimen in 
English, one of the best specimens in any language, for investigating the mechanisms of 
cultural renown” (Taylor 1989: 6).2 Although the judgement of value and its subsequent 
impact upon the production and reception of texts is integral to the formation of critical 
notions regarding the structures and significance of textual representation, more 
significant are the functions of representation that allow for a coherent reading –
functions that are not necessarily assumed by any conventional criteria of assessment, 
and that are not dependent upon the location of the text in a specific cultural canon.3 The 
purpose of this chapter is therefore not to attempt to isolate a single and universal 
definition of representation, which would be both presumptuous and unfeasible, but 
rather to consider the potential connotations and definitions that will be relevant to a 
study of representation within the context of textuality, particularly within the framework 
of this study.
The text has no inherent aesthetic or truth value: it is only through a supposition of the 
mode or genre of the narrative within a particular socio-cultural milieu, as well as a 
consideration of the reader’s aesthetic expectations of the text (within his/her socio-
cultural milieu), that any apparent differentiation is feasible. A text is (in isolation) no 
more than a collection of words, sentences and paragraphs that, when comprehended by a 
reader, will allow for the possibility of signification; any classification or evaluation of 
the text lies beyond the text, and it is at this point of evaluation that a postmodern 
conception of representation is most apposite. For example, Jacques Derrida considers 
2 Taylor continues this theme in Chapter 6 of his book, “Present Tense” (1989: 298-372).
3 This is not to deny that aestheticisation and valorisation have an effect on the reception and evaluation of 
textual representation. However, in this chapter the pertinent concern is with the notion of representation, 
rather than the implications of value judgements.
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the problems of representation as central to both philosophical and critical discourses. In 
particular, he discards the influential Platonic model of mimesis that asserts that there 
exists both an original and a copy, which implies that the original is more significant than 
the copy.4 If this were so, then representation would always be no more than a process of 
substitution, contaminated by its difference from what it purports to represent. However, 
the element of difference is not merely a substitution (or an addition) to representation, 
and language is not merely a substitute for speech and, by implication, any related 
thought and meaning. Derrida’s primary concern in much of his work is to counter this 
privileging of speech over writing, with its attendant assumption of logocentric authority. 
Moreover, in Of Grammatology, he takes issue with this assumption in the work of 
Ferdinand Saussure. 
As Saussure argues in his Course in General Linguistics, the linguistic sign consists of 
“not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound image … I propose to retain the word 
sign to designate the whole, and to replace concept and sound-image respectively by 
signified and signifier” (Saussure 1959: 66-7). Any sign is both arbitrary – that is, there is 
no inherent and necessary relationship between the signifier and the signified – but fixed 
within a particular linguistic community – that is, no individual is able to alter the 
relationship between the signifier and signified, or the meaning of the signifier. Because 
of this relationship, Saussure argues that “in language there are only differences without 
positive terms” (1959: 120). “Conceptual and phonic differences” therefore determine the 
meaning of a word. The implications of this for meaning is that the object (the signified) 
is not necessarily understood in the same way when the word (the signifier) is employed, 
particularly as different communities (historical, cultural, linguistic) may use different 
words for the same object, or have differing conceptions of the same word. Language is
an endless differential network of words – words that have meaning only because they 
differ from other words that have similar connotations or similar sounds (as well as from 
those that have different connotations and different sounds).  
4 Derrida’s critique of mimesis can also be found in “Plato’s Pharmacy” (1981a), in which he argues that 
“Plato is bent upon presenting writing as an occult, and therefore suspect, power. Just like painting, to 
which he will later compare it, and like optical illusions and the techniques of mimesis in general” (1981a: 
97); as well as in “The Double Session” (1981b) in which he deconstructs the negative assumptions of 
Platonic mimesis through a detailed analysis of a poem by Mallarm.
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Although he commends Saussure for some important discoveries, Derrida is also critical 
of Saussure’s logocentric position that privileges speech over writing, and argues that it is 
only through writing (and the metaphors of writing) that Saussure can sustain his position 
in the first place. In other words, “something that was never spoken and is nothing other 
than writing itself as the origin of language writes itself within Saussure’s discourse” 
(Derrida 1974: 44). Instead, Derrida suggests an “arche-writing”, a writing that, rather 
than implying a pure meaning, is dependent upon the play of differences, and thereby 
exceeds the logocentric logic that is limited to a restricted referentiality between language 
and what it represents, between signifier and signified. Through arche-writing – a 
“movement of difference, irreducible arche-synthesis, opening in one and the same 
possibility, temporalization as well as relationship with the other and language” (Derrida 
1974: 60) – representation can no longer be assumed to be a singular ‘concept’. Instead, 
arche-writing is the a priori pre-condition of all possible knowledge: “we cannot think
the possibility of culture, history or knowledge in general without also thinking the prior 
necessity of writing” (Norris 1987: 95). Yet the question remains, whether discussing 
arche-writing or the necessity of writing in general: who is it that necessarily writes?
1.1 The Author
The post-structuralist denial of the figure of the author has rendered the entire notion of 
“an author” of a text as problematic. Roland Barthes, in his essay entitled “The Death of 
the Author” (1977a), claims that critical acquiescence to the authority of the authorial 
figure (he who “confides” in the reader) can result only in a monolithic interpretation of 
the text. However, following the example of writers such as Mallarm and Proust, whose 
texts question the role of the author, it is possible to liberate the text from the constricting 
context of the author’s imposed individuality: “Once the Author is removed, the claim to 
decipher a text becomes quite futile. To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that 
text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing … literature (it would be 
better from now on to say writing), by refusing to assign a ‘secret’, an ultimate meaning, 
to the text (and to the word as text), liberates what may be called an anti-theological 
activity, an activity that is truly revolutionary since to refuse to fix meaning is, in the end, 
to refuse God and his hypostases – reason, science, law” (Barthes 1977a: 147). Barthes 
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triumphantly concludes that “[t]he birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of 
the Author” (1977a: 148). The contextually placed reader is therefore the source of 
cognition rather than the author, and the result of multiple readings is an inevitable 
intertextuality, a complex mosaic of references, quotations, influences and linguistic 
networks that ensures that no text is a closed system, and that all texts are related to other 
texts in an infinite network of differentiation, thereby effectively negating any fixed point 
of textual origin (such as authorial intention). It is this network of intertextuality that 
determines the production of any text, thus ensuring that the very notion of origin 
becomes diminished to the point of vanishing. 
Michel Foucault, in “What is an Author” (1969), also suggests that the imposition of the 
authorial figure inhibits a multiplicity of interpretations of the text. Using as a starting 
point Beckett’s question “what does it matter who is speaking?”, Foucault argues that the 
author-function is both contextual and variable, and can be characterised by four 
interdependent traits: “(1) the author function is linked to the juridical and institutional 
system that encompasses, determines, and articulates the universe of discourse; (2) it does 
not affect all discourses in the same way at all times and in all types of civilization; (3) it 
is not defined by the spontaneous attribution of a discourse to its producer, but rather by a 
series of specific and complex operations; (4) it does not refer purely and simply to a real 
individual, since it can give rise simultaneously to several selves, to several subjects –
positions that can be occupied by different classes of individuals” (Foucault 1969: 113). 
In other words, there exists a disjunction between the author, as an individual who writes, 
and the author-function which is associated with differing “selves”, and which serves as a 
signature of cultural value. Just as there can be no fixed meaning owing to the plurality of 
such differing selves, so too can there be no end to the practice of writing, and it does not, 
ultimately, matter “who is speaking”. 
Derrida’s position on the Author figure is subtly different from that of Barthes and 
Foucault. In Plato’s Pharmacy, he suggests that “[t]o a considerable degree, we have said 
all we meant to say. Our lexicon is at any rate not far from being exhausted” (1981a: 65).
He then argues that the relationship between author and reader is not unproblematic, and 
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that the reader assumes in a qualified sense the role of author during each reading of a 
text: “If reading and writing are one, as is easily thought these days, if reading is writing, 
this oneness designates neither undifferentiated (con)fusion nor identity at perfect rest; 
the is that couples reading and writing must rip apart. One must then, in a single gesture, 
but doubled, read and write” (Derrida 1981a: 63-4). The dichotomy between the passive 
reception of reading and the active authority of writing is gradually diminished, and the 
ambiguous figure of the author (s/he whose signature marks the text), through the 
processes of intertextuality and repetition that develop as a consequence of the exhaustion 
of the lexicon, becomes progressively associated with the figure of the reader, even 
though the signature may remain.
Thus the role of author in the generation of meaning is marked by absence and rupture, 
and it is this that constitutes the act of the representation rather any notion of authorial 
intentionality: “For a writing to be a writing it must continue to ‘act’ and to be readable 
even when what is called the author of the writing no longer answers for what he has 
written, for what he seems to have signed, be it because of temporary absence, because he 
is dead or, more generally, because he has not employed his actual and present intention 
or attention, the plenitude of his desire to say what he means, in order to sustain what 
seems to be written ‘in his name’” (Derrida 1988: 8). The meaning(s) and 
interpretation(s) generated by the acts of writing and representation must necessarily 
function within the space made possible by such an absence. Derrida, however, does not 
deny the historical existence of the author, or as he often puts it, the “signature”, and 
many of his own texts are discussions and critiques of the work of particular authors, 
such as Saussure, Husserl, Plato and Rousseau. For example, in his discussion of the 
authorial function of Francis Ponge in SignSponge, he argues that the signature, 
ostensibly a monolithic symbol of authorial authority, is in effect subsumed within the 
narrative as the text becomes subject to a multiplicity of future interpretations: “The law 
producing and prohibiting the signature (in the first modality) of the proper name, is that, 
by not letting the signature fall outside the text any more, as an undersigned subscription, 
and by inserting it into the body of the text, you monumentalize, institute, and erect it into 
a thing or a stony object. But in doing so, you also lose the identity, the title of ownership 
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over the text: you let it become a moment or a part of the text, as a thing or a common 
noun” (1984: 363). 
Consequently, this discussion will consider the author as analogous to the reader (in the
sense of being such a “moment or a part of the text”) in terms of any singular 
interpretation: a reading by the author cannot result in any assumptions of a definitive or 
privileged meaning, but rather is yet another singular reading among an infinite number 
of singular readings, similarly burdened – but also endowed – with its own 
presuppositions and situated within its own socio-cultural space. It is with this notion of 
the reader in mind that the following overview of the theory of representation is to be 
understood.
2. Some Accounts of Textual Representation and Linguistic 
Meaning
2.1 Why Referentiality Might Be Pertinent
To claim that there is an external reality ready to be “transposed” by representation is to 
employ the most basic – and most problematic – theory of meaning, namely the 
referential theory. The supposition of such a theory is that for any expression to be 
understood in a meaningful manner, it is necessary that that expression have an
extralinguistic reference. Words are therefore substitutes or symbols for their extra-
textual referents, and any meaning is to be found in the relationship between the 
expression and its referent (Alston 1964: 12). The obvious difficulty with this position, 
however, is that it is clearly not the case that all meaningful expressions actually refer to 
something. Syncategorematic terms – conjunctions, connectives, and so on – cannot 
generate meaning in isolation, and even commonplace terms present practical and 
theoretical difficulties. To use any word (for example, leaf) does not necessarily imply 
any singular instance of the object being represented: the word “leaf” can be used to refer 
16
to any leaf, rather than a particular leaf.5 To evade this objection by saying that the use of 
the word leaf is to refer to the class of “leaf” is still problematic, as it is not the case that 
when the word leaf is used in an utterance that the resulting reference is “to” an abstract 
class. The problem with the referential theory of language is that, although it is based on 
the important insight that language is used to represent objects outside (and inside) 
language, the matter has been oversimplified by insisting that all words and sentences are 
meaningful only in relation to extralinguistic entities, and this has undermined that very 
insight: “If referring is one linguistic job among others and is assigned only to some types 
of expressions, no account of meaning that presupposes that all meaningful units refer to 
something can be correct. More specifically, it cannot be the case that to say a word has a 
certain meaning is to say that it refers to something” (Alston 1964: 16). Nevertheless, it is 
neither practical nor possible to discard the referential theory altogether, and elements of 
the theory will remain important for the discussion which follows. 
2.2 Intentionality
The phenomenogical theory of intentionality, as initially propounded by Franz Brentano, 
and later developed by Edmund Husserl, has a certain relevance for textual representation
in that it does allow for the generation of multiple viewpoints and interpretations. 
Intentionality is an activity of consciousness in which mental states are directed towards
what is external to them, even if that object of thought is an ideal construct (such as a 
mathematical concept), or an imaginary construct (such as a unicorn). These mental states 
can therefore generate a representation (as well as a misrepresentation) of a verifiable 
state of affairs in the world. Husserl makes explicit use of the terminology of the noesis, 
the “concretely complete inventive mental process” (Husserl 1983: 233), which has the 
function of constituting the signification of the external data. The noema is the object as 
intended by the conscious act (being both objective and transcendent), and is therefore 
distinct from the object in-itself (being subjective and immanent: the “noetic” meaning). 
Every act must have a noema, but not necessarily an external object. As a result, notions 
5 This has resonance with Frege’s notion of sense and reference, where the latter is the referential 
relationship between the word and object referred to, while the former is the contextual understanding of 
the representation (or modes of representation). Therefore two individuals may have two different 
conceptions regarding the same individual leaf (see Kenny 1995: 126-41).
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such as unicorns, round-squares and fictional characters may be noematically perceived 
(transcendentally understood)  without reference to a noetic actuality (an actual object-in-
itself). Another key concept of Husserl’s phenomenology is the necessity of 
transcendental reduction,6 where empirical existence is subject to a process of 
“bracketing” through which any assumption, prejudice or culturally conditioned 
knowledge regarding the world is excluded from consciousness: “all individual 
objectivities which are constituted through the functional activities of consciousness in 
valuation and in practice are suspended – all varieties of cultural expression, works of the 
technical and of the fine arts, of the sciences also … Therewith all the sciences natural 
and mental, with the entire knowledge they have accumulated, undergo disconnexion as 
sciences which require for their development the natural standpoint” (1931: 171). Only 
through such reduction can the essence of experiencing phenomena be described. 
However, Husserl’s notion of the transcendental reduction has been criticised by some as 
being too idealistic. Hintakka makes the point that “You simply cannot be aware of a 
relation’s holding between two terms if you are not aware of both of the two terms. If the 
entire object is in each and every case bracketed in the phenomenological reductions, it 
therefore becomes literally impossible for a phenomenologist to explain the relation of a 
noema to its object” (1995: 80). Heidegger, contra Husserl, argues for a grounding of 
phenomenology in the historical and the lived, with a consequent primacy of practical 
experience over theorising. In Being and Time, he excludes Husserl’s concerns with the 
transcendental ego, consciousness and objectivity: “Phenomenology, for Heidegger, leads 
to a new way of seeing rather than to a set of philosophical propositions” (Moran 2000: 
228). Similarly, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology argues for the inclusion of the 
reduction in a manner that enhances, rather than diminishes, the relationship between 
theory and practical experience, in order to give an adequate description of human 
experience: “It is because we are through and through compounded of relationships with 
the world that for us the only way to become aware of the fact is to suspend the resultant 
activity, to refuse it our complicity … not because we reject the certainties of common 
6 “The disconnexion from Nature was for us the methodological means whereby the direction of the mental 
glance upon the pure transcendent consciousness becomes at all possible” (Husserl 1931: 171).
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sense and a natural attitude to things – they are, on the contrary, the constant theme of 
philosophy – but because, being the presupposed basis of any thought, they are taken for 
granted” (1962: xv). He goes on to claim that “The most important lesson which the 
reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction” (1962: xv).   
Such bracketing or reduction therefore allows for various aspects of the representation, 
many of which are not necessarily apparent from one point of view alone. This allows for 
an elaboration of an inter-subjectivity of consciousness in which each act of conscious 
perception anticipates other acts of perception. Such “operative” intentionality is 
“apparent in our desires, our evaluations and in the landscape we see, more clearly than 
in objective knowledge, and furnishing the text which our knowledge tries to translate 
into precise language” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: xviii). The implication of this is the 
possibility of a multiplicity of interpretations of noematic perceptions of a text, and it is 
Derrida’s critique of phenomenology that argues for both the generation of a potentially 
infinite number of readings, as well as a more inclusive notion of the literary object. In 
The Time of a Thesis: Punctuations, he writes “[I]t was for me a matter of bending, more 
or less violently, the techniques of transcendental phenomenology to the needs of 
elaborating a new theory of literature, of that peculiar type of ideal object that is the 
literary object” (1983: 37). Combined with this is the emphasis on the necessary 
repeatability of a text as a condition for textual intentionality. In Speech and Phenomena,
he emphasises the importance of (transcendent) repetition in the phenomenology of the 
(immanent) ideal or essence: “But this ideality, which is but another name for the 
permanence of the same, and the possibility of its repetition, does not exist in the world, 
and it does not come from another world; it depends entirely upon the possibility of acts 
of repetition” (1969: 12) This statement is a powerful critique of the transcendental 
phenomenology of Husserl, as well as the emphasis on experience and perception as 
articulated by Merleau-Ponty. 
However, Derrida is not inherently opposed to the idea that intentionality, for all practical 
purposes, is an integral part of speech and meaning which allows for interpretation within 
certain contexts; he is opposed to the idea that intentionality is a means of determining 
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the must and the should of the workings of the text. As Peggy Kamuf claims, “[Derrida’s 
notion of] iterability conditions any intention as possible but thereby impossible as a pure 
presence to itself” (Kamuf 1991: 81). The fact that a sign is repeatable is a limiting factor 
on the claims of intentionality to be the “determinable ground of signification” (1991: 
80). This emphasis upon the importance of the possibility of acts of repetition becomes 
crucial in Derrida’s formulation of the process of iterability, particularly in Limited Inc
(1988), and it is this process, rather than intentionality, which will be considered as the 
key element in the interpretation of textual representation in this study. 
2.3 Iterability
Phenomenological intentionality, therefore, is not a necessary function of or pre-
condition for postmodern iterability. Although both speakers and writers generate words 
that have intentional significance, the graphic utterance differs from the phonic utterance 
in that the former allows for infinite future readings and (re)interpretations, whereas the 
latter assumes a logocentric authority of significance unadulterated by any possible future 
(mis)readings. Derrida challenges this view: all texts are instances of, or are influenced 
by, arche-writing. This is why he has labelled a text, whether written or spoken, as being 
iterable: to be intelligible, it must be both repeatable (in various contexts) and singular 
(having the potential to be understood uniquely in each one of those various contexts). 
One of the features of any written text is that, by its very nature, it is marked by the future 
absence of the initial readership and the subsuming of the original signature. This also 
reinforces the notion of the text: “If one admits that writing (and the mark in general) 
must be able to function in the absence of the sender, the receiver, the context of 
production, etc. that implies that this power, this being able, this possibility is always 
inscribed, hence necessarily inscribed as possibility in the functioning or the functional 
structure of the mark … it follows that this possibility is a necessary part of its structure” 
(Derrida 1988: 48).
In an interview with Maurizio Ferraris, Derrida asserted that “I prefer to speak of ‘mark’ 
rather than of language … it is the possibility of language, and it is everywhere that there 
is a relation to another thing or relation to an other” (Derrida and Ferraris 2001: 76). The 
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notion of iterability recognises that for any text to function coherently, there must exist 
the possibility that it may be read again and again over time, in a “structure of 
repeatability”, even if both the author and addressee of the mark are dead or absent. 
Derrida claims elsewhere (Limited Inc 1988) that “[p]lenitude is the end (the goal), but 
were it attained, it would be the end (death)” (1988: 129) – death as the end of possibility, 
the end of the illusion of possibility, but also the condition of writing. “To be what it is, 
all writing must, therefore, be capable of functioning in the radical absence of every 
empirically determined receiver in general. And this absence is not a continuous 
modification of presence, it is a rupture in presence, the “death”, or the possibility of the 
“death” of the receiver inscribed in the structure of the mark” (1988: 8). 
The notion of the metaphysics of presence – the metaphysical, logocentric, assumption 
that language has a fixed, or at least stable, meaning or identity7 – is therefore challenged 
by iterability: repeatability, the rupture in the (assumption) of presence, emphasises the 
continuously changing implications of the mark, and thereby allows for continuously 
changing interpretations of the text. The result of the deconstruction of presence is that 
there can be no stable origin, and there can consequently never be an ultimate 
interpretation of any text or utterance. To recognise the potential for deconstruction in 
any text is to recognise the implicit hierarchies, doctrines, ideologies and prejudices 
which purport to represent something definite and unshakeable outside of the words of 
the text, as well as to challenge the referential assumption that there exists an independent 
external reality that is the original as opposed to the copy of the representation. 
Following the erasure of an originary context, and for a text to be readable, it must have
the potentiality for being repeated again and again in an infinite variety of contexts, while 
simultaneously being potentially singular each time. Yet a singular reading – the 
theoretically unique interpretation available to every reader, is already compromised by 
7 The metaphysics of presence is a feature of the Western intellectual tradition, based upon the assumption 
that meaning is “present” in every utterance. In Of Grammatology, Derrida employs the texts of Rousseau 
to deconstruct this presence (which is intricately linked to the logocentric assumption that privileges the 
immediate significance and authority of speech over the oppressive instability of meaning inherent in 
writing, a theme common to both Plato and Rousseau): “Self-presence, transparent proximity in the face-to-
face of countenances and the immediate range of the voice, this determination of social authenticity is 
therefore classic: Rousseauistic but already the inheritor of Platonism” (1974: 138).
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the paradox that the singular is determined by the general: “An absolute, absolutely pure 
singularity, if there were one, would not even show up, or at least would not be available 
for reading. To become readable, [the text] has to be divided, to participate and belong … 
any work is singular in that it speaks singularly of both singularity and generality. Of 
iterability and the law of iterability” (Attridge 1992a: 68). In addition, no context allows 
for saturation, and no meaning can be determined out of context. However, context is in
itself not a definitive framing of the iterable text. In Signature Event Context Derrida 
argues that “a context is never absolutely determinable, [and] its determination can never
be entirely certain or saturated” (Derrida 1988: 3). No implied frame, contextual or 
otherwise, can limit the potential meaning of the text, and what is external to it is
constantly absorbed within its meaning.
Consequently, it is reasonable to maintain that any notion of meaning within the 
framework of textual representation is an acknowledgement that the word “meaning” is 
both epistemologically unstable and comprehensible only in relation to a variety of 
contextual factors (themselves variable and indeterminate), which are subject to various 
theories of linguistic understanding. Textual passages are necessarily iterable – repeatable 
but singular – and dependent upon the future absence of sender and addressee. The 
inferences to be drawn from such a notion of representation remain problematic, 
however, as iterability affects significantly more than just the individual reader’s 
perception of the work: it also affects the aesthetic and cultural positioning of the text 
within a network of texts, as well as the implications that accompany perceptions of 
factuality and fiction. Prior to any reading, the text has only potential meaning. It is only 
through subsequent claims to veracity and actuality (or fictionality, see Chapter 4) within 
varying contexts that the text is read as a representation. It is only once this point has 
been reached that the potential functions of representation invite examination.  
3. How Representation Functions: Some Central Questions
Before the implications of textually representing violence are investigated further, it is 
necessary to explore the various definitions of the term representation in order further to 
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clarify the sense in which it will be employed in later chapters. There are a number of 
diverse definitions of the verb “to represent”; however, the notion of representation in 
this study has been deliberately limited to those aspects of it that are of particular 
relevance to the iterable reading of a written text. Consequently, those definitions which 
are not wholly relevant (for example, “to present an image of through the medium of a 
picture or sculpture”) have been excluded from consideration. Those identified as being 
significant for the functioning of textual representation, within the limits identified above,
are as follows:
1. to stand as an equivalent of; correspond to
2. to act as a substitute or proxy
3. to use or serve as a means of expression
4. to exhibit the characteristics of; exemplify; typify 
5. to set forth in words; state or explain; to describe; to make out to be
In order to qualify (in the sense of “to declare competent or capable, or to certify, as well 
as to modify, limit, or restrict”) these five definitions, it is helpful to apply them to an 
example of a textual representation, thereby allowing for an exploration as to how 
representation functions within the text in terms of the Derridean notions outlined earlier. 
The following extract is taken from Antjie Krog’s contentious narrative based on the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Country of my Skull (second 
edition, 2002). The choice is calculated, in view of the ambivalence of a text that admits 
to a juxtaposition of historical actuality and fictional narrative: the author, in her 
acknowledgements, makes the startling claim that “I have told many lies in this book 
about the truth. I have exploited many lives and many texts” (2002: 294). The 
consequence of such an amalgamation is that the reader is never in the position of being 
able sufficiently to determine whether or not the testimony given in the following extract 
has any verifiable reference to a historical event, is wholly fictional, or is placed 
somewhere between the two (perceived) poles of historical record and invention. 
Additionally, due to the fragmentary mode of writing in Country of my Skull, the extract 
is itself a representation of the testimony of the event: although contextually linked to the 
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thematics of the text as a whole, this passage consists of the entire narrative of this 
specific event.
It was Sunday. And cold. He came into the kitchen. “Make me some bean soup”.
“It’s Sunday, jong, I want to cook special food.”
But he wanted bean soup.
While dressing for church we heard the noise. The youths were coming down the 
road. We were standing in our bedroom. We were not talking. We were not moving. 
They surrounded the house and they shouted: “Let the spy die, let the spy die!” They 
threw stones through the window. When they left, he said to me: “Don’t cry 
Nontuthuzelo. A person dies only once, not many times. I know now where these 
things are leading to. Come, let’s make soup.” We went to the kitchen and put the 
beans in the pot. 
Then someone we knew knocked at the door. “The comrades are burning your shop, 
Uncle Mick!”
“I’ll be back for lunch,” he said to me.
They told me afterwards. He walked up to the door of his shop, he didn’t look back 
… someone in the crowd shot him in the back … They told me afterwards Craig 
Kotze had said my husband was the one who betrayed Steve Biko.
(Krog 2002: 27)
3.1 Equivalence
The term “equivalence” is a problematic concept, particularly when used in relation to 
textual representation. Equivalence holds that A is equivalent to B, if and only if B is 
equivalent to A. Consequently, if A is the thing represented, and B the representation, 
then it becomes difficult to recognise the equivalence of the latter to the former, and vice 
versa, as equivalence implies an exact correspondence between A and B. The ambiguous 
implications of this definition of representation become immediately apparent. Can the 
given extract achieve any form of equivalence, and if so, to what extent? If it is assumed 
(for the purposes of this first definition) that the representation of the testimony has a 
factual basis in a verifiable historical event, can the position be maintained that the text 
achieves an equivalence of that event? Or is the equivalence to the testimony, which in its 
turn should be equivalent to the event? In either case, there are three possibilities of 
equivalence: 
(1) The representation is equivalent to the event. In other words, the details of the 
description – the shouting of the youths, the making of the soup, the dialogue as given in 
the text, and all the rest – exactly correspond to the event as it happened in an external 
reality.
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(2) The representation is the equivalent of the narrator Nontuthuzelo’s recollections of the 
event: the text is necessarily a partial representation of the event, but nevertheless a 
complete representation of Nontuthuzelo’s perception of the event. In other words, it is 
an event solely through its reconstruction in language. 
(3) The representation is the equivalent of Krog’s understanding of Nontuthuzelo’s 
recollection of the event: the text is necessarily a collective representation of both the 
event and Nontuthuzelo’s recollections of the event, as interpreted and represented by 
Krog. 
It is obvious that the first possibility cannot be sustained – no written text can 
exhaustively represent an actual event; there must necessarily be omissions. The second 
possibility is to some extent more plausible than the first, but any acknowledgement of 
the fragmentary and selective possibilities inherent in any act of remembrance or 
testimony implies that the use of equivalence is the unnecessary assumption of a limiting 
concept that cannot be applied convincingly to the relationship between event and the 
textual representation of that event. The third possibility has further diluted that 
relationship to such an extent that the application of the term becomes incoherent. It is, 
therefore, unsustainable to argue that equivalence can function in terms of a textual 
representation.
Consequently, it is necessary to attenuate the rigidity suggested by the term, and instead 
substitute the term correspondence. The result is, in effect, an adaptation of the referential 
theory of meaning outlined earlier, also known as the “correspondence theory”. The 
correspondence theory holds that propositions are true, if and only if they correspond to 
an existing state of affairs. However, apart from the difficulties of adequately interpreting 
contentious terms such as “truth” and “facts”, the potential for misrepresentation, 
mistranslation or misattribution, combined with the iterable nature of the written text, 
would provide sufficient justification for rejecting a nave relation of correspondence 
between what is represented and the representation. A further possibility is to substitute 
the term “resemble”, which is also dependent upon the referential theory. However, 
Nelson Goodman is critical of a crude notion of resemblance in which “A represents B if 
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and only if A appreciably resembles B …A represents B to the extent that A resembles 
B” (Goodman 1976: 3). Accordingly, if A is considered to be the Krog extract, and B is 
the totality of the event referred to in the extract, then (according to the nave view) the 
author is claiming that the text resembles the event. Assuming the event took place more 
or less as described,8 it is still not reasonable to infer that the text resembles the event. If 
it is the case that not even a picture or a photograph of an event or object can represent 
that event or object as it is,9 then it is even more the case that a sequence of signifiers 
only conventionally related to a signified can never be equivalent to, or even resemble, an 
event. The assumption of an ultimate meaning, a plenitude of presence, is unsustainable 
given both the limitations of referentiality and the functioning of iterability to which both 
the reader and the text are subject. This is not to suggest that there is no reality to which 
the text refers; rather, “we must avoid having the indispensable critique of a certain nave 
relationship to the signified or the referent, to sense and meaning … that is, a pure and 
simple suppression, of meaning or reference” (Derrida 1981c: 74). 
The representation of a historical event is, therefore, necessarily linked to human 
sentiment and experience; however, in consequence of the fact that it is only through 
language that the responses to such events can be articulated, such articulations are 
limited to what language is able to represent, and can therefore never be represented in 
totality. Selective representation is essential; generalisation is a necessary condition for 
coherent memory. If selective representation were impossible, then articulate testimony 
would be impossible. For example, consider the story “Funes, the Memorious” by Jorge 
Luis Borges (1964: 87-95). In this narrative, the protagonist can recall everything that has 
happened to him throughout his life, including every leaf on every tree that he has seen, 
8 It is also necessary to query whether the representation is that of the TRC hearing, or of the actual event.
In the former case, it would therefore be a representation of a representation, which involves further 
complexities. Does the extract resemble the hearing, which then resembles the event? Or does the event 
resemble the testimony of the event?
9 “The reality in a photograph is present to me while I am not present to it; and a world I know, and see, but 
to which I am nevertheless not present (through no fault of my subjectivity) is a world past” (Stanley 
Cavell, in Mulhall 2002: 65). Also, in Goodman: “And even we who are most inured to perspective 
rendering do not always accept it as faithful representation … as the saying goes, there is nothing like a 
camera to make a molehill out of a mountain” (1976: 15).
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and every letter of every sentence of every book that he has read.10 The only consequence 
of such a totality of recall is that he “cannot act any more, cannot even move. What 
characterises the transmission of memory is the filtering out. And with the filtering out, 
comes generalization” (Interview with Umberto Eco, in David, Lenoir and de Tonnac 
1999: 190-191). 
In the Krog extract, such generalisation is manifest. As an illustration, consider the 
following straightforward sentence: “While dressing for church we heard the noise”. In 
order to attempt a more comprehensive representation, it would be necessary to describe 
precisely which clothes were being put on, the current state of (un)dress, which church is 
being referred to (both as a physical building and as a denomination, as well as the 
importance of such a building/denomination for each of the persons involved), the 
colours of the room, its furnishings, its ornaments and pictures, the exact temperature 
outside and inside (what exactly is meant by cold?), the weather conditions, the lighting, 
the exact time, the position of the narrator, as well as any other persons in the house (are 
there only two? Or are others silent, absent from the representation?), the nature of the 
perceived noise - its level, intensity, and duration. Even if such detail were possible (or 
desirable), it could not encompass the various emotions felt by each person at the time, 
each one’s states of mind, alertness, perception, religious and political beliefs, and the 
multitudinous panorama of possibilities that exist within the confines of this sentence. 
There may be sufficient or adequate representation for the purposes of the narrative – in 
other words, the representation allows for a certain limitation of interpretation that 
ensures the potential consensus required for comprehending the passage. However, there 
will never be an inclusive representation, and each reader will interpret that sufficiency 
differently from every other reader, even if the singularity of each reading is necessarily 
influenced by the general intersubjective and intertextual functioning of the iterable text.
10 “In fact, Funes remembered not only every leaf of every tree of every wood, but also every one of the 
times he had perceived or imagined it. He decided to reduce each of his past days to some seventy thousand 
memories, which would then be defined by means of ciphers. He was dissuaded from this by two 
considerations: his awareness that the task was interminable, his awareness that it was useless. He thought 
that by the hour of his death he would not even have finished classifying all the memories of his 
childhood.” (Borges 1964: 93).
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Consequently, no representation, no matter how detailed, can ever be the equivalent of 
the event in every respect, nor can it accurately correspond to the event, nor can it 
comprehensively resemble the event. Each utterance must necessarily fall under the 
constraints of a generalisation in which a large portion of the detail of the remembered 
event is omitted, or was never part of conscious awareness in the first place.11 The 
conclusion drawn from this must therefore be that the correspondence/equivalence theory 
is not suitable with regard to notions of textual representation, and that even resemblance 
is not a necessary condition for representation – as practically anything may stand for 
anything else when appropriately governed by intention and context. As Goodman 
asserts, “a passage that describes … an object refers to, and more particularly denotes it. 
Denotation is the core of representation and is independent of resemblance” (Goodman 
1976: 5). In addition, textual denotation understood as a signification or symbol of a 
referent rather than a resemblance, becomes subject to the differential network of 
language, which in turn allows for the infinite readings of an iterable text. Thus, the 
notion of denotation as a substitute rather than an equivalence is a more adequate account 
of the function of textual representation.
3.2 Substitution
To denote is to serve as a symbol or a name for the meaning of something, or to signify. 
Hence, it is not necessary to resemble, to imitate, or to copy that something: it is enough 
to act as a substitute or proxy in a textual and linguistic sense. In the above extract there 
are various labels: the youths, the soup, the house; these labels cannot be equivalent to 
the corresponding objects in the world, but rather denote them by standing in for them. 
However, Derrida’s formulation of this as “there is nothing outside context” (Derrida 
1988: 136), itself a reformulation (or clarification) of “there is nothing outside of the 
text” (Derrida 1974: 158) suggests that while it is impossible to determine meaning 
without a contextual framework, it is equally impossible for potential meaning(s) within 
11 “Our acts are end points in long sequences of unconscious responses. They arise from a structure of 
habits and skills that is almost infinitely complicated. Most of our life is enacted without conscious 
awareness. Nor can it be made conscious … we think of our actions as the end-results of our thoughts. Yet 
much the greater part of everyone’s life goes on without thinking … When we know what to do we are 
hardly conscious of doing it” (Gray 2002: 69-70).
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that context to become saturated. The youths as represented in the extract will have 
different contextual significances for Nontuthuzelo, for Krog, and for every reader of the 
text. The term youth therefore denotes, as it is a substitute that suggests an interpretation 
dependent upon the personal history, contextual space and individual prejudice of every 
reader of the text. Although the descriptions of the youths, the soup, the house and all the 
other objects depicted by the representation are not comprehensive, they remain as labels, 
a potentiality that each depiction implies within the understanding of each addressee. 
Such substitutions may contain instances of referentiality, yet are equally exposed to the 
workings of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity, particularly in an encounter with textual 
representation which is dependent upon individual re-formulation and conceptualisation.
The difficulty with the notion of writing as supplementarity is the suggestion that it is 
little more than a substitute for authenticity, or, as Rousseau suggests, a “mediated 
representation of thought” (Derrida 1974: 144). The logic of supplementarity is not 
merely the substitution of language for actuality; it is the possibility of language itself, 
the condition for representation, and the inescapable dissolution of any ‘frame’ or 
‘boundary’ or ‘meaning’ that the writer may assume – the author can always say “more, 
less, or something other than what he ‘would mean’” (1974: 158). Supplementarity is 
therefore the confusion of signifier with signified, the association of the object or event 
with its textual representation, that results in the valorisation of a text: “Writing is 
dangerous from the moment that representation there claims to be presence and the sign 
of the thing itself. And there is a fatal necessity, inscribed in the very functioning of the 
sign, that the substitute make one forget the vicariousness of its own function and make 
itself pass for the plenitude of a speech whose deficiency and infirmity it nevertheless 
only supplements” (Derrida 1974: 144). Whatever Nontuthuzelo (if such an individual 
actually existed as a living person) understands by the representation, whatever Krog 
understands by it, or whatever the reader may understand by the language and content of 
the extract: these may all be verifiable within the framework of an actual historical event, 
as well as with reference to personal comprehension and interpretation of the event. 
However, no meaning is absolute, and no analysis can encompass a totality of 
interpretation regarding the denotations within the text. Any attempt to do so is to impose 
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meaning upon a text, and to ignore the differential network of language: pure meaning 
“would not be, from the outset, in the position of a signifier, would not be inscribed in the 
relational and differential tissue which would make of it, from the outset, a referral, a 
trace, a gram, a spacing. It could be shown that metaphysics has always consisted in 
attempting to uproot the presence of meaning, in whatever guise, from différance” 
(Derrida 1981c: 32). Yet how does this notion of différance provide the means of 
signification for textual representation?
Denotation may imply supplementarity, but rather than allowing for a complete or 
definitive representation of the object or event, it is both disrupted by, and added to, by 
the supplement, so that a definitive signification through representation is ultimately 
unattainable. Linked to this notion of supplementarity is the idea of différance.12 Both 
differing and deferring, différance is not so much a concept as an instability implicit in 
any text which challenges any absolute or universal interpretations of the text; meaning is 
permanently deferred, and not subject to any extralinguistic reference: rather it is subject 
to its difference from other meanings and interpretations, regardless of the factual or 
fictional status of the narrative. Meaning can never be fundamentally accessible, present, 
or self-constituted: “It is because of différance that the movement of signification is 
possible only if each so-called present element, each element appearing on the scene of 
presence, is related to something other than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark 
of a past element, and already letting itself be vitiated by the mark of its relation to a 
future element, this trace being related no less to what is called the future than to what is 
called the past, and constituting what is called the present by means of this very relation 
to what it is not” (Derrida 1982: 13). The potential signification of any text (including 
both the extract from Country of my Skull and the text in its entirety) is subject to 
supplementarity and différance: a deconstruction that will be both a feature and an 
example of the limitless possibilities of (re)interpretation resulting from future 
(re)readings. To represent may be to substitute or to supplement; but as even Plato is 
subject to infinite reinterpretation (and rewriting), as Derrida demonstrates in his 
12 Although the term “notion” is misleading: Derrida has claimed in the essay “Diffrance” that it is that 
“which is not a name, which is not a pure nominal unity, and unceasingly dislocates itself in a chain of 
differing and deferring and substitutions” (Derrida 1982a: 26).
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discussion of memory, speech and writing in Plato’s Pharmacy (1981a), so every text 
(including the oeuvre of Derrida himself) will be subject to both the reinterpretation and 
the re-evaluation that are implicit in the open-ended chain of meaning enforced by the 
implications of diffrance and supplementarity.13
3.3 Means of expression
This definition necessitates a consideration of the nature of expression, and how this is 
relevant to representation. Firstly, as Goodman claims (1976: 85-87), representation is 
distinguishable from expression: one difference between the two is that representation is 
of objects or events, while expression is of feelings or other properties. Although both are 
instances of denotation, the one denotes the concrete, while the other denotes the abstract. 
Expression is more likely to be suggestive than imitative, and as a result is often more 
emotionally immediate than descriptive or mimetic representation. Additionally, 
expression is typically only connected to the object by convention: “Whereas almost 
anything can denote or even represent almost anything else, a thing can express only 
what belongs but did not originally belong to it. The difference between expression and 
literal exemplification, like the difference between more and less literal representation, is 
a matter of habit” (Goodman 1976: 89). Expression may also suggest the validation, 
through language, of pre-conceived notions.14 An example of this can be observed in the 
experience of dramatic tragedy, in which the genres and conventions of the Western 
tradition ingrained in the consciousness of the Western spectator will often preclude any 
appreciation of, for example, the conventions of Japanese Noh theatre. 
13 As an introduction to his critique of Plato, Derrida discusses the widely differing evaluations of the 
Phaedrus within the Platonic canon. Such multiplicity of interpretation is an indication of the shifting 
nature of canonicity and the impossibility of presence: “We are speaking of the Phaedrus that was obliged 
to wait almost twenty-five centuries before anyone gave up the idea that it was a badly composed dialogue. 
It was first believed that Plato was too young to do the thing right … in 1905 [this view] was reversed, not 
in order to bring about a recognition of the excellent composition of the Phaedrus but in order to attribute 
its faults this time to the senile impotence of the author” (Derrida 1981a: 66-7). 
14 This has resonance with the paradox of singularity, in which each reading “would consist in giving 
oneself up to the most idiomatic aspects of the work while also taking account of the historical context, of 
what is shared (in the sense of both participation and division, of continuity and the cut of separation), of 
what belongs to genre and type” (Attridge 1992a: 68).
31
The means by which representation and expression – the concrete and the abstract – are 
juxtaposed, determines to a significant extent the style of writing that will dominate a 
particular narrative. In the extract quoted above, expression is subordinate to 
representation – the text is both unembellished and unemotional in its account of the 
represented occurrence. Only two utterances entail expression. Firstly, an expression of 
trepidation and of imminent suffering is suggested by the words “do not cry, 
Nontuthuzelo”. Secondly, an intersubjective evocation of the consequences of the 
impending hostility and fear is evident in the descriptions of the youths surrounding the 
house, the consequent stone-throwing, and the explicit threat in the sentence “Let the spy 
die”. However Krog, as the author of a textual representation, is required by the 
limitations of language to use “more or less literal representations” in order to create the 
degree of expression required in the text, and the choice of descriptive style is what may
be termed the aestheticisation of the narrative. 
It is such aestheticisation that is often used to create a more literary effect through a 
reliance on figurative rather than literal language, and this is not confined to fictional 
texts.15 Most realist fiction relies on assumptions of resemblance and reference in the 
attempt to recreate a plausible state of affairs through the deliberate avoidance of an 
excess of metaphorical representation. Yet the ideal of an objective and purely 
descriptive realist narrative (fictional or non-fictional) is unsustainable owing to the 
iterability of the text, as well as because of the intersubjective determination of 
interpretations of representation and expression. It has been asserted that, even more than 
the representation of objects and/or events, the representation of emotions and expression 
is conventionally determined. For example, Goodman cites Aldous Huxley’s claim that 
“the artistic expression of [emotions] varies from age to age and from one country to 
another. We are brought up to accept the conventions current in the society into which we 
are born … Such conventions vary with great rapidity, even in the same country” 
(Goodman 1976: 90). To represent – or to experience a representation of – expression is 
unavoidably to remain confined within a socio-cultural paradigm determined by 
15 The unsustainability of the dichotomy between conventional notions of fact and fiction will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
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convention and intersubjectivity, although this also applies to the representation of 
objects. As the textual representation of expression is more constrained by such 
limitations than the textual representation of events, a degree of aestheticisation and 
metaphoricity is both necessary and unavoidable when attempting to put into words 
emotions and expressions.
3.4 Exemplification
In his reading of Derrida’s reading of Rousseau, Paul de Man writes that “[W]hat is being 
said about the nature of language makes it unavoidable that the texts should be written in 
the form of a fictionally diachronic narrative, or if one prefers to call it so, of an allegory. 
The allegorical mode is accounted for in the description of all language as figural” (De 
Man 1983: 135). However, despite the commonplace assertion that representations of 
expression are more figurative, whereas the descriptive representation of events or 
objects is more literal, it is more often the case that the latter is equally dependent upon a 
figurative style. This leads in turn to the claim that all representation is figurative, owing 
to the limitations of language that prevent it from encapsulating that which is denoted.16
As figurative implies not literal, it is constructive to consider representation as more than 
merely a substitute: rather, representation exemplifies or typifies that which it denotes. 
Exemplification is an important feature of representation, as it is a mode of symbolisation 
that labels a representation: “while anything may be denoted, only labels may be 
exemplified” (Goodman 1976: 53). To exemplify is to illustrate by example, or to serve 
as an example of something; to typify is to embody the characteristics of what is 
represented. For instance, the representation of the serial killer Patrick Bateman in Ellis’s 
American Psycho (Ellis 1991) both exemplifies the individual as sadist (which is in itself 
a label), as well as typifying the properties of sadism, cruelty and lack of empathy that 
necessarily characterise such an individual.
16 For example, in “White Mythology”, Derrida argues for the dependence of philosophical texts upon 
hidden or ignored metaphors: “Metaphor is less in the philosophical text (and in the rhetorical text 
coordinated with it) than the philosophical text is in the metaphor. And the latter can no longer receive its 
name from metaphysics, except by a catachresis, if you will, that would retrace metaphor through its 
philosophical phantom: as ‘nontrue metaphor’” (Derrida 1982b: 258). 
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Nevertheless, even this becomes too limited for the purposes of a general definition of 
representation as it implies an unrealistic reliance upon an unambiguous connection 
between an object or event and its representation. Yet, as the theory of the iterable text 
has clarified, it is neither practical nor feasible to exhaust the possibilities implicit in each 
instance of representation (even within the confines of an intersubjective conception of an 
adequate representation). For instance, consider the following sentence from the extract 
quoted above: “We went to the kitchen and put the beans in the pot”. This is a reasonably 
intelligible utterance that records a commonplace occurrence. Yet the sentence cannot be 
an exemplification of the event as it is necessarily constrained in its exhibition of the 
characteristics of that event. As it stands, it is no more than a vague connotation of 
kitchen as a place where the beans and the pot would be kept. In order to exhibit the 
characteristics of that particular kitchen, the representation would need to be both 
extended and clarified. The label “kitchen” may exemplify the thought a reader has of his 
or her own experience of a kitchen; yet as far as the kitchen in the extract is concerned, 
any exemplification or typification of it must of necessity be re-interpreted and 
superseded by the experience of the reader – the representation of the text (which in this 
case is no more than a label) is insufficient in isolation, and subject to a multiplicity of 
inconsistent senses. The idea of a kitchen would evoke different images and expectations 
in the mind of such varying readers as a chef, a cleaner, a housewife, and an architect. All 
these (and all other) conceptions of the kitchen in the extract would be legitimate 
inferences as to its connotation, yet no single conception could encapsulate that 
connotation. Only a specific socio-cultural context of the narrative could potentially limit 
the possible denotations of kitchen.
Therefore, exemplification can effectively be understood as a reference relating the 
denotation to what is denoted, while the latter remains subordinate to an infinite number 
of possible sites of intersubjective interpretation. The text offers the possibility of 
interpretation and, simultaneously, the impossibility of a plenitude of interpretation. This
concurrence is what Blanchot has recognised as the two-sidedness of the text: on the one 
hand, the text is part of our cultural heritage, and subject to interpretation by readers and 
critics; on the other, it “speaks only in its own voice and in so doing resists our attempts 
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to conceptualise it. It invents, so to speak, a new language that exceeds the boundaries of 
our critical competence” (Haase and Large 2001: 38). In order to illustrate this 
phenomenon, Blanchot compares the text to the Biblical narrative of Lazarus, who has 
just been raised from the dead. In Blanchot’s account, the notion of the tomb becomes a 
metaphor for the isolated text, prior to the activity of interpretation. The figure of Lazarus 
then metaphorically embodies the meaning of the text. The conventional perception of 
the conclusion of the narrative is the manifestation of the resurrected Lazarus, fresh in the 
whiteness of his burial shroud: in other words, the meaning of the text that is made 
acceptable by the cultural construction of critics, readers and authors. But the resurrected 
Lazarus is also a bewildered figure, still bearing the odour of decomposition and the 
tomb, who represents the “opacity at the centre of every text, what remains after every 
interpretation, and which, like the secret of the tomb itself, refuses our grasp” (Haase and 
Large 2001: 40). 
Such opacity denies the text an ultimate interpretation: any declared meaning of 
representation necessarily leaves a lacuna which “refuses our grasp”. Interpretation is 
therefore dependent upon the functioning of representation within the text, rather than the 
text’s existing as a vehicle for representation. The various readings articulated by 
interpretations of representation are reliant upon the positioning of the iterable text within 
the socio-cultural context of the reader, rather than on the idealistic assumption that 
representation can accurately portray the world as it is. As suggested earlier, the “word” 
cannot directly represent the “thing”, but refers instead to an inestimable number of 
further words that ensure that the initial word can never reach a teleological moment of 
definitive meaning; each word ultimately points to the absence (the opacity) that is at the 
heart of language. As each word has meaning only within this chain, it follows that the 
events, ideas and objects represented by the text are sites of différance (in terms of both 
differing and deferring, thus rendering unstable any fixed meaning of any word within the 
text), the result of which is the potential for infinite (re)interpretation. In addition, 
interpretation does not only imply the possible, but also the impossible. Language 
therefore distances the reader from the immediacy of the experience: “A word may give 
me its meaning, but first it suppresses it. For me to be able to say ‘this woman’, I must 
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somehow take her flesh-and-blood reality away from her, cause her to be absent, 
annihilate her” (Blanchot 1995: 322). The reading and understanding of a text therefore 
exceeds the possible interpretations of the text, as there are always further possible 
interpretations concealed within the opacity and absence implied by iterability. As the 
metaphor of Lazarus and the tomb suggests, no individual reading can adequately 
conceptualise all the possibilities of the text – it is beyond individual critical and 
cognitive faculties to comprehend the totality of any text, and the limitations of language 
and textuality would suggest that the very proposal of such a totality is both navely 
idealistic and illusory. All that remains is the limited and limiting potentiality of 
representation within the confines of a relative contextual space. 
3.5 To Set Forth in Words
It is this relative space that forms the basis for a primary objection to the fifth definition: 
if such a multiplicity of interpretations is necessary for any instance of textual 
representation to be even partially understood, then how is it possible that any text can 
adequately “set forth in words; state or explain”? In other words, how can the inscribed 
words and sentences of a text represent anything that exists outside of the narrative? This 
difficulty can be effectively addressed only if the notion of the text is placed under 
further scrutiny. It is often asserted that the concept text goes beyond inscription, that it is 
a “literary or other work (not necessarily linguistic or verbal) stripped of preconceptions 
about autonomy, authorial control, artistic or aesthetic force, and so on” (Hawthorn 1994: 
213). This definition suggests that the term exceeds the limitations imposed by writing, 
and may refer to such diverse areas as methodological or ideological domains, discourses, 
or visual images. However, for the purposes of this discussion, “text” will be understood 
primarily in its limited sense as inscription, as instances where language has been written 
down and recorded, and thereby subjected to the potentiality of iterability.17
Such potentiality also depends upon varying estimations of the text based on factors such 
as the mode of composition (fact or fiction), the aesthetic assessment of the text, and the 
17 Notions of ideology, discourse and imagery are not ignored as a result of this limitation, but will be 
acknowledged as contextual components of the iterable written text.
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ethical implications of both the interpretation and the evaluation of the content of the 
narrative. These issues will be examined in more detail in the following chapters. What is 
important at this point is to clarify the necessary function of context within the 
interpretation of the text – “there is nothing outside context” (Derrida 1988: 136). Even 
the characters mentioned in the extract cited above, while having verifiably existed as 
historically situated individuals, become textual representations subject to 
(re)interpretation within varying contextual fields that locate the intersubjective attitudes 
of various readers, most of whom will not even know what these individuals looked like.
The result is differences of perception that are frequently diametrically opposed in terms 
of ideology and cultural expectation. For example, one of the characters mentioned is 
Steve Biko. For the right-wing Afrikaner nationalist, Biko represents the dangers of 
Black emancipation; for the black African Nationalist, he is the symbol of defiance in the 
face of racial oppression. Yet for the narrator, Nontuthuzelo, the figure of Biko becomes 
not so much representative of a political position as the catalyst for a perspective on the 
murder of her uncle (although she will also have a particular political perspective on 
Biko)
Each interpretation of each representation, although contextually valid, cannot result in 
the encapsulation of the individuals denoted. Rather, any denotation becomes 
supplemented by language and connotations that serve further to remove the 
representation from the extralinguistic object it purports to represent, and to place it 
within the infinite chain of language. The text becomes subject to the accumulations of 
memory and meaning implicit in every word within what Derrida refers to as “arche-
writing”: “Writing supplements perception before perception even appears to itself [is 
conscious of itself]. ‘Memory’ or writing is the opening of that process of appearance 
itself. The ‘perceived’ may be read only in the past, beneath perception and after it” 
(Royle 2003: 64). To define any word it is necessary to rely on other words, which in turn 
require definition by yet more words, in an unlimited sequence of traces of deferred 
meaning.
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Another issue that needs to be addressed when considering representation as a “setting 
forth in words” is that of aestheticisation. It is clear, for example, that a sentence such as 
“This is the light of the mind, cold and planetary”18 is not the type of sentence likely to be 
encountered in the reading of a factual text such as a news report or a historical reference 
book. The result is that some thinkers have proposed a clear difference between a so-
called “literary language” and everyday speech. However, it does not seem persuasive to 
argue for such a distinction, even when the argument is grounded upon issues of 
interpretation rather than aestheticisation. Any representation, be it fictional or factual, is 
necessarily an aesthetic representation which, owing to the limits of language and the 
pervasiveness of metaphor, is interpreted through individual (inter)subjective 
perspectives. Figuration necessarily permeates all language – the literary, the everyday, 
even the scientific – yet is readily understood, if not always recognised: “It is obvious 
that this sort of thing is possible only if these uses are somehow derivative from uses in 
established senses … We can distinguish different types of figurative use in terms of the 
basis of derivation” (Alston 1964: 96). It is the position of this study that aestheticisation 
is implicit within any text, subject only to differences of degree rather than a distinction 
between literary and non-literary methods of writing. The implications of this position for 
the interpretation of a text will be explored in some detail in the following chapter.
4. A Definition of Representation
To summarise: Representation must necessarily have some reference to the 
extralinguistic world; however, such reference is preliminary, incomplete and 
(inter)subjective, with no single theory of meaning so comprehensive as to exclude all 
others. In addition, any text as representation must be iterable – subject to repeatability in 
numerous contexts – and subject to the internal workings of différance and 
supplementarity. As a result of these conclusions, it is feasible to propose a working 
definition of representation that will form the basis for the following enquiry into the 
textual representation of violence. Thus, 
18 Sylvia Plath: “The Moon and the Yew Tree” (Selected Poems 1985: 41)
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Textual representation is the iterable, contingent and context-
dependent denotation of extralinguistic objects, events, properties and 
notions in the form of written language, such representation being 
subject to infinite (re) interpretation.
If this definition is plausible, then it necessitates two principal suppositions. Firstly, the 
definition implies the neutral character of the text; that is, any perceived difference 
between a text that is factual and a text that is wholly or partially fictional is based on 
little more than intersubjective and conventional determinations of interpretation and 
context. This first supposition implies the second – that any meaning of a text is 
inseparable from the reader’s perception and interpretation of that text. The effect of 
these two hypotheses is that the reception of a text is governed less by any intrinsic worth 
of the text than by the changeable and changing perceptions that determine the evaluation 
(ethical and/or aesthetic) that results from reading any instance of writing. It is within this 
framework of representation that the distinction between factual and fictional writing as 
textual representation can be analysed and questioned in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 3
THE POTENTIAL READER
A principal premise of this study is that any instance of representation is necessarily 
iterable. A consequence of this iterability for a theory of reading is that any text can 
acquire cognitive and aesthetic value only once experienced by a reader contextually 
situated within a particular historical and cultural milieu. It is therefore necessary to 
explore the implications of the notion of the “reader”, as well as considering the role of 
that reader in the process of interpreting textual representation. Much of the following
discussion is dependent upon the influence of reader-response theory, in which the reader 
is considered as to be any person within a specific contextual field who, through the act 
of reading, is able to establish a possible meaning (not the meaning) of that particular 
text. Reader-response theory is not a distinct school of thought, but rather a convenient 
label for a number of different theories which frequently differ with regard to the 
relationship between the reader and the text. It is consequently necessary to clarify the 
parameters of what is understood by a reader in terms of this particular study. 
1. The Reader
The first notion that needs to be elucidated is the significance of the term reader. For the 
purposes of this study, a reader (and this notion includes the Derridean notion of reader-
as-writer as discussed in the previous chapter) will be considered as an abstract or 
hypothetical entity, the potential individual/s to whom the narrative is directed, and the 
ultimate interpreter of the textual representation.1 The advantage of this is that a reader 
can be conjectured without reference to a specific context, thereby allowing for a general 
rather than limited understanding of reading and representation. However, theories 
involving abstraction can result in the postulation of a reader who is relevant for one 
1 The notion of the reader includes the Derridean notion of reader-as-writer as discussed in the previous 
chapter: “One must then, in a single gesture, but doubled, read and write” (1981a: 64).
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particular theorist at a particular moment, and who may therefore be little more than the 
projection of that critic’s perceptions of the ideal reader. Any notion of the reader 
assumed for the purposes of this study must consequently be hypothetical, but must also 
attempt to avoid unrealistic assertions of universality. Therefore, prior to any 
consideration of the characteristics of such an abstract entity, it is instructive to consider 
other instances of the hypothetical reader. 
An influential model of the hypothetical reader is that postulated by Wolfgang Iser2 – the 
“implied reader”: “This term incorporates both the prestructuring of the potential 
meaning by the text, and the reader’s actualization of this potential through the reading 
process. It refers to the active nature of this process – which will vary historically from 
one age to another – and not to a typology of possible readers” (Iser 1974: xii). Iser 
asserts that any narrative inevitably consists not only of the words of the text, but also 
includes omissions and gaps which must be completed or filled in by the implied reader, 
within the context of his or her own experiences, prejudices and socio-cultural context. 
Only after such filling in has occurred can the narrative be considered to have any 
meaning for that reader. In this sense, Iser is akin to Derrida in emphasising the necessity 
of context for textual interpretation, although Derrida’s claim that “there is nothing 
outside context” (1988: 136) exceeds the limits of Iser’s cognition of the role of 
contextuality in the act of reading. In addition, despite conceding the possibility of 
infinite re-interpretation, Iser maintains the primacy of the author in directing the 
conditions for understanding his or her text; his notion of the “prestructuring of the 
potential meaning by the text” quoted above diverges significantly from Derrida’s 
emphasis on the potential for a re-creation of meaning following every reading of the 
iterable text. As suggested in the previous chapter, the author, perceived as one reader 
amongst a theoretically infinite number of readers, does not possess any authoritative 
interpretive ability or privilege with regard to his or her own text. 
2 “Iser is, in short, a phenomenon: he is influential without being controversial, and at a moment when 
everyone is choosing up sides, he seems to be on no one side at all or (it amounts to the same thing) on 
every side at once” (Fish: “Why No One’s Afraid of Wolfgang Iser” diacritics 11.1 (1981: 2). 
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Other notions of the reader similar to that of the implied reader include the “inscribed 
reader” and the “postulated reader”.3 The former is a reader who is presumed by the text, 
rather than marked in it, and consequently discovered only by investigating the context of 
the text when it was written. However, an iterable text is that which is singularly re-
interpreted by each reader in a variety of contexts, rather than a text whose significance is 
predetermined at the origin of its composition. If such predetermination were possible, it 
would serve to privilege both the author and the origin of the narrative, thereby 
contradicting the notion of iterability, as well as the postmodern denial of the originary 
author-function. As a result, the intended reader theory will not be considered here. The 
relevance of the postulated reader, however, is not implied through a study of the text; 
rather, the characteristics of such a reader actually serve to create the text. This theory is 
proposed by Stanley Fish, who claims that the informed reader – one with the necessary 
linguistic, social and semantic competencies – is the reader best able to locate meaning in 
the text, although only within the constraints of an “interpretive community” which is 
characterised by shared conventions and normative practice. While a reader equipped 
with such competencies is required for any reading, there exist two major difficulties with 
this theory. Firstly, any assumption of the reader’s characteristics implies an imposition 
on the part of the critic; and secondly, the degree of competency required to read a text is 
disputable, as is the resulting hierarchy of interpretation based on competing claims to 
interpretive authority.4
As a result of such objections to the various theories regarding the hypothetical reader, it 
is preferable to reformulate the notion. Rather than an implied, intended or postulated 
reader – all of which refer to the author or critic’s ideal of a reader – it is perhaps more 
apposite to refer to a potential reader. A potential reader does not imply an ideal reading, 
in the sense that such a reading is able to generate a decisive interpretation. In addition, 
such a reader is not limited to any particular textual category or genre. The assumption of 
such a hypothetical reader re-emphasises the inevitability of iterability: “What I am 
suggesting is that formal units are always a function of the interpretive model one brings 
3 Hawthorn 1994: 165-168 discusses various theories of reading, including both the postulated and the 
intended reader.
4 Eagleton (1983: 54ff) provides a critique of this hierarchy in the work of both Iser and Fish.
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to bear; they are not ‘in’ the text” (Fish 1980: 163). Even if a text is read within the 
framework of the formal and linguistic fundamentals of the narrative (what Roman 
Ingarden calls the skeleton, and Iser the primary code)5 which allow for the filling in the 
gaps left by the unavoidable openness of any representation, the narrative is equally
subject to re-interpretation within differing contexts. It is these gaps in the text, the 
absences implied by the words as inscribed in the narrative, that establish the possibility 
of re-interpreting the text. The potential reader is therefore not a reader who will conform 
to the formal properties or genre of only one type of text (such as literature, factual 
writing or popular fiction), nor one who is limited to a particular historical era or 
contextual perspective. Rather, such a reader will be receptive to differing modes of 
textuality, as well as being potentially situated in differing temporal and historical 
contexts. Consequently, there will be a theoretically infinite number of potential readers, 
corresponding to the theoretically infinite number of interpretations of an iterable text. 
2. The Reader and the Text
Although an abstract hypothesis, the potential reader is latent within any text that is 
accessible for reading. Any person with the ability to comprehend a written description –
in other words, a person possessing the competencies suggested by Fish’s informed 
reader – will also be capable of interpreting that text. That each interpretation is 
determined by differing individual and social contexts suggests infinite possible readings 
of the same text. However, this does not imply that every text will acquire a wholly new 
and different meaning each time it is read. As the personal reading and experience of a 
text is contextual in a social, as well as in an individual, framework, the prevalence of 
inter-subjectivity – the conditioning of a community of people through historical, cultural 
and political conventions – creates the conditions for corresponding textual 
interpretations. Fish’s observations on inter-subjectivity may refer specifically to the 
notion of literature, but in terms of the potential reader his comments are relevant to the 
reading of all texts: “The conclusion … is that it is the reader who ‘makes’ literature. 
5 Jefferson and Robey 1986: 126ff.
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This sounds like the rankest subjectivism, but it is qualified almost immediately when the 
reader is identified not as a free agent, making literature in any old way, but as a member 
of a community whose assumptions about literature determine the kind of attention he 
pays and thus the kind of literature ‘he’ makes” (Fish 1980: 11). This differs from 
Derrida’s notion of the free play of signs in that the framework of the interpretive 
community, as postulated by Fish, is more limited and limiting in its assumption of the 
function of language. Derrida does not deny the role that an inter-subjective community 
can play in the interpretation of texts, but he also sees the text (and hence the 
interpretation of the text) as “overrunning” the limits of the community: “Thus the text 
overruns all the limits assigned to it so far (not submerging or drowning them in an 
undifferentiated homogeneity, but rather making them more complex, dividing and 
multiplying strokes and lines) – all the limits, everything that was to be set up in 
opposition to writing (speech, life, the world, the real, history, and what not, every field 
of reference – to body or mind, conscious or unconscious, politics, economics, and so 
forth)” (Derrida 1979: 257).   
Bearing in mind this textual and interpretive overrun, differing interpretative 
communities will necessarily construct various inter-subjective interpretations of the 
same text, without there being any formal or linguistic modification of the text. For 
example, James Fenimore Cooper’s novel The Deerslayer, written in 1841, became one 
of the most popular novels of the nineteenth century, thus influencing generations of 
readers’ opinions regarding the conflict between the British and the French in the 
wilderness of North America in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Although the 
characters and events are highly stylised, it was based upon contemporary popular and 
romanticised assumptions of life on the frontier, and generally considered to be an 
accurate representation. The supposition by the readership of a verifiable and directly 
referential description allowed the textual representation to be taken literally, rather than 
as a narrative that served to confirm contemporary assumptions of cultural, moral and 
racial supremacy. Yet in the introduction to the American Wordsworth edition of the 
novel published in 1995, Hilary Soames reacts to such an interpretation with outrage: 
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A reader coming to The Deerslayer in the 1990s must simply grit the teeth, count to 
ten, and implore historical relativism for mercy. So much of what has proved lethal in 
American life is encapsulated in this hero, Natty Bumppo. Scarcely a chapter goes by 
in which he doesn’t parade both racial and sexual superiority in some egregious 
manner and, of course, with the best intentions. After all, white men have their ‘gifts’, 
as Natty calls them. Which is not to say he does not acknowledge the ‘gifts’ that 
belong to ‘red-skins’ or ‘females’. It is just that Natty’s ‘gifts’ are the ones that 
always prevail” 
(Cooper 1995: i). 
It is improbable, given the intersubjective context of the time, that many white European 
or American readers of the novel in the 1840s would have experienced or interpreted the 
text in a manner analogous to Soames. This serves to highlight the importance of the 
context in which an interpretation of an iterable context is undertaken. Soames’s criticism 
of the text may highlight contemporary concerns with political and gender issues either 
ignored or not recognised by the novel’s original readership. However, her views, 
compelling and persuasive as they may be within her own intersubjective interpretive
community, cannot be considered as a definitive reading of the text.
Of course, it is not necessarily the case that all present-day readers of the novel would 
interpret it as she has done. The inter-subjectivity that is implicit in the readings of 
critical discourse is often understood in a different manner from the inter-subjectivity of 
popular discourse. This implies that the literary-critical community is likely to have 
differing inter-subjective assumptions from readers of popular fiction. For example, 
Janice Radway suggests (in a study of the Book-of-the-Month clubs) that the reading 
strategies and interpretations of women who read such texts do not correspond to the 
ways in which they were assumed to have been read by academics, and that this has 
implications for the continuing divide between the academy and the general reading 
public: “[W]hat has appeared as intellectual warfare over aesthetic issues has actually 
been a dispute over the exercise of cultural authority” (Radway 1992: 514). Therefore it 
must be recognised that various readings may be considered irrelevant, or even flawed, 
by different types of readers in differing inter-subjective communities. Although the 
dominant discourse will assume interpretive authority, the notion of the potential reader 
rejects assumptions of infallibility, instead acknowledging that any reader may at any
time interpret a text within the framework of competing conventions, even though any 
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individual reader will not be able to take account of more than a few of those competing 
conventions.6
The notion of the potential reader is related to the theories of Fish, whose own
assumptions of the role of the reader within an interpretive community presuppose a 
similar inter-subjectivity. However, it must be emphasised that this relationship is 
necessarily qualified, owing to certain reservations regarding two assumptions implicit in 
Fish’s theory. Firstly, Fish maintains that a reader, in order to create meaning, in effect 
invents the physical text. The text can no longer be considered as an depository of 
meaning, or an objective authority, and is not even an object in its own right: “The 
objectivity of the text is an illusion and, moreover, a dangerous illusion, because it is so 
physically convincing. The illusion is one of self-sufficiency and completeness” (Fish 
1980: 43). Secondly, Fish proposes that the reader is always reading a set of personal 
presuppositions back into the text, and as a consequence the reader will always interpret 
the text in a manner predetermined by those same presuppositions: thus, “reading … 
consists of nothing but replications of independently existing collective interpretive 
strategies” (Lang 2005: 3). However, it is more plausible to consider that all readings
have the potential to re-formulate existing ideas into innovative conceptual thinking. To 
imply, as Fish does, that a text can only confirm what a reader already knows – thus 
negating the possibility of developing or modifying knowledge and understanding – fails 
to acknowledge the probability of new or altered perceptions (and the acquisition of facts 
of which the reader was previously unaware) that is frequently actualised through the 
reading of an iterable text by a potential reader. It also tends to limit the possibilities of 
both language and context, whereas the differential network of language within fluid 
contextual fields allows for infinite re-interpretation of iterable texts, something not 
possible in the closed cognitive system of language postulated by Fish. 
6 Such interpretive freedom results in the related topic of the micro-narrative (minority discourses contrary 
to the conventions of the dominant discourse), and the related problem of relativism. These problems will 
be discussed fully in the next chapter. However, the existence of such problems does not negate the 
efficacy of the potential reader in determining individual meaning through inter-subjective interpretation.  
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Therefore, if an instance of textual representation is, as argued in the previous chapter, 
iterable, contingent and context-dependent, then it is obvious that the interpretations of 
that text will be determined by both socio-cultural factors and the differential nature of 
language, rather than by any transcendent notions of aesthetic evaluation. In order so to 
interpret the text, there must exist a potential reader, who may be defined as follows: 
A hypothetical reader who may be regarded as any historical, 
contemporary or future interpreter of an iterable and contextual 
instance of writing.
Without such a reader to read the iterable text, the narrative remains without 
signification: “A span of writing is worth nothing in itself; it is neither good nor bad, 
neither true nor false” (Derrida 1981b: 185). Any text, rather than existing as an absolute 
and solitary locus of meaning, is present as potential signification within the intertextual 
system of texts and configurations of signs. The potential reader who reads and interprets 
this text is necessarily entering into this system or network. Therefore, following from 
these conclusions regarding the notion of the relationship between the potential reader 
and the iterable text, it is now feasible to consider the implications of differing modes of 
textuality for the aesthetic and ethical evaluation of textual representation. 
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CHAPTER 4
FACTUAL REPRESENTATION
As Hamlet observes: “for there is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so” 
(II.ii.249-50), a comment that may reflect (and encourage) moral and aesthetic relativism, 
but which encapsulates the difficulties intrinsic to the acknowledgment of the iterability 
of the text and its subsequent unlimited re-interpretation. The dilemma facing a 
postmodern conception of textuality is that, if there are an infinite number of possible 
interpretations, then it would be inconsistent to privilege some at the expense of others;
however, there also exist certain points-of-view that are divergent from, or even hostile 
to, the dominant narrative (referred to as micro-narratives), and which may be considered 
ethically and socially insupportable.1 However, if textual evaluation is dependent upon 
context, then even the aesthetic and ethical potential of these objectionable micro-
narratives need to be critically considered. Before discussing the ethical evaluation of a 
text, however, it is necessary to discuss the contextual interpretation of a text, and this is 
largely dependent upon the reader’s expectations regarding the authenticity and/or 
veracity of an iterable text situated within the intertextual system of texts and 
configuration of signification discussed in the previous chapter.
1. Factuality and Fictionality
When reading a text, the common expectation of the reader will be that the text will 
belong to one of two broad categories, either the factual or the fictional. The former is 
typically understood as being representative of a state of affairs that obtains or has 
obtained in the world, and that is consequently verifiable. The latter is typically 
considered to be without any concrete denotation of verifiable historical events and 
1 These could include Holocaust denial, racism, xenophobia, and various forms of religious 
fundamentalism, to name but a few.
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personages; a fictional text is consequently considered to be an invented state of affairs. 
Yet both views tend to presuppose an absolute state of factuality or fictionality which is 
difficult to sustain when the representation of the text is more closely scrutinised. 
Regarding the factual (or non-fictional) text, the necessary limitations of language 
preclude any narrative from being wholly factual owing to the inevitable contextual
plurality that is crucial to any (re)reading of an iterable text. Additionally, any 
unqualified references to an external actuality within the textual descriptions of a so-
called factual text are destabilised by the aestheticising effects of figurative language, as 
no such reference could ever occur in a purely literal fashion. Conversely, it is equally 
erroneous to categorise a text as purely fictional, thus denying it a verifiable extra-textual 
reference: no text or narrative can be wholly imaginary. A sentence can produce 
cognition within the consciousness of its reader only if it can be understood within the 
limits of the experiences of that reader. No text can be understood (and thus interpreted) 
without a sufficient prior knowledge that allows for a contextualisation and positioning of 
that sentence within a certain socio-cultural and linguistic framework (even if that 
framework is removed from its original context). All reading is subject to differing 
perspectives, and is dependent upon subjective or intersubjective experience. For 
instance, a science-fiction novel set in the distant future that postulates entities and 
objects that are physically and intellectually incompatible with the daily existence of the 
reader can be understood only in terms of that reader’s prior knowledge. It is possible to 
describe something that does not exist, but the individual elements that make up the 
description must be recognisable to the reader in order for cognition to be possible.2
Consequently, it can be asserted that there can be no text that is wholly factual, nor can 
there be a text that is wholly fictional. Rather, all texts necessarily include certain 
elements of both factuality and fictionality, with one or the other type being dominant 
2 This is a notion long recognized in philosophy. For example, Hobbes in Leviathan (1651) writes of 
imagination that “simple imagination [is] when one imagineth a man, or horse, which he hath seen before. 
The other is Compounded; as when from the sight of man at one time, and of a horse at another, we 
conceive in our mind a Centaure” (2005: 10). Similarly, in 1739 Hume writes of “fables and romances”, 
wherein “[n]ature there is totally confounded, and nothing mention’d but winged horses, fiery dragons, and 
monstrous giants. Nor will this liberty of the fancy appear strange, when we consider, that all our ideas are 
copy’d from our impressions” (2005: 7). 
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with respect to the genre or the style employed.3 This chapter will therefore be divided 
into two sections. The first will concentrate on the strategies and assumptions that are 
inherent in the production of the factual text; the second on those inherent in the fictional 
text. 
2. The Factual Text
2.1 Factual Representation 
The first question to be investigated concerns the conditions necessary for the 
construction of a factual text, and whether or not such a text can properly be said to exist. 
This question is fundamental as any text that purports to be wholly factual necessarily 
presupposes a number of conditions. In the first place, such a text is required to refer to 
an extralinguistic event that has occurred in the past. Such an event may have occurred 
earlier today, or in a previous year, or even centuries ago. In this sense, every instance of 
factual writing is simultaneously an instance of historical writing, a “series of 
propositions which are supposed to correspond point by point to some extra-textual 
domain of occurrence or happening” (White 1978: 122). Secondly, in order for a textual 
representation of an occurrence to be considered factual, such an occurrence must also be 
sufficiently verifiable: it must be known to have occurred, or be subject to empirical 
and/or scientific evidence that will prove that it has actually occurred. Thirdly, the text 
should be an attempt to represent that event as it happened. That is, it should avoid 
fictional representations (or representational strategies) that co-mingle with any strategies 
of factual representation. 
The latter condition therefore entails the (unsustainable) proviso that any historical 
narrative must be composed in a style that avoids aestheticising language – a language 
that relies on figurative strategies and is thereby subject to charges of a subjective 
distortion of the facts which form the basis of the representation. Derived from 
3 It will also be necessary to consider the many texts in which the balance between the two modes is 
deliberately constructed so as to be less obvious, with neither fact nor fiction being the dominant mode: 
such texts as the historical novel, the projected scenario, the factional text, and the narrative that juxtaposes 
historical figures and events with fictional characters and occurrences
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nineteenth-century historiography, this stipulation was a result of the imperative that the 
historian (or any writer of factual discourse) should “expunge any hint of the fictive, or 
merely imaginable, from his discourse, to eschew the techniques of the poet and orator, 
and to forego what were regarded as the intuitive procedures of the maker of fictions in 
his apprehension of reality” (White 1978: 123). The author must not only be disinterested 
– free of any prejudice, bias and socio-cultural positioning – but also competent to 
compose a narrative that will convey that state of disinterestedness to any reader who 
reads the text in the future. Yet, as was concluded in the previous chapter, language is 
both ambiguous and self-referential, and no interpretation can exist outside context. The
attempt to draw a sharp distinction between the literal and the metaphorical must 
necessarily fail owing to the fact that language can be explicated only within the terms of 
further metaphoricity within the endless differential network of words. To claim that a 
factual text has meaning without recourse to metaphor is merely to ignore the metaphors
that determine the representation: “Henceforth the entire teleology of meaning, which 
constructs the philosophical concept of metaphor, coordinates metaphor with the 
manifestation of truth, with the production of truth as presence without veil, with the 
reappropriation of a full language without syntax, with the vocation of a pure 
nomination” (Derrida 1982b: 270).
Such a “manifestation of truth” – the principle of an absolute factuality – therefore 
remains both unfeasible and idealistic. Yet it is unclear exactly how much of language 
can be considered tropic. Derrida seems to suggest that all language, and hence all 
textuality, is little more than a succession of tropes. Yet a subtler interpretation of his
argument is that it is not so much that tropes are deliberately employed in a text, but 
rather that they are both pervasive and inevitable, to the extent that the entire narrative 
may be metaphorical without a reader’s perceiving it as such. The result is a text that 
presupposes a manifestation of authority and immediacy, but is in fact reliant on the 
representations of (obsolete) metaphors that are no longer familiar to the reader
(including the author-as-reader). This phenomenon was recognised by Nietzsche as one 
of the principal motivations for the assumption of a transcendental and universal truth: 
“Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have 
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become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which lost their 
embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins” (Nietzsche 1873: 
118). If Nietzsche is justified in this assertion, then much of what is written, factual or 
fictional, is metaphorical, a notion that has fundamental implications for the 
understanding of textual meaning.4
Another problem with the notion of the factual text is that of the construction of the 
narrative. To construct a factual text is to reorganise the random concurrence of a myriad 
of events that make up the text of the event into a misleadingly teleological whole.5 This 
gives the impression that the event being represented was inevitable and logically 
ordered, subject to the dictates of a plot. Such reorganisation of disparate events into a 
logical whole is an instance of what White would identify as an example of a “fictional 
matrix”.6 Yet the view of history as a structured development is common, despite the 
evidence that history entrenches certain conclusions while excluding others, the latter 
becoming “mute and forever closed signs – Derrida will later speak of “cinders” –
[which] endanger history in both senses of the term: no historical enquiry can account for 
them, and they cannot be said to exist or occur in the same manner as identifiable events 
or recognisable objects” (Fenves 2001: 285). Certain events are selected from a random 
number of events and thereby privileged, while others are omitted: those that are selected 
become the basis of the factual text that serves to impose a selective meaning on history 
at the expense of those excluded. The result is what could be called a “tyranny” of 
historical discourse that imposes cognition based upon the ideology of the dominant 
discourse, as well as creating the framework for revisionary or alternative histories 
opposed to that discourse.
Yet herein lies the paradox of factual representation: owing to the volume of data 
available to the historical writer, as well as to the seemingly random disorder of the 
inestimable number of events, it is only through the selective organisation of certain 
4 The nature of metaphor will be discussed in further detail in Section 2.2 below
5 An historical event is neither immediate nor brief. This is why Ricoeur has chosen to label representations 
of historical events as “quasi-events”, brought about by the collective will of the “quasi-characters”
involved. Direct access to the event is not possible. (See Ricoeur 1984: 230ff). 
6 For example, see the discussion in White: “The Historical Text as Literary Artifact” (1978: 81-100).
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events that any meaningful narrative may be constructed. This paradox is articulated by 
Derrida’s considerations of an “a historicity of meaning” in the essay “Violence and 
Metaphysics”, in which he is compelled to defend his use of the term history: “For our 
own reference to history, here, is only contextual. The economy of which we are 
speaking does not any longer accommodate the concept of history such as it has always 
functioned, and which it is difficult, if not impossible, to lift from its teleological or 
eschatological horizon” (Derrida 1978a: 148). Each factual (historical) text must 
therefore be considered to be re-contextualised by teleogical boundaries within the 
fictional matrix of narrative, as a pre-condition of its own meaning. Even texts that offer 
seemingly random impressions, testimonies or events cannot avoid the limiting structure 
of the implied historical narrative, nor escape the interpretation of the historian: “A 
historical narrative is thus necessarily a mixture of adequately and inadequately explained 
events, a congeries of established and inferred facts, at once a representation that is an 
interpretation and an interpretation that passes for an explanation of the whole process 
mirrored in the narrative” (White 1978: 51). It is therefore within this limiting narrative 
structure that the notion of the factual text will be considered.
In order to illustrate these conclusions, consider the following extract taken from Antony 
Beevor’s narrative of the fall of Berlin at the end of the Second World War. The claims 
of the narrative are based on verifiable historical events, thereby classifying the text as 
factual. Nevertheless, certain fictional strategies and linguistic limitations ensure that the 
text cannot maintain an ideal of absolute factuality.
General Gnther Blumentritt, like most of those in authority, was convinced that the 
bombing raids on Germany produced a real ‘Volkgenossenschaft’ or ‘patriotic 
comradeship’. This may well have been true in 1942 and 1943, but by late 1944 the 
effect tended to polarize opinions between the hardliners and the war-weary. Berlin 
had been the city with the highest proportion of opponents to the Nazi regime, as its 
voting records before 1933 indicate. But with the exception of a very small and 
courageous minority, opposition to the Nazis had generally been limited to gibes and 
grumbles. The majority had been genuinely horrified by the assassination attempt 
against Hitler on 20 July 1944. And as the Reich’s frontiers became threatened both 
in the east and in the west, they drank in Goebbels’s stream of lies that the Fuhrer 
would unleash new ‘wonder weapons’ against their enemies, as if he were about to 
assume the role of a wrathful Jupiter flinging thunderbolts as a symbol of his power. 
(Beevor 2002: 4)
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This text is a typical example of popular historical writing, and provides an indication of 
exactly why the language of any factual text must be both contingent and dependent upon 
the tropes and strategies of fictional writing. Beevor is referring to a number of 
confirmable occurrences in this passage, such as election results, the attempt to 
assassinate Hitler, and the decline of Nazi military power as the war turned against 
Germany in 1944. Such events can be verified through testimonies, documents, media 
footage and so forth, and there can be no doubt that they did in fact occur in some form. 
The problem lies once again with the limitations inherent in any textual representation of 
the occurrences. The text can be interpreted only within the framework of the data 
provided, as there is no possibility of a direct and unmediated experience of the events 
represented by the narrative. For instance, to claim that “with the exception of a very 
small and courageous minority, opposition to the Nazis had generally been limited to 
gibes and grumbles” is to accept as adequate a generalised intersubjective conception of 
such vague terms as small, generally and minority. How small, how general, what 
minority? It is naturally impossible (and undesirable) to include within a description all
the possible data. Nevertheless, the very absence of minutiae must necessarily result in 
differing interpretations of the words in question, and the accuracy of the narrative 
constructed by such sentences – although cognitively adequate – is compromised in term 
of any absolute factuality. 
It is within this ambit of adequacy, or sufficient meaning, that factual texts must function. 
It is not necessary to have access to the exact statistical percentage of the minority in 
order to acquire a sense (rather than a knowledge) of the implications of the sentence, and 
the employment of generally understood terms does not result in the text becoming 
unintelligible. The structure of the text assumes that those competent in the use of the 
English language will have the skills necessary to interpret the words as intelligible, thus 
allowing for a sufficient understanding of the text without an expectation of a totality of 
knowledge. Yet this does not negate the requirement that the iterable text must be 
interpreted by its readers, and will thereby be subject to different points of view, different 
contexts, and different intelligibilities, not all of which may correspond with each other in 
the interpretation of the text. It is the process of (re)interpretation that determines that any 
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reading of the factual text is only understood within the terms of the fictional text: “There 
are different historiographical modes – different ways of hypotactically ordering the facts 
contained in the chronicle of events occurring in a specific time-space location, such that 
events in the same set are capable of functioning differently in order to figure forth 
different meanings – moral, cognitive, or aesthetic – within different fictional matrices” 
(White 1978: 127, author’s emphasis).
Yet another reason as to why the “fictional matrices” created by the interpretation of 
factual texts result in such variability of meaning, even within the ambit of sufficient 
knowledge, is the unavoidable use of tropes and figurative language within historical 
discourse. The claims of Derrida’s “White Mythology” – that “[in] effect, there is no 
access to the usure7 of a linguistic phenomenon without giving it some figurative 
representation” (Derrida 1982b: 209) – contradict the aim of the traditional historian to 
eschew figurative language; rather, the actuality is that s/he is compelled to employ 
linguistic tropes owing to the very nature of language, given the way in which it signifies. 
If the extract is examined more closely, it is evident that Beevor has utilised a number of 
tropes in order to emphasise certain elements of his text, to the extent that the meaning 
generated by the reader has less to do with the original events and data than with the 
(re)interpretation of the assortment of metaphors.8 Thus, opinions are “polarized”, the 
majority “drink in” Goebbels’s “stream of lies”, and, most overtly, Hitler assumes “the 
role of a wrathful Jupiter flinging thunderbolts as a symbol of his power”. Although
overtly tropic, this text will be accessible to any reader with sufficient knowledge, or with
access to the information needed to comprehend the imagery. This may occur without 
necessarily consciously relating the metaphors to a specific source, and even without pre-
knowledge of Classical mythology and its narratives of the god Jupiter (the Zeus of 
Greek mythology) and his destructive thunderbolts. The use of figurative language in a 
7 “Usure”, means both the acquisition of interest, and deterioration through usage, thereby implying the 
compounding of signification as well as its cognitive depletion. (See Derrida 1982b: 209, note 2). 
8 This is not necessarily a negative strategy, given the impossibility of a neutral historical language. As 
White has claimed, “[The] aporia or sense of contradiction residing at the heart of language is present in all 
the classical historians. It is this linguistic self-consciousness which distinguishes them from their mundane 
counterparts and followers, who think that language can serve as a perfectly transparent medium of 
representation and who think that if one can only find the right language for describing events, the meaning 
of the event will display itself to consciousness” (1978: 130, author’s emphases). 
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factual text can be either explicit (as in Beevor’s text), or unconsciously conventional,
whereby metaphors that have lost any tropic connotations become included in the text, 
despite being unrecognised by the reader. Nevertheless, deliberate or otherwise, the use 
of tropes in factual writing must be acknowledged as a means of allowing for
understanding. As meaning-generating devices their inclusion has cognitive implications 
for any narrative. It is, therefore, necessary further to discuss the importance of figurative 
writing, particularly the trope of the metaphor, in relation to factual representation.   
2.2 Metaphor
Derrida’s claim that cognition is possible only if it “constructs the philosophical concept 
of metaphor with the manifestation of truth”, was mentioned earlier (Section 2.1, p49). It 
will therefore be constructive at this point to examine in some detail the nature of 
metaphor.9 In the terminology of I. A. Richards, a metaphor is a figure of speech which 
operates by reassigning the meaning of a name or description (the tenor) to an object (the 
vehicle) by means of substitution, omitting the “like” or “as” common to simile (which is 
effectively a diluted form of the metaphor). According to Aristotle, one of the first 
philosophers to comprehensively study the trope, the metaphor has three distinctive 
features. Firstly, it is a figure of speech that involves a noun;10 secondly, it involves a 
movement between terms; and thirdly, it is the transposition of a name. It is therefore a 
substitution of an alien term for the original term which, by association, enhances or 
reveals an alternative or subtler understanding of the original term. As a result, the 
metaphor becomes an effective poetic means of providing both pleasure and education, as 
the knowledge being conveyed is conveyed more intensely and more effectively than if 
the tenor were employed without the substitution. Paul Ricoeur argues that this 
Aristotelian notion of metaphor as a tropic intensification of meaning has relevance for 
both rhetoric and the text: “With respect to structure, [metaphor] can really consist in just 
one unique operation, the transfer of the meanings of words; but with respect to function, 
it follows the divergent destinies of oratory and tragedy. Metaphor will therefore have a 
9 The following discussion forms the basis of a technical understanding of the use of metaphor which is 
necessary to an understanding of the postmodern critique of tropic textuality.
10 “Noun” is understood here as being within the extended, ancient Greek sense of nouns: see Ricoeur 
1977: 17.
56
unique structure but two functions: a rhetorical function and a poetic function” (Ricoeur 
1977: 12). The poetic function is concerned primarily with fictional writing, and the 
rhetorical function with oratory. Yet both have implications for a factual text. If most of 
what is ostensibly verifiable in an extralinguistic actuality is represented through 
metaphorical rather than literal means, it follows that the eventual interpretation of a text 
by a particular reader in a particular context is a result of the functioning of fictional 
and/or rhetorical strategies, rather than a result of any immediacy or literalness contained 
within the representation. Interpretation is therefore primarily dependent upon the 
efficacy of the metaphors employed in the narrative. When metaphor is explicitly utilised 
in a text, it is not as a means to the verifiability or actuality of the events or objects 
represented. Language is a conventional system, and metaphor serves to accentuate the 
inherent artificiality of the representation when considered in relation to the events or 
objects represented, rather than providing a simple picture of the perceptible world. 
For example, in the extract by Beevor quoted above, it is stated in the text that the 
German people believed that Hitler was “about to assume the role of wrathful Jupiter 
flinging thunderbolts as a symbol of his power.” When analysing this trope, it is obvious 
that the tenor is Hitler as the “defender of the Reich” (itself a metaphor, as no single 
individual could be the sole defender of an entire nation), and that the vehicle is the 
Roman deity Jupiter, himself an appropriation of the Greek deity, Zeus. There is a 
substitution of the mythological figure Jupiter for the historical figure Hitler, thus 
employing a fictional character to act as a vehicle for a factual one. The metaphor is also 
implicitly sardonic: Jupiter was the supreme god of Roman mythology, the “bringer of 
light” who determined the course of human affairs.11 The origin of the image of the 
thunderbolt can be traced to Greek mythology, where Zeus (later Jupiter) freed the 
Cyclops from the captivity of Cronos, and was rewarded with the thunderbolt as a 
weapon of offence (see Graves 1960: 40ff). Later writers, most notably Ovid in the 
Metamorphoses, portrayed the power of Jupiter as being embodied in the thunderbolt: 
“The omnipotent father … mounted to the highest point in heaven, that height from 
11 Although, ironically, Jupiter has also been superseded as a god, now being regarded as no more than a 
myth.
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which he is wont to spread clouds over the broad lands of earth, whence he sends forth 
his thunderings and hurls his flashing bolts” (Ovid 1955: 58). 
By employing the term “Jupiter”, Beevor evokes the notion that the German people 
perceived their Fuhrer as a locus of military omnipotence and political power, with the 
word thunderbolt serving as a metaphor for the instrument of that power. The extended 
metaphor of divine power is built upon a loose understanding of a mythological trope, 
which becomes implicitly ironic owing to the information to which we have access 
regarding the historical character of Adolf Hitler – particularly in comparison to the 
mythological Jupiter – and his incapacity in the face of the Russian assault on the Third 
Reich – in contrast to the suggestion of the power associated with the thunderbolts. 
Beevor is not claiming that Hitler should be associated with Jupiter; he is asserting that 
the majority of the people of Germany made that assumption, and this intensifies the 
irony of the metaphor when considering the ultimate outcome of the fall of Germany in 
1945. This assumption of an assumption by an entire nation further complicates the 
metaphor. Beevor is assuming the metaphor on behalf of a significant proportion of a 
country’s population who lived more than half a century ago; in addition,  he is assigning 
the metaphor not so much to a noun (Hitler), but to the abstract and ill-defined notion of a 
role that that noun was expected to play. This, of course, leads to a further metaphor, 
wherein the expected function of an individual becomes the tenor, the vehicle being 
terminology borrowed from the vocabulary associated with the theatre: a role to be 
played, or an actor, or a scene from a play. It is evident that Beevor’s metaphor is 
essentially a metaphor that is dependent upon yet more metaphors, which may (or may 
not) be concurrent with others, in a regression that may not be infinite in itself, but is not 
traceable to some final and original originary moment. 
It is frequently maintained that the meanings of words either change or are reassigned 
over periods of time, and that words such as ‘role’ have a dual meaning: as the part an 
actor is expected to play, as well as the expected performance of an individual. If this 
were so, then it would to a significant extent negate the implications of the metaphor in 
the extract quoted. However, there are at least two principal rebuttals to this objection to 
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the metaphoricity of the factual text. The first is Nietzsche’s assertion (quoted in Section 
2.1, p51-2) that any claim regarding literal meaning in representation (Nietzsche’s truths) 
is no more than “metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of 
sensuous force”. Such transfer of meaning is indicative of the wearing out of the original 
metaphor, a reassignment that has taken place because the original force of the metaphor 
has been lost. The resultant text is then mistaken for a literal representation, when it in 
effect consists of metaphors that have deteriorated through usage (this is the point of 
Derrida’s term “usure”, discussed in Section 2.1, p54). Secondly, following on from this 
point, it is possible again to consider the notion of the trace, briefly mentioned in Chapter 
2, Section 3.2. Whenever a term is employed, its prior meanings are perhaps no longer 
present, but have left their mark as a structure of difference, which inscribes a relation to 
what is now absent: “Traces thus produce the space of their inscription only by acceding 
to the period of their erasure. From the beginning, in the ‘present’ of their first 
impression, they are constituted by the double force of repetition and erasure, legibility 
and illegibility” (Derrida 1978: 226). The trace inhabits the word in all its occurrences, 
even if the word role has a number of meanings as a result of a variety of interpretations.
The result is that the metaphor of Jupiter becomes a metaphor of linguistic entities. There 
is no originary essence, no single term that can be said to be the origin of the tenor or the 
vehicle. 
This point is emphasised in “White Mythology”, where Derrida deconstructs firstly the 
notion of origin,12 and secondly the distinction between concept and metaphor. Such an 
opposition is based on the supposition that a concept provides a means of bringing some 
external truth – with an implied purging of figurative language – before the mind, 
whereas metaphor merely establishes a link based on an analogy – which is permitted in 
philosophical discourse only if it allows for a return to some conceptual truth: “The 
philosophical evaluation of metaphor has always been ambiguous: metaphor is dangerous 
and foreign as concerns intuition (vision or contact), concept (the grasping or proper 
presence of the signified), and consciousness (proximity or self-presence); but it is in 
12 Derrida had previously deconstructed the notion of origin, most notably in Of Grammatology Part II, 
Chapter 3 (1974: 165-268).
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complicity with what it endangers, is necessary to it in the extent to which the de-tour is a 
re-turn guided by the function of resemblance” (Derrida 1982a: 270). Yet, since most 
language is fundamentally metaphorical, all texts allow their readers to believe that they 
are in control of the language, when in actuality it is the tenors that have been 
overlooked. Derrida also emphasises the contradictory nature of metaphor: as language 
tends to become more metaphorical, so too do the original meanings of the “dead” 
metaphors become unavailable: “in the Ricoeurean sense that if a metaphor is dead, then 
it is no longer a metaphor – it is just language” (Simms 2003: 129). 
Therefore, Ricoeur has questioned the notion of the dead metaphor as metaphor, together 
with the consequent assertion of an essentially defunct metaphorical language. For 
Ricoeur, metaphors are a means of cognitive access to the world we inhabit, which both 
informs and is informed by the texts that we read and interpret. Thus the use of metaphor 
– existing metaphors and, more importantly, new metaphors – allows for an increase in 
human knowledge and self-awareness: “[Metaphor] … guarantees the very transference 
of meaning and gives poetic language its characteristic of semantic ‘plus-value’, its 
capacity to be open to new aspects, new dimensions, new horizons of meaning” (Ricoeur 
1977: 296). This does not seem at odds with Derrida’s notion of metaphor; yet Ricoeur’s
notion of metaphoricity is based less on individual terms than at the level of the sentence. 
Thus, to substitute Jupiter for Hitler is not a substitution of a “deviant” term for a proper 
term; rather, it is “the interaction between the ‘focus’ [Jupiter] and the ‘frame’ [Hitler] 
within the context of the whole sentence” (Simms 2003: 76). This results in three 
differing tensions: firstly, between the focus and the frame; secondly, between the 
figurative meaning and the literal meaning;13 and thirdly, between the implications of the 
word “is” which also entails “is not”. This tension, according to Ricoeur, gives rise to the 
process which invites the reader to interpret the metaphor, hence disclosing a locus of 
meaning.
13 Although Derrida would argue that, as metaphor is endemic to language, the tension between the 
figurative and the literal would be a matter of perception and interpretation rather than an absolute 
dichotomy. 
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Even if Ricoeur is accurate in his assumption that human knowledge is increased by 
metaphors through acts of interpretation (rather than by a presentation of objective facts), 
the problem still remains as to the veracity of a factual textual representation that is 
fundamentally metaphorical. This issue is further complicated by Ricoeur’s claim that 
poetic language, being the most metaphorical, is the language that is most able to portray 
human experience. For example, is it the case that Beevor’s (factual) narrative is more
capable of increasing the knowledge of events that actually did occur as a direct result of 
his employment of metaphor than the narrative by an author who assumes a style of 
writing that endeavours to eliminate all deliberate use of tropes? One answer to this is to 
reiterate the point of view outlined in the previous chapter that no writing is disinterested, 
and that all readers and all authors are necessarily linked to certain ideological and 
cultural contexts. In addition, any author who attempts to avoid tropic devices in his or 
her discourse is not only attempting the impossible, but in doing so is subjecting his or 
her narrative to the charge that it is of little interest, as well as biased: “Any historian who 
simply described a set of facts … would not only not be very interesting but could 
legitimately be labelled a doctrinaire thinker who had “bent the facts” to fit a 
preconceived theory” (White 1978: 129). Thus it is not possible to portray a historical 
event in a manner that is wholly objective, as the choice of facts – as well as the language 
employed in writing them – would inevitably indicate the positioning of the text within a 
specific ideological and cultural framework.
It is therefore necessary – in order to make the text appealing and/or relevant for the 
reader – that figurative language and teleological plot development be used by the writer 
of factual texts. In such a way, the narratives of great classic historians such as Michelet
and Tocqueville, as well as those of contemporary historians such as Beevor and 
Schama,14 will be considered more significant than those whose narratives assume that 
there exists the possibility of an objective text with inherent and universal truths waiting 
to be discovered by the attentive reader. In terms of tropic discourse, the strategies and 
styles of the factual text are dependent upon the same resources as those employed by the 
14 Examples of classic historical texts include Jules Michelet’s Histoire de France (1833-67) and Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1835-40). Contemporary historical texts include Simon Schama’s 
Citizens (1989) and Antony Beevor’s Stalingrad (1998).
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fictional text. This does not diminish either mode of writing, but rather emphasises that 
“all written discourse is cognitive in its aims and mimetic in its means … history is no 
less a form of fiction than the novel is a form of historical representation” (White 1978:
122). 
2.3 Types of Factual Texts 
There exist numerous varieties of factual text. As has already been noted, any instance of 
factual writing is in some sense already an instance of a historical text, limited to an 
instance of writing which refers to or represents a determinable prior event or occurrence, 
and which is told with reference to the documents, testimonies and other data necessary 
for the production of the final text (such text being subject to iterability and re-
interpretation). The historical text can be distinguished from texts such as journalism 
which concentrate on the immediate past, and which are dependent upon the continuing 
development of the events or occurrences being narrated. Another type of factual text is 
the (auto)biography; this would include testimony, collections of letters, memoirs and 
curricula vitae. The genre of biography (or autobiography) could be considered as a 
branch of historical writing which concentrates on the events as they pertain to a 
particular individual or individuals, rather than on the events themselves (although the 
writer-as-reader has a uniquely subjective relation to the text of an autobiography). Other 
forms of factual writing include scientific and mathematical texts, company reports, and 
critical writing (although the latter perhaps blurs the boundaries between the factual and 
the non-factual), and numerous other types of writing which refer to or represent events, 
objects or people in the world (or the differing attitudes of people towards such events 
and objects). As it not possible to consider each instance of the modes of factual writing 
in this discussion, three particular types of factual writing have been selected: the 
testimony, the scientific text, and the newspaper article. 
2.3.1 Testimony
Testimony implies a declaration of reality or fact, the giving of evidence testifying to a 
verifiable event. This notion, of declaring the truth or the facts, is frequently associated 
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with oral or written statements representing the memories of an individual (or group of 
individuals) who have been witness to, victim of, or in some other way involved in, a 
specific historical event. In most cases of the representation of violence, that historical 
event has been of a particularly traumatic nature, and the testimony given is a means by 
which that individual may recall his or her memories of that event within the broader 
framework of the historical narrative. Such a recounting may be through the medium of 
the autobiography (as well as the biography), memoirs, filmed and written interviews, or 
any other medium through which the voice of individual experience is privileged above 
the historical context of the testimony. Therefore, testimony may be considered as the 
foregrounding of individual voices within the framework of the representation of a
historical event, where such voices “stand in” for the event (although the event itself can 
never be sufficiently represented – see Chapter 2, Section 3), thereby singularising the 
individual’s experience of that event. 
Yet such foregrounding highlights the representational tension that exists between the 
experiences of the individual (narrated as an isolated testimony), and the narrative of the 
event as a whole (within which that isolated testimony is relatively insignificant). It is 
only in the consideration of a grouping of testimonies – all of which must correspond to a 
considerable degree to the relevant historical occurrences – that testimony may be 
considered pertinent. Ricoeur asserts that the only authentic history is to be found in the 
narratives of peoples, countries and civilisations, and the role of any individual is largely 
irrelevant to these narratives. Individual testimony may provide one person’s perspective 
on the overall narrative of the event, but such a perspective necessarily includes the 
possibility, even probability, of prosopopoeia – the “rhetorical introduction of a
pretended speaker” (OED). When the event is as momentous and as emotive as the 
Holocaust, for example, there exists “a delicate balance between the need (a) to use 
narrative imagination to revisit trauma and allow for a healing-mourning process and (b) 
to respect the unspeakable evil of that trauma” (Kearney 2002: 49). There is a 
contradiction within the very act of testimony: it consists of a memory mediated through 
the discourse of a moment which is temporally removed from that same discourse.
Another moment in time (the historical event in question) therefore declares – as if an 
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instance of absolute truth – the events of the past. This contradiction is highlighted by a 
Holocaust survivor reflecting on his own testimony: “This cannot be described, for there 
are no words for it … how can one describe things that cannot be described, for which 
there are no words? But words must be found … and so every author uses words that ‘did 
not exist’ but that were within his scale of possibilities and within his knowledge of the 
facts. Thus contradictions were unavoidable” (quoted in Kearney 2002: 64).15
To question the testimony of the individual is not to advocate that individual voices 
should be silenced. Rather, it is to argue that only within the context of a testimony 
shared between many voices can a plausible history be narrated. Any instance of 
testimony – like any instance of historicity - is subject not only to the variable contexts of 
the testifier and his or her audience (who may experience the text at different times and in 
different places), but is also subject to the same limitations of language that necessarily 
pre-empt any totality of meaning. Testimony is representation compounded by the
additional difficulty of fragmented memories and differing contexts, combined with a 
sense of heightened intensity. Testimony can refer only to isolated instances in one 
individual’s experience, whereas those experiences represent only an infinitesimal 
fraction of the irrecoverable totality of the event. As it has already been argued that the 
totality of any event cannot be accessed owing to the impossibility (and undesirability) of 
recovering every detail, so the recollections of any individual can be no more than a 
fragmented representation of a historical event.
In addition, a shared testimony must also necessarily reflect and determine a particular 
standpoint, depending upon the context of the testimony as a whole. The testimony of 
concentration camp survivors will approach the narrative of the Holocaust from a 
perspective different from that of the testimony of the concentration camp guards. Even 
the testimony of inmates would be subject to different contexts of place, experience and 
positioning within the system: kapos, sonderkommandos, labour prisoners, those used for 
15 This has resonance with the Wilkomirski case, where the juxtaposition of historical fact and invented 
narrative creates contradictions not unlike those mentioned above, but which become problematic owing to 
the ethical implications of misrepresenting the testimony of the Holocaust. This will be discussed in some 
detail in Chapter 9, Section 2.
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medical experiments – all would have a differing testimony, and the collation of 
testimony can reflect only these circumstances rather than narrating a unified whole. This 
raises the problem of the micro-narrative, and the role of ideology in determining 
testimonial authority. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 9, Section 2.1.
Moreover, although testimony often suggests a moral imperative, which allows for the 
possibility of an articulation of empathy and which outlines certain ethical considerations 
that are relevant to both the event and the future perception of the event, it is not 
necessarily the case that it is the means of ensuring that violent historical events – such as 
the Holocaust – cannot happen again.
Another dynamic to be considered is that of the intentions of the individual recording an 
instance of testimony. Although post-structuralist theorists argue against the significance 
of the author in determining the meaning of a text, it remains the case that the ethical and 
aesthetic evaluation of a text – particularly a testimonial text – is often determined by the 
reader with regard to the integrity and plausibility of the author. For instance, when the 
revisionist historian David Irving brought a libel suit against Deborah Lipstadt for 
denouncing his perspective on the Holocaust, the London High Court found against him. 
This judgment could be regarded as being based as much on Irving’s unacceptable anti-
Semitic agenda as on his biased historical methodology.16 Therefore, it is pertinent to 
question the ideologies, the emotions, the agendas attached to any act of testimony; as 
well as the assumptions of the reader of testimonies. For example, consider the 
controversy generated by the publication in 1979 of Testimony, the purported memoirs of 
composer Dmitri Shostakovich (edited – some claim invented – by Simon Volkov). For 
many readers, Testimony was an accurate and verifiable representation of the years of 
Stalinist terror. Yet, for others, Testimony was no more than anti-Soviet propaganda, 
distributed in the West by Volkov and others opposed to the communist state. The 
opening paragraph is indicative of  this struggle to enforce a single ideological viewpoint 
as true, yet it simultaneously asserts its own claims to infallibility: “These are not 
memoirs about myself. These are memoirs about other people. Others will write about us. 
And naturally they’ll lie through their teeth – but that’s their business. One must speak 
16 See Evans: Lying About Hitler (2001), Chapter 1: “History on Trial (1-39). 
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the truth about the past or not at all. It’s very hard to reminisce and its worth doing only 
in the name of truth” (Volkov 1979: 1, italics added). 
Yet to assert truth is to avoid the contingency of the term based on differing theories, 
contexts and individual (as well as social) constructions. It is not possible for a reader 
without access to supporting evidence to separate truth from falsehood. Naturally, those 
others will make the same claim. It was only after Maxim Shostakovich, the son of the 
composer, defected to the West in 1981 that he was able independently to verify his 
father’s text, thus vindicating those who had believed it from the beginning. Yet even his 
verification is qualified: “It’s true. It’s accurate. Sometimes, for me, there is too much 
rumour in the book, but nothing major. The basis of the book is correct” (quoted in 
MacDonald 1991: 7, emphases added). Yet to separate the “basis” from the rumour was
not possible, and the controversy continued. Many queried the proportion of the text 
composed by Shostakovich himself as compared to any reconstructions by Volkov. If 
both, as suggested by the text, were disillusioned with the Soviet state, then any assumed 
objectivity becomes suspect – even if objectivity were possible in the first place.17 This 
may be an exaggerated instance of the problems facing the reader of testimony, but it 
does reveal the extent to which the verifiability of a testimony is determined by 
individual and social constructions of truth, coloured by prejudice and (inter)subjectivity, 
rather than by the unobtainable ideal of objective historical fact. 
Although the narrative of testimony may serve to personalise the historical event for a 
reader, and even allow that reader the possibility of empathy through the re-interpretation 
of the textual fragments of another’s memories, that experience cannot be conflated into 
the actuality and totality of the event. Even historical narratives (such as those by 
Beevor), which amalgamate personal testimony within the macro-historical sequence of 
events, are limited in their evocation of “what it was like to be there”. If contemporary 
occurrences are accessible to the reader only through the limiting medium of language, 
subject to contextual considerations, then historical occurrences, subject to the 
17 In the preface to the 1979 translation of Testimony, Volkov mentions that, in conversations with 
Shostakovich, the composer “often contradicted himself. Then the true meaning of his words had to be 
guessed” (1979: xiv).
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complexities of iterable textual re-interpretation (and mediated through contemporary 
language and contexts) become even more problematic in terms of their claims to truth 
value. This in itself re-emphasises the literary and fictional tropes and strategies that 
characterise historical texts. As White has pointed out, those narratives that do not 
attempt to avoid literary techniques, but rather embrace them, are generally 
acknowledged as being the more significant and appealing texts. Such acknowledgment 
confers on the latter text an authority and influence among potential readers that may be 
less apparent in the reception of instances of the former. If this is the case, then notions of 
verifiability become inextricably related to the aesthetics of the textual representation. 
2.3.2 Scientific Narrative
One of the more contentious claims of postmodern literary theory is that empirical 
science can be likened to the narratives of history and fiction. It is therefore no more than 
a narrative, just one more contextually determined narrative among many others. For 
example, Paul Feyerabend asserts: “I want to defend society and its inhabitants from all 
ideologies, science included. All ideologies must be seen in perspective. One must not 
take them too seriously. One must read them like fairytales which have lots of interesting 
things to say but which also contain wicked lies, or like ethical prescriptions which may 
be useful rules of thumb but which are deadly when followed to the letter” (1975: 290). 
Similarly, although not as radically, Rom Harr attempts to “bring out the narrative 
conventions according to which discourses are produced by members of the [scientific] 
community. What story lines do scientific discourses reveal?” (Harr 1990: 83). The 
objective of both is to discard the meta-narrative of science, which attempts to propose an 
objective and disinterested explanation regarding the nature of the world, free from 
moral, ideological or social constraints, and which assumes both teleology and 
universalizability. However, several of the postmodern critiques of science have been 
devastatingly refuted by scientists and philosophers who have exposed the faulty 
scientific reasoning behind many of the more excessive claims. For example, 
Baudrillard’s contention that the “space” of war has become a “non-Euclidean 
hyperspace” has been dismissed by Sokal and Bricmont as being a fundamental 
misunderstanding (or deliberate misrepresentation) of scientific terminology, since it is 
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senseless to talk of a Euclidean space of war in the first place. They also criticise 
Feyerabend’s pronouncements, arguing that his “methodological relativism, if taken 
literally, is so radical that it becomes self-refuting” (Sokal and Bricmont 1998: 78). 
Therefore, to avoid accusations of insignificance in the light of the verifiable evidence of 
scientific discovery and discourse, the claim that the language of science is prone to 
multiple interpretations must be investigated without resorting to a critique of the
scientific texts themselves; rather, an investigation into the context of the iterable textual 
representation that frames and determines those texts is necessary.
It should be re-emphasised at this point that although all language and representation is
subject to iterability and context, the narratives within which the language is framed are 
frequently dissimilar. Thus a literary specialist, for example, will be less likely to 
comprehend the intricacy and terminology of scientific discourse than a person actually 
trained in that discipline. Yet a scientific paper remains as an example of narrative (albeit 
of a specialised type), whose conclusions may or may not be verifiable, and whose 
language, although specific to the scientific branch of study, is subject to the same 
limitations as any other instance of textuality. In addition, the way in which such a paper 
is structured reinforces the notion that it is a narrative. Harr argues that “these texts have 
been written within the conventions of a certain rhetoric and embody certain narrative 
conventions … Each ‘secretes’ its own favoured philosophy of science” (1990: 89). 
Scientific texts are consequently not as conclusive and as objective as the scientific 
community would like to believe. Each discovery is usually presented from the point of 
view of the I of the narrator of the text, or more often, the inclusive we that constructs 
credence in the illusion of unity of the scientific community, a community placed within 
a historical time and space (a specific example of Fish’s interpretive community). Yet 
this implies that the texts are written by actors or agents (the scientists) for the eventual 
benefit of an audience: “it is in the presence of an audience, like that of the people of 
Rome in Browning’s The Ring and the Book, that places the event in human history, 
shows it is important, makes it an event” (Myers 1990: 108). The event in question is the 
conclusion of the scientific narrative: such texts are typically constitutive of a supposedly 
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unequivocal conclusion – the proof of an initial hypothesis – with a large proportion of 
the work done in the laboratory being omitted from the final draft. 
One of the more important principles of the philosophy of science is the qualification of 
the inductive method in empirical science. Employing the notion of the “falsifiability
criterion” developed by Karl Popper, this theory holds that all conjectures and 
conclusions are subject to the absence of contradictory data. As a result of the possibility 
of such data’s being discovered in the future through re-examination and re-
hypothesisation, even the seemingly most obvious scientific conclusions should be 
regarded as at least potentially contingent. In addition, Harr has argued that the identical 
scientific hypothesis is phrased in a certain style when a scientist employs it to support 
his or her own observations, but in different style when used to counter the observations 
of a competitor: “In the actual system there is a marked asymmetry in the criteria by 
which one judges one’s own hypotheses and those which are used to undermine the 
credibility of those of a rival” (Harr 1990: 93). 
This would suggest that the understanding of a scientific text is as much determined by 
narrative re-interpretation within a differential network of metaphoricity as is the 
interpretation of all other texts, factional or otherwise. For example, consider the 
following: “Through direct nucleotide sequencing and other methods, it soon became 
clear that the gene in eukaryotes is composed of coding and non-coding segments 
interspersed between the beginning and the end of the genetic message” (Myers 1990: 
109). Although – to the non-scientist at least – much of this sentence is semantically 
inaccessible, certain metaphoric tropes are obvious – “it became clear”, “coding and non-
coding”, “the genetic message”. Derrida, in “White Mythology”, discusses the use of the 
scientific word “cell” in terms of its origin in the honeycomb structure of the beehive: 
“This animal metaphor of the hive, analyzed here in its determined effects on the 
development of a theory, is put into abyme [a connotation of infinite reflection] … in 
order to figure the metaphoricity of the concept, the metaphor of the metaphor, the 
metaphor of metaphoric productivity itself” (Derrida 1982b: 262). The unfeasibility of 
achieving comprehensiveness and universalizability is also evident in the use of words 
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such as “other methods”, “soon” and “interspersed”, all of which contain a degree of 
uncertainty and semantic contingency, and which refute the myth of the totalising and 
unambiguous potential of science: “Descriptive completeness of detail at the factual level 
must be recognised to be in principle impossible. It is a red herring that can and should be 
put aside in any serious deliberations about the completeness of science … it is absurd to 
ask for something that cannot possibly be reproduced” (Rescher 1984: 17).
Although many scientists may argue against universalizability (for example, Popper’s 
falsifiability criterion), the notion of the scientific text as having a potential for truth and 
objectivity remains pervasive. Yet, just as a historical text may be rewritten and re-
understood in innumerable different ways, so too is the scientific text open to re-
interpretation. The conclusions of the narrative may be accurate within the limited 
framework of the study, yet still subject to empirical verification and changes in linguistic 
meaning. As the text employed to describe or discuss these findings is necessarily 
contingent, it must be considered as inherently subjective, or at least inter-subjective. The 
project of science can therefore never be ultimately concluded. As Rescher argues in The 
Limits of Science, this is due in no small way to natural science’s being “subject to 
domain-external incapacities. We must recognize that various important evaluative and 
cognitive issues lie altogether outside the province of science as we know it” (1984: 217). 
Such issues incorporate notions of methodology and verifiability (the province of the 
philosophy of science); however, the nature of language and representation, functioning 
within the space of iterability and context, ensures the contingency of all texts – even 
those derived from scientific discourse.
2.3.3 Journalism
The newspaper article, like any historical text, concerns itself primarily with events that 
have happened in the past. Although it claims to be dealing with current events, or events 
that may have occurred in the immediate past, the most recent news report is 
instantaneously part of historical discourse, even when dealing with events that are 
continuing: anything else can be no more than opinion or conjecture as to the possible or 
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probable consequences of the ongoing event.18 As the newspaper article is composed by
employing the same natural languages (even if in a different style) that are employed to 
write other factual texts, and as it uses several of the same tropes and rhetorical devices, it 
is not necessary to recapitulate the theories advanced earlier that highlight the 
contingency and iterability of any textual representation. Rather, it should be sufficient to 
refute the notion that the newspaper article can attempt to be a mirror of reality – a true 
and objective reflection of recent occurrences in the world. The very notion of objectivity 
becomes incoherent in terms of postmodern notions of representation, as it implies a view 
from nowhere, itself an impossibility when considering the interpretation of an iterable 
text. Michael Schudson argues that, far from aiming at objectivity, “objectivity in 
journalism, regarded as an antidote to bias, came to be looked upon as the most insidious 
bias of all. For ‘objective’ reporting reproduced a vision of social reality which refused to 
examine the basic structures of power and privilege” (Schudson 1978: 160).
However, the possibility of an objective news report is the principal premise of the article 
“What is News?” by D. Bradley (1965). Bradley’s opening statement immediately 
emphasises the idealistic notion of the news report that is both true and objective: “It is 
the honest and unbiased and complete account of events of interest and concern to the 
public” (1965: 95, emphases added). He then re-emphasises this claim by asserting that 
“News … is supposed to be honest, accurate, concise and easy to understand. It should 
not be written to serve any special interests, groups or individuals” (1965: 96, emphasis 
added). With reference to the earlier discussions on the nature of representation, 
particularly within the framework of the historical text, it is clear that Bradley’s analysis 
is both practically and empirically falsified by the ways in which newspapers reflect 
different ideologies, and give different accounts of the same event. That Bradley is not 
wholly unaware of this is indicated by various qualifications within his article that serve 
18 The paradox of current affairs is that any notion of the present is immediately in the past, as the present is 
an infinitely small point that no longer exists the moment it is uttered or occurs. This traditionally 
logocentric notion implies that the present is both static and irrevocable. However, as Derrida argues, the 
present is also necessary for the “movement of signification” as “each element appearing on the scene of 
presence, is related to something other than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of its relation to 
the future element, this trace being related no less to what is called the future than to what is called the past, 
and constituting what is called the present by means of this very relation to what it is not” (Derrida 1982a:
13). The implication is therefore that the present is defined by the very absence of past and future. 
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to undermine his own rhetoric. Firstly, he is compelled to suggest doubt regarding his 
own declarations by the inclusion of the modifying phrase “is supposed to be…” in the 
second sentence quoted above. Secondly, he claims that an editor creates news by 
selecting particular stories for the editorial columns. He refers to the editing process as 
one which “may not change the content or slant [the stories] without removing the wire 
service identification” (1965: 95), which implies that if an editor does happen to slant a 
story, then all that is necessary is that he or she omit the wire service identification 
(which will have its own slant on the story in any case). He continues by listing the ways 
in which stories may be “consciously or unconsciously” slanted – through selection, 
excitement or interest value, the position of the article on the page (and on which page), 
the use of illustrations, the lack of time to check facts. With regard to the last, and using 
Bradley’s own emphasis, he writes that “A story that is incomplete may be slanted 
because it omits some of the facts” (1965: 96). It has already been established that no text, 
historical or otherwise, can include even most of the facts, never mind all of the facts, 
even if the previous sentence assumes the omission of the word relevant before the word 
facts. Bradley then claims that only through a comparative reading of the same story 
written from different points of view in different newspapers will a reader arrive at an 
idea of the truth. Yet even a multitude of texts covering the same event cannot result in a 
plenitude of meaning, even less a totality of universal meaning.19
It was argued earlier that one of the reasons for the absence of universal meaning is that 
any text (or group of texts), due to its iterability and contextual positioning, reveals to a 
greater or lesser extent various prejudices, socio-cultural stances, and subjective points of 
view. Most readers are familiar with the rhetoric of persuasion that is implicit in the 
employment of the term terrorist as opposed to freedom fighter, or the term traditional 
belief as opposed to the term superstition. There can be no point of view from nowhere, 
and newspapers are perhaps, implicitly or explicitly, the most common conveyers of 
19 For example, Rissover and Birch (1977: 114-137) is relevant: “The Press Reports and Comments on the 
Conflict at Attica Prison, September, 1971”. Even after reading eleven articles on the same event, the 
impression is one of eleven points of view rather than one single truth. Even so-called live television 
coverage will be determined by the ideology of the network (as presented by the reporters). Coverage by
CNN will not present the same truth of an event as coverage by an Arabic network such as al-Jazeera, for 
example. 
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propaganda and (mis)information. Martin Quigley (1971: 100-106) has identified seven 
elements of persuasion that are used by propagandists, and all seven can be found in any 
edition of any newspaper accessible today. These are: name-calling (to influence 
judgement or opinion); generalities (an identification with virtue and emotion); transfer 
(to carry over objects of admiration to support a particular viewpoint); testimonia; “plain 
folks” (to identify with the “everyman”); card-stacking (to falsely or misleadingly tarnish 
an opposing viewpoint); and band wagon (everyone does it) devices. It is not necessary to 
enter into a discussion of each element, but it is worth noting Quigley’s comment that 
“whether the object of the persuasion is to implant the big lie or to impart the big truth, 
the elements of persuasion remain the same” (Quigley 1971:102). Similarly, John Elridge 
writes that “it is not reality that is constructed [by the news] but a semblance of it” 
(Elridge 1993: 4).20 This may seem self-evident, since representation is not reality; yet it 
does emphasise that, rather than being objectively factual, the news story is essentially a 
narrative mediated by various different persons acting within a limited period of time, 
and this narrative is predominantly determined by the dominant discourse that holds in 
that society, be that discourse political, financial, cultural or religious. Although 
newspapers for minority communities will use their own discourses, these will 
necessarily have less readership and influence than those of the dominant discourse.
Newspaper articles are not so much a chronicle of the facts but rather a series of 
overlapping and competing narratives, where the discourse of various micro-narratives 
will inevitably be subordinated to the narrative(s) that reflect the prevailing power-base 
of that society. George Orwell, whose experiences in the Spanish Civil War led him to 
believe that much of the newspaper reporting on the war was not only highly subjective, 
but often deliberately inaccurate and misleading, highlights this narrative phenomenon: 
“From the anti-Fascist angle one could write a broadly truthful history of the war, but it 
would be a partisan history, unreliable on every minor point. Yet, after all, some kind of 
history will be written and after those who actually remembered the war are dead, it will 
be universally accepted. So for all practical purposes the lie will have become truth” 
(Orwell 1942). However, he is also aware that such (inter)subjective interpretations of 
20 To represent reality or truth is clearly not feasible in any case, not only in cases of journalism.
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events are unavoidable, and that any notion of objective reporting is impossible: “One is 
practically obliged to take sides, and it must be clear enough whose side I am on … I 
warn everyone against my bias, and I warn everyone against my mistakes” (Elridge 1993: 
7). 
It may therefore be concluded that newspaper articles are no more true’ and accurate 
reflections of reality than any other text, and are similarly contained within a particular 
discourse. As Storey suggests, even texts critical of the dominant discourse are “always 
critical within a discursive practice which ultimately works to contain such criticism” 
(2001: 80). Although some general notion of what is happening may be gleaned from the 
article (or, preferably, from a number of articles written as competing narratives), the 
omission and bias (deliberate or otherwise) that determine much of the information 
ensures that the news conveyed by the article is both contingent and partial. As Schudson 
comments, “the news story informs its readers about politics, but in a specific way. Its 
meaning lies in the instructions it tacitly gives about what to attend to, and how to attend, 
within the going concern of American political life. It asks readers to be interested in 
politics, but politics as the community of journalists conceives it” (Schudson 1995: 70).
Therefore, just as in the texts of history, testimony and science, there is nothing inherent 
within the narrative of an instance of journalism that can coherently be labelled objective, 
and hence factual, in any absolute sense that excludes context, interpretation and bias.
2.4  Factual Texts and Interpretation
Yet to deny claims to an absolute factuality is to be subject to accusations of self-
reflexivity, linguistic idealism, and both moral and cognitive relativism. For instance, 
Richard Kearney identifies two particular problems that are implicit in any postmodern 
narrative critique of factual representation. The first problem is concerned with the 
“danger of certain postmodern arguments that the narratives of the Shoah, like all other 
narratives, are bound to the self-referentiality of language and so can make no truth-claim 
to any kind of reality outside of the narrative texts themselves (what Baudrillard calls
‘irreference’)” (Kearney 2002: 8). The second is the problem of the micro-narrative, 
referred to earlier in this chapter: By insisting on a contextual and iterable narrative “the 
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danger [exists] of disintegrating into a medley of relativistic micro-narratives: the way the 
Shoah can be told in a thousand different ways – pro-Jewish, pro-Nazi, pro-communist, 
etc. – and you can take your pick since any one of these language games is as good as the 
next” (Kearney 2002: 8). 
However, to maintain the notion of the self-referentiality of language is not necessarily to 
suggest that an external actuality is non-existent except as a linguistic entity, nor that 
subsequent determinations of meaning are unrelated to such an actuality. Rather, it argues 
that access to, and cognition of, the external world (and its re-interpretation through 
representation) are only feasible in terms of the mediation of language, with all the 
limitations and possibilities for interpretation that such a mediation implies. In the case of 
the factual text, the representation interprets an occurrence that is verifiable, even if the 
narrative necessarily fails to encapsulate the event in its totality. (Inter)subjective 
interpretation based upon social and cultural discourse determines the particular 
emphases of the text – either in composition or interpretation. Therefore, for any
discourse to propose an absolute truth-claim is to assume and impose an artificial 
infallibility. The danger that exists, contra Kearney, is not that of an attenuation of 
referentiality with an attendant inference of relativism, but rather an assumption of an 
authority of interpretation. To disallow an external actuality may be incoherent, but to re-
categorise a dominant interpretation as truth is to prescribe an interpretive autocracy.  
However, the issues raised by notions of relativism and the supposed equality of micro-
narratives remain problematic. Nevertheless, to argue that textual representation is 
context-dependent and iterable does not necessarily entail the conclusion that all 
narratives are cognitively or ethically equivalent, nor that competing narratives are all 
uniformly relevant to the events that they are purporting to represent. It may be the case 
that the interpretations of the dominant ideology, combined with verifiable historical 
evidence, will negate the more extreme micro-narrative claims. For example, narratives 
of the Holocaust that deny the scale of the event (such as those by David Irving) are 
largely discredited by competing texts that convincingly demonstrate the actuality of the 
event. In addition, there exist competing micro-narratives within the various discourses, 
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all of which insist upon interpretive preference. Sim offers the illustration of the Western
European political left in the twentieth century, “where we find factions subdividing into 
even smaller factions over fine differences of doctrine that outsiders could hardly 
recognize existed … As much energy could be expended in fighting each other as in 
fighting the established political power” (Sim 2005: 45). Although no narrative 
(dominant or otherwise) can include all the particulars of a historical event, various 
opposing narratives will highlight (or exclude) relevant data in order to accentuate 
specific characteristics that serve to substantiate their interpretation of the “quasi-event”. 
Yet no micro-narrative is given credence purely on the basis of its being a micro-
narrative, and interpretation is always subject to falsification through verifiability. 
Dominant narratives determine to a large extent the intersubjective analysis of any event, 
yet any imposition of interpretation can never presuppose infallibility. Micro-narratives 
do exist, and do compete for dominance, and there exists a constant latent possibility that 
any micro-narrative may develop into a dominant discourse. The danger of micro-
narratives lies less in their existence than in the potential that one consisting of uneven 
(and perhaps objectionable) ethical premises may assume dominance (as happened with 
the micro-narrative systems of Nazism and apartheid). However, this leads in turn to 
another problem: that of the interpretation and determination of ethical criteria.21
Therefore, to refer to a factual text is to refer to a narrative that confirms the conclusion 
(reached in the first chapter) that any textual representation is the iterable, contingent and 
context-dependent denotation of extralinguistic objects, events, properties and notions in 
the form of written language, such representation being subject to infinite (re) 
interpretation by the potential reader. A factual text can therefore be defined as follows:
A factual representation is an instance of an iterable text, representing 
actual persons, situations and events, in which meaning is made 
possible through the presuppositions and contextualisation of the 
potential reader. Such a text has reference to an extra-textual actuality, 
21 The idea of the iterability and contingency of language as an ethical problem will be considered in more 
detail in Chapter 8, which deals with the ethics of representing violence.
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although access to such actuality is mediated through the language and 
form of the text. 
According to this definition, the factual text cannot be said to be fundamentally different 
from the fictional text. Therefore, the following chapter will investigate in more detail the 
strategies and assumptions of fiction, before any conclusions regarding the association 
between the two modes may properly be made.  
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CHAPTER 5
FICTIONAL REPRESENTATION
1. The Fictional Text
Before discussing the theory, nature and strategies of fictional representation, it is first 
necessary to address the notion that there is any significant distinction between 
“literature” and “fiction” that is relevant to this study. The term fiction is in itself 
problematic; yet when used as an extension of the field of literature, it becomes 
additionally burdened with notions of value, canonicity and privilege. As Derrida claims, 
“[t]he terribly equivocal word fiction (which is  sometimes misused as though it were 
coextensive with literature) says something about this situation. Not all literature is of the 
genre or the type of ‘fiction’, but there is fictionality in all literature. We should try and 
find a word other than ‘fiction’ ” (Attridge 1992a: 49). Accordingly, the notion of 
fictionality that will be employed in this text is not dependent upon the value-laden 
assumptions implicit in the perception of the “literary text”. What is important is not so 
much the value accorded to certain texts but the implications of the iterable 
representation for the potential reader. To consider a text iterable is to assume that the 
notion of value will be relevant to an aesthetic evaluation subsequent to the reading of the 
text; this is fundamentally different from the idealistic notion that the text contains any 
intrinsic value. A case in point is the Shakespearean canon, considered by some to be 
universal in its appeal and timeless in its relevance. Yet any contextually interpreted text 
– even a text by the playwright whose work is regarded as the core of the Western canon 
– is contingent upon aesthetic re-evaluation and cognitive re-interpretation based upon 
differing spatio-temporal perspectives. As Gary Taylor, himself a prominent 
Shakespearean scholar, has noted: “Shakespeare’s works are no more immortal than the 
scores of plays by the great Greek dramatists that have evaporated. Those plays 
succumbed to the fall of old power structures and the rise of new ideologies ... 
Shakespeare is just as vulnerable to accidents of war and shifts of ideology, just as 
helpless against the political power of a reigning orthodoxy” (Taylor 1989: 378-9).  
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The word literature will therefore be utilised only in cases where certain theorists 
(Derrida, Blanchot, Miller) have preferred to use it in a particular context, but with the 
implied understanding that “there is fictionality in all literature”. Otherwise the word 
fiction will be retained to describe the mode of textual composition that represents 
characters, situations and events that are not verifiable, or that juxtaposes representations 
of the actual and the imaginary, or that attempts to portray the possibility of an alternative 
actuality. 
1.1 Representation in Fiction
Two issues need to be explored when discussing fictional representation: firstly, the 
nature of fiction and its relationship to iterable representation, and secondly, the 
association between fictional and factual texts. The commonplace perception of fiction is 
that it is both imaginary and invented, and consequently stylistically and aesthetically 
divergent from instances of non-fiction. However, as was concluded in the previous 
section, it is not possible for there to be a text that is wholly factual; in other words, a text 
that succeeds in circumventing the pervasiveness of fictional strategies, modes and 
assumptions. It is likewise unfeasible to assume that there may be a text that is wholly 
fictional: in other words, a text that is entirely imaginary and invented, with no 
representation of (or reference to) any verifiable external actuality. On the contrary, in 
order to be understood by a historically situated reader, any instance of a fictional text 
must necessarily be dependent upon conventional expectations and suppositions, even if 
cognitive modification is required to facilitate and appropriate the claims of the text into 
the pre-knowledge that has been fashioned within the reader’s consciousness through 
social, political and cultural contextuality. Again, contra Fish (see Chapter 3, Section 2), 
this is not to propose that the possibility of further knowledge is impossible or exhausted, 
nor to suggest that anything considered original is merely a variant of existing cognitive 
and aesthetic patterning. Rather, it is to suggest that the acquisition of any new 
understanding by the reader is dependent upon a re-interpretation of that text within the 
framework of the reader’s personal accumulation of prior knowledge. Such re-
interpretation will then increase that accumulation, which may be employed in another 
instance of reading. 
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Although this relationship is applicable to any text, factual or fictional, it is perhaps more 
obvious when someone reads a fictional narrative. An author may represent in his text 
what seem to be wholly imaginary occurrences and fantastical characters, which are 
nonetheless rendered comprehensible by their relation to existing verifiable actualities
(see note 3 above). For example, consider the following passage, which is extracted from 
a work of science-fiction by novelist Ian Banks:  
Uagen Zlepe, scholar, hung from the left-side sub-ventral foliage of the dirigible 
behemothaur Yoleus by his prehensile tail and his left hand. He held a glyph-writing 
tablet with one foot and wrote inside it with his other hand. His remaining leg hung 
loose, temporarily surplus to requirements. He wore baggy cerise pantaloons 
(currently rolled up above the knee) secured with a stout pocket-belt, a short black 
jacket with a stowed cape, chunky mirror finish ankle-bracelets, a single-chain 
necklace with four small, dull stones and a tasselled box hat. His skin was light green, 
he was about two metres standing straight on his hind legs and a little longer 
measured from nose to tail. Around him, beyond the hanging fronds of the 
behemothaur’s slipstream-ruffled skin foliage, the view faded away to a hazy blue 
nothing in every direction except up, where the creature’s body filled the sky.
(Banks 2000: 75-6)
Apart from the deliberately alienating effect of unusual proper names (an effect common 
also to factual texts representing unfamiliar locales and persons with unusual names), the 
description above is as recognisable, and consequently as easy to understand and 
interpret, as any factual text (or as any realist fictional text). The portrayal of Zlepe, a 
character not empirically an element of any actual human experience, is made probable 
by the juxtaposition of descriptions that emphasise the incongruity of the whole while
simultaneously assuming an awareness of the elements that make up the invented 
creature. Although each reader will necessarily interpret the passage differently, within 
the inter-subjective limits suggested in Chapter 2, familiar descriptions of his “prehensile 
tail”, his height (measured from “nose to tail”), and his ability to employ all limbs 
equally, coalesce to create the impression of a simian being, which would be recognisable 
to most readers. Although the colour of his skin deliberately detracts from the common 
notion of an ape, the concept of the colour green can readily be applied to the 
representation. Other commonplace descriptions include those of the ape as a scholar, his 
flamboyant clothing, and his inscribing of his experiences. A further combination of 
recognisable representations results in the object of the “glyph-writing tablet”. A “glyph”
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is a rare form of hieroglyphic, and the word tablet is reminiscent both of the slabs of 
stone or wood employed in ancient times for purposes of writing, as well as the 
contemporary portable computer known as the tablet PC. Although a more exact 
description of the glyph-writing tablet is not supplied, sufficient information is present in 
the text for the reader to comprehend the possibility of the object, despite its having no 
physical foundation in the world of the reader’s experience. 
More alienating for the reader than the figure of Zlepe is the depiction of the (living) 
object to which he is clinging – the behemothaur – which is a deliberate linguistic 
conflation of terms combining the impression of a creature of immense size (the 
behemoth) with the nomenclature for ancient and unfamiliar life-forms ( the –othaur). In 
addition, the behemothaur is depicted as being impossibly massive – almost the size of a 
small planet together with its own atmosphere and eco-system – and quasi-sentient (or at 
least instinctive), drifting through the universe in search of other behemothaurs. This may 
appear ludicrous to some, amusing to others, ingenious to yet others, but again all would
be able to comprehend the creature, based on the supplied information. Even if it were 
the case that each reader were requested to describe his or her own conception of the 
behemothaur, and that each description turned out to be different from every other, this 
would not detract from the interpretation of the creature initialised by combining 
recognisable terms and representations into a totality that, in itself, is not a recognisable 
element of a world external to the representation. 
The conclusion to be reached regarding the representation of non-verifiable objects, 
occurrences and characters in fiction is that any potential reader – whether  reading a 
narrative that is foreign to normal human experience, or a text that is concerned with 
familiar and demonstrable events and characters – has the ability to construct a meaning 
from that text by drawing on existing experience. Although many such reconstructions 
will be referential in nature, owing to the need to reformulate a mental image of a 
represented entity, not all fictional representations are of physical objects, and
reformulations of ideas, notions and perceptions are equally relevant to the experience of 
fiction.  
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1.2 The Characteristics of the Fictional Text
When considering a text known to be factual, the potential reader is confronted with
representations of occurrences, characters, situations and places that are presumed to 
denote a concrete actuality that either exists or has existed at some time in the past. Such 
a reader may be aware that metaphorical and narratological strategies are implicit in the 
factual text, but this does not negate the actuality of the depictions and descriptions.
Rather, to be so aware tends to emphasise the manifest inadequacy of any textual 
representation, and to suggest that the representation is both limited and limiting in its 
attempts to depict extra-textual events in the world. When discussing representation in 
fictional texts, however, there arises a further complication: the degree of realism 
employed by the author. This is often combined with, although not exclusive to, the 
degree of aestheticisation employed in order to achieve a certain result. It was argued 
earlier (with regard to the Beevor text) that aestheticisation is an inevitable attribute of 
the factual narrative. However, in the non-fictional text it is frequently less apparent than 
in the fictional text. This can be seen in a consideration of the following extracts: both are 
taken from the fictional genre of the novel, and both depict an instance of violence
involving firearms. 
(i)
A dull blow struck the back of his head. He had long expected it and yet it took him 
unawares. He felt, wondering, his knees give way and his body whirl round in a half-
turn ... It got dark, the sea carried him rocking on its nocturnal surface. Memories 
passed through him, like streaks of mist over the water ... A second, smashing blow 
hit him on the ear. Then all became quiet. There was the sea again with its sounds. A 
wave slowly lifted him up. It came from afar and travelled sedately on, a shrug of 
eternity.
(Koestler 1941: 215-16)   
(ii)
The blanket fluttered, air slammed. Starling shot Evelda Drumgo through the upper 
lip and the back of her head blew out. Starling was somehow sitting down with a 
terrible stinging in the side of her head and the breath driven out of her. Evelda sat in 
the road too, collapsed forward over her legs, blood gouting out of her mouth and 
over the baby, its cries muffled by her body.
(Harris 1999: 16-17)
Both of these descriptions are examples of how language within the context of a fictional 
narrative is subject to selective aestheticisation. Although both use the medium of a 
descriptive language comprehensible to a potential reader within the familiar form of the 
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novel, the degree of aestheticisation determines to a large extent the ethical and aesthetic 
evaluations resulting from reading the text. All fictional accounts are necessarily 
instances of aestheticisation to some degree, but that degree is largely determined by a 
combination of the genre of the text and the degree of figurative language employed in 
the text. This is evidenced by further analysis of the two examples given above. 
The first extract – a textual depiction of an execution – is an instance of a description that 
has a higher degree of aestheticisation. Koestler’s narrative is dependent upon figurative, 
specifically metaphorical, strategies that serve either to diminish the perception of the 
violence as a literal possibility, or conversely to heighten the perception of the violence in 
a non-literal manner. This is not to claim that the effect of the description is diminished –
such depictions often acquire even more aesthetic power as a result of skilful 
aestheticisation. Rather, the argument is that the aestheticisation further removes the 
actuality of possible violence (as understood by a potential reader) from the experience of 
reading the text. In such a case, description will function within a framework that 
emphasises the representational possibilities of the language. Figurative language, in such 
a text, has precedence over the extra-textual re-formulation of possible and actual events 
and experiences. The passage becomes both metaphorical and comprehensible owing to 
the juxtaposition of  the alienating and the familiar through the use of figurative devices 
(particularly the extended metaphor of the sea) that are employed in such a manner that 
“even though [they are] used in none of [their] established senses … this sort of thing is 
possible only if these uses are somehow derivative from uses in established senses”
(Alston 1964: 97).22
The employment of metaphorical figuration is therefore the primary reason for textual 
aestheticisation.23 As discussed earlier with regard to the non-fictional text, a metaphor 
22 This may be not quite consonant with Derrida’s account of the innovative aspect of metaphor, but even if 
the language employed is innovative, a relationship with established senses would have to exist in order for
such language to be comprehensible .
23 Many postmodern novels, employing the style of “metafiction” in which attention is drawn to the 
artificiality of the construct of the text, employ metaphors in which the tenor and vehicle are deliberately 
incongruous. Waugh gives an example from Muriel Sparks’ novel Not to Disturb: “lightning … 
[illuminates] the lily-pond and the sunken rose garden like a self-stricken flash photographer, and like a 
zip-fastener ripped from its garment by a sexual maniac” (in Waugh 1984: 17).  The effect of such 
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implies using a specific term (the vehicle) in a differing sense (the tenor), thus disrupting
that term’s original sense. In the first extract, the loss of consciousness experienced by 
the protagonist (the vehicle) is metaphorically depicted by the tenor of a vast and 
darkening ocean. By working through this sense of the ocean as signified to 
unconsciousness and death, the author is able to moderate the violence of the character’s 
death by suggesting that he experiences it as analogous to the undulating motion of a 
calm sea (“a wave gently lifted him up”). Even his last thoughts are included within the 
extended metaphor as “streaks of mist over the water”. The reader is not unaware of the 
violence of the representation, but the metaphorical language serves to direct the response 
that a potential reader may have by aesthetically eliminating any graphic or realistic 
reconstructions of the violence. This is not to suggest that the extract is wholly figurative, 
and devoid of any realist description. Yet even the descriptions of the shooting – the “dull 
blow”, the “smashing blow” – are metaphorical, even if more graphic than the dominant 
and extended metaphor of the ocean.
The second extract is an example of a text that depends on a less figurative style in order 
to create its realistic effect. Although metaphor is necessarily present in the depiction –
the air “slammed”, Starling’s breath is “driven out” of her – it is stylistically divergent
from the metaphoricity of the first extract: extra-textual re-formulations of possible 
events and experiences have precedence over metaphorical language. The degree of 
aestheticisation is limited as the representation attempted by the text is more narrowly 
descriptive of the actuality of a similar occurrence, and so less figurative. Yet, the very 
attempt by writers of realist fiction to diminish the distinction between the factual and the 
fictional becomes equally paradoxical: “the nascent realist novel declares its 
independence … as a self-sustaining reproduction of actuality while at the same time 
insisting on its dependence on that actuality as a true eyewitness account” (Furst 1995: 
7). This paradox is further complicated by “the realist’s insistence on equating truth with 
illusion [which] means that they could achieve their aims only on the level of pretence, 
by prevailing upon their readers to accept the validity of their contentions and to believe 
language is determined by the strangeness of the relation between tenor and vehicle as well as by its 
appropriateness to the description. Such a metaphor paradoxically evokes an image that is unfamiliar, while 
simultaneously heightening the effect of the description.
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without reservation in the reality of the fictive worlds they created” (1995: 9). Despite the 
realist techniques of the second extract, there are no such actual persons as Starling or 
Drumgo, yet Harris’ style of writing presupposes a deliberate disregard for this illusion, 
as the reader replaces it instead with a ready acceptance of the paradox of a possible
actuality of the event. The passage is realist because it interweaves elements of reality 
with the illusion implicit in the fiction, “yet that illusion can be presented in a manner 
designed to elicit belief in its truthfulness” (Furst 1995: 12). 
However, for any potential reader to accept the possibility of verifiability in a realist text, 
certain contextual expectations need to be realised. These contexts and constructs of time, 
situation, and socio-cultural space largely determine the nature of the response of the 
reader to the iterable text. Realism is necessarily relative to, and dependent upon, context, 
so that “for a Fifth-Dynasty Egyptian the straight-forward way of representing something 
is not the same as for an eighteenth-century Japanese; and neither way is the same as for 
an early twentieth-century Englishman … realism is a matter not of any constant or 
absolute relationship between a picture and its object but of a relationship between the 
system of representation employed in the piece and the standard system” (Goodman 
1976: 37-8). This suggests that the conditions necessary for evaluating a narrative as 
realist are based less on direct references to an extra-textual actuality than on a frame of 
reference familiar to the reader. Representation, particularly realist representation, is 
therefore “a matter of habit” (1976: 38). This has important implications for all types of 
text. Factual texts, even more than fictional, are written predominantly in a realist mode,
and are hence subject to the same conditions of context and circumstance. Strategies of 
reading, combined with an iterable textuality, determine evaluative responses to both 
fictional and factual writing. 
Factual texts are primarily realist, while differing instances of fictional representation fall
into a wider spectrum of aestheticisation. Nevertheless, even if highly aestheticised texts 
are usually fictional, there is still a close correspondence between the fictional text and 
the factual text, both of which are intrinsically reliant on figurative language. The 
implication of this assertion is that it becomes problematic to declare any absolute 
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boundary between factual and fictional representations The text, prior to reading, makes 
no specific differentiation between types of writing, apart from the degree of 
aestheticisation employed. This, however, is clearly not an adequate indicator as to 
whether the text is of one or the other. This is further complicated by the strategies of 
much fictional writing: even though (arguably) “fact, not truth, is the opposite of fiction,
… fiction, which goes out of its way to avoid the appearance of the fictitious, is bound to 
involve a contradiction in terms” (Furst 1995: 10). It is therefore essential, before 
returning to a critique of the fact-fiction dichotomy, to consider the theories which 
attempt to explain exactly how fictional texts evade “the appearance of the fictitious”.
1.3 Theories of Fiction
1.3.1 Null Denotation
Various theories of fiction concern themselves with the paradox that a text with no 
verifiable extra-textual reference is still able to function in such a manner as to generate
an aesthetic response in a reader as though it did have reference to an existing actuality. 
The first theory to be considered here is that of null denotation, as proposed by Nelson 
Goodman. Goodman’s claim that there can be no representation without denotation has 
already been considered in the first chapter – that is, the notion of denotation as a textual 
substitute for the referent, rather than an instance of equivalence. The problem that now 
arises is that of a denotation within the text that is not a substitute for anything outside of 
the text. Goodman illustrates his theory by referring to two fictional descriptions: firstly, 
that of the character of Pickwick, and secondly that of a unicorn. A reader may
comprehend either portrayal, while at the same time acknowledging that neither exists in 
any verifiable physical sense. In other words, the descriptions are examples of null 
denotation. Yet this fails to explain how it is possible that the passage can represent a 
something (in this case Pickwick, or the unicorn), while simultaneously not representing 
anything actually existing or having existed. Goodman argues that the description is not a 
description of Pickwick as Pickwick, or a description of a unicorn as a unicorn, but rather 
a “Pickwick-description”, a “unicorn-description”. This means that a text “cannot, 
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barring equivocation, both represent Pickwick and represent nothing … but a 
[description] may be of a certain kind – be a Pickwick-picture – without representing 
anything” (Goodman 1976: 22). Nevertheless, although it is possible to consider 
classifying the various descriptions into a Pickwick-description or a unicorn-description, 
there exists no clear indication as to the appropriateness or means of classifying fictional 
textual representations: “The way [descriptions] are thus classified into kinds … is far 
from sharp or stable, and resists codification. Borderlines shift and blur, new categories 
are always coming into prominence, and the canons of classification are less clear than 
the practice” (1976: 23).  
Even so, a reader does not comprehend an instance of fictional narrative through
classifying it according the type of description it suggests. The question is how that 
description – which has null denotation – has the potential for meaning, particularly when 
it is clearly not a part of that reader’s direct experience. It was suggested earlier in this 
chapter that the elements that constitute any fictional description are known to the reader 
in advance, rather than in their totality, and it is the conflation of these elements that 
creates the necessary conditions for the generation of understanding and meaning in any 
text. Goodman takes this notion further by claiming that “we can learn, on the basis of 
samples, to apply ‘unicorn-picture’ not only without ever having seen any unicorns but 
without ever having seen or heard the word ‘unicorn’ before” (1976: 24). By 
comprehending the actuality of a single horn, combined with the knowledge of what a 
horse is, one may re-arrange these familiar elements into what may ultimately be 
determined as a “unicorn-description”, which allows for each potential reader to
empirically interpret  the characteristics of a unicorn, despite there having been no such 
existing entities as unicorns. Similarly, the character of Pickwick may be understood as a 
“man-description” which corresponds to the reader’s understanding of a man combined 
with the various textual representations of the characteristics of that particular man as 
suggested by Dickens’s narrative: “Understanding a term is not a precondition, and may 
often be a result, of having to apply the term and its compounds” (1976: 25). The reason 
that this understanding remains unproblematic is that, although a description must denote 
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something in order to represent it, it is not necessary for a description to denote anything 
in order to be a something-representation. 
It is also the case that, just as most factual texts are dependent upon fictional strategies 
and techniques, so too are most fictional texts dependent upon a contextual re-reading of 
an extra-textual actuality. One way in which this occurs is through the re-organisation of 
the familiar elements of a null denotation into a coherent whole (as in the case of the 
unicorn discussed above). Another is the cognition of descriptions that are not wholly 
null denotations, but that do include specifically verifiable extra-textual elements, 
characters and/or occurrences. For example, the Dickensian fictional character Barnaby 
Rudge is the protagonist of a novel that includes the historically real character of Lord 
George Gordon, as well as the historically verifiable occurrence of the Gordon riots, 
which took place in London, an existing metropolitan area. However, all the above 
constituents are combined within the framework of a fictional narrative, and hence each 
should be considered as having an indeterminate (if not null) denotation, despite their 
having some reference to existing characters, places and events. Indeterminate denotation 
should be considered in the same manner as null denotation – rather than attempting to 
glean any actual reference from the text, the reader should consider the entire text as 
being fictional, albeit with suggestions of possible historical connections. For example, 
without a verifiably factual text that corresponds to the Dickensian representation, it is 
not possible (nor desirable) to determine the veracity of Dickens’s description of Lord 
Gordon. As Goodman asserts, “where we cannot determine whether a picture denotes 
anything or not, we can only proceed as if it did not – that is, confine ourselves to 
considering what kind of picture it is. Thus cases of indeterminate denotation are treated 
in the same way as cases of null denotation” (1976: 26).
Therefore, the first characteristic of a fictional text is that it has null denotation, that its 
reference to an extra-linguistic actuality is either non-existent, or is qualified by the 
framing of any verifiable reference within the overall structure of a non-factual linguistic 
representation. Even if the language and compositional strategies of many fictional texts 
are technically and semantically indistinguishable from the language of factual texts (and 
88
vice versa), the comprehension and evaluation of the narrative subsequent to the reading 
of the text determines its reception as an instance of either null denotation or, conversely, 
as a historically verifiable representation. 
1.3.2 The Theories of Pretence, Illusion and Counterpart
The notion of null denotation does not in itself offer a solution to the paradox implicit in 
a cognitive response to fictional writing. Colin Radford, in “How Can We Be Moved by 
the Fate of Anna Karenina?” ,24 argues that such a paradox is based on three premises.
These are: 
1) In order to be affected by an instance of fictional writing, we must accept as true 
the concrete existence of the characters and/or situations we are responding to.
2) Yet such belief is unattainable when experiencing fictional texts, due to the
unverifiable and imaginative nature of the narrative.
3) However, fictional characters and situations can and do affect and involve the 
reader in a variety of ways.25
The paradox is that although any two of the premises may be true, the third will always 
be logically incompatible. As a consequence of this, any emotional or affective 
involvement with a fictional text – even though such involvement determines to a large 
extent the potential reader’s evaluation of the text – can be considered not only irrational, 
but incoherent: “Our being moved in certain ways by works of art, though very ‘natural’ 
to us and in that way only too intelligible, involves us in inconsistency and so 
incoherence” (Radford and Weston 1975). Yet Radford’s theory of the illogicality of 
reading the fictional text merely asserts that fictional writing is irrational, and therefore 
largely inexplicable, even though he is compelled to concede that a reader will not 
necessarily question the experience of reading fiction. As he fails to offer any theory as to 
how what may occur (apart from dismissing it as incoherent), and as he does not attempt 
to explicate that experience, it is necessary to study other theories that consider in more 
24 The following discussion develops points made by Schneider 2006 in “The Paradox of Fiction”. 
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/f/fict-par.htm. Accessed 2 November 2007
25 Although there are various ways of responding to a fictional narrative, many theorists concentrate on 
emotional responses. By responding thus, a reader is compelled to relate to and empathise with the 
characters in the narrative as if they were actual. While responding in a more analytical and less emotional 
manner does not negate the experience of the text, it diminishes to a certain extent the affective experience. 
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detail the implications of responding to a fictional text of null denotation as if it were 
demonstrable in an external actuality. Such theories include the Pretend theory, the
Illusion theory and the Thought theory.
The Pretend, or Simulation, theory bases its argumentation on a rejection of the third 
premise – that fictional characters and situations can emotionally involve the reader in a 
variety of ways. Kendall Walton, for instance, argues that it is not possible to experience 
any genuine emotion when experiencing a work of fiction. Rather, the reader is subject to 
a series of “quasi-emotions” which give the impression of the emotion, but which are 
constructed through the combination of pre-existing criteria and second-order beliefs 
regarding the characters and situations depicted in the narrative. The analogy he employs
is that of a childhood game of make-believe. Just as for a child the hobby horse is an 
actual horse, so too will the potential reader believe in the prop (the text) which creates 
the conditions for the response to that fictional text. Although the use of words as props 
occurs primarily in fictional language,26 it is as a psychological rather than as a visual 
prop that they are employed: “The reader of Anna Karenina does not merely note that it 
is fictional that Anna is unfaithful to her husband, suffers the disapproval of society, and 
is finally driven to throw herself under the wheels of a train. It is fictional in the reader’s 
game that he learns about all this, that he sympathizes with Anna, and suffers with her. 
He imagines learning about an actual Anna, and imagines sympathizing and grieving for 
her” (Walton 1994: 294). Novels and other forms of fictional representation are therefore 
assumed to be a specific category of psychological game, in which words become
symbols not dissimilar to pictures. 
If this is the case, then the descriptions, evocations and representations that are required 
for the stimulation of the imagination are dependent firstly upon the linguistic and 
semantic strategies of the text, and secondly upon the empathetic and cognitive abilities
of the reader. If the fictional representation is cognitively and contextually interpretable 
by the potential reader, then it is the more likely that the reader will be able to pretend
26 According to Walton, the words of a factual text contain mere information, as opposed to being props for 
the imagination. Yet this was disputed earlier in the chapter, with Hayden White in particular criticising 
such nave assumptions of the existence of an objective historical text.
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that these occurrences and characters are actual, and there will be a correspondingly 
greater probability of imagined empathy. Walton argues that what distinguishes an 
aesthetic response from a genuine response is that we do not act upon the former 
response. Yet, as Paskow comments, “It is simply not true that a person’s actional 
inhibitedness in the face of artistically fictional events is a sufficient reason for doubting 
the authenticity of his or her self-described emotional responses” (Paskow 2004: 50). 
Similarly, Scholdan argues that the experience of empathy is primary, requiring an 
“abstraction from your own embodiment, and the very concrete imagining of somebody 
else’s experience”. Without this empathetic aspect of the experience of fictional 
narratives, then, the “stories do not make sense, … they do not give enjoyment, neither 
intellectually nor emotionally, they do not offer an adequate imagining of the world, if 
the reader is refusing to or unable to be affected sympathetically by the perspective from 
which the story is told.”27 This implies that to acknowledge as pretence any empathetic 
response to the fictional text is to refute the “concrete imagining of somebody else’s 
experience”, thereby negating the possibilities contained within such a response. 
Another objection to the pretend theory of fiction is that the notion of quasi-emotions is 
problematic within the presumably authentic experience of responding to a text.
However, it is generally the case that a reader will not accept a narrative as factual to the 
same extent that he or she would suppose a historical account to be actual.28 The 
emotions generated by a reading of the former text are therefore effectively dissimilar to 
the emotions generated by a reading of the latter. This disjunction between actual 
emotions  and an imaginative emotional response has resulted in some theorists 
proposing a theory of Illusion as superseding the theory of Pretence. This theory rejects 
the second premise of the paradox of fiction, that belief is unattainable when 
experiencing fictional texts, due to the unverifiable and imaginative nature of the 
narrative. The Illusion theory argues for a contrary point of view: the fictional text is a 
generator of belief, rather than dependent upon existing beliefs that are prior to reading. 
27 (Scholdan 2003: http://www.political-science.at/forschung/Fiction.htm, Accessed 2 November 2007).
28 Paskow, arguing from a realist perspective, claims that in order to understand emotional and cognitive 
involvement in a fictional situation, it is necessary to accept that situations exist independently of the 
reader. However, there must also exist a simultaneous acceptance of an inherent quality of make-believe in 
the text (Paskow 2004: 62ff). 
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Yet the earlier objection that behavioural disanalogy militates against authentic belief 
becomes even more relevant in the case of the Illusion theory: “Hardly anyone ever 
literally believes the content of a fiction when he knows it to be a fiction; if it happens at 
moments of forgetfulness or intense realism in the story (which I doubt), such moments 
are too brief to underwrite our often sustained responses to fictional events and 
characters” (Currie 1990: 188). 
Whereas the Pretend theory denies the third premise, and the Illusion theory denies the 
second, the Thought theory rejects the first premise of the paradox of fictional 
representation, that the reader must accept as factual the concrete existence of the 
representation. This theory also requires a modification of the third premise in order to
suggest that it is the possible counterparts of the text that are important to cognition, 
rather than the narrative. Thus the argument advanced in this theory is that our beliefs and 
responses to actual events are of a certain type, and not necessarily the model for the 
beliefs and responses suggested by the fictional text. In addition, to respond to a text does 
not imply any beliefs regarding the extra-textual actuality of the characters and events 
depicted in the text. A text is therefore more depiction than belief, and our responses to it 
are a mental reconstruction of that depiction. What is pertinent is not whether something 
exists or not, but whether or not the qualities of the character or situation depicted allow 
for the possibility of its existence, and consequently for the reader’s response to that 
existence. Currie argues that “we experience genuine emotions when we encounter 
fiction, but their relation to the story is causal rather than intentional; the story provokes 
thoughts about real people and situations, and these are the intentional objects of our 
emotions” (Currie 1990: 188). However, the problem with this standpoint is that it tends 
to avoid the possibility that a fictional representation could interact with the reader’s 
experience without evoking specific individuals or occurrences. 
Each of the theories of fiction discussed in this section contributes certain pertinent 
notions to the problems inherent in the paradox of fictional representation; however, none 
is able comprehensively to explicate the aesthetic and cognitive implications of the 
reading of a non-factual narrative. The Thought theory appears to be the most credible
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theory, within this framework for considering fictional texts, owing to its insistence upon 
a re-interpretive and contextual juxtaposition of experience and narrative, separated from 
notions of extra-textual belief. However, a central hypothesis of this study is that there is 
no intrinsic difference between a factual and a non-factual text, prior to and even 
throughout the reading of the text. A more comprehensive theory of fiction – one that 
recognises this hypothesis as credible – is necessary before any conflation of the two 
perceptions of representation is possible. Such a theory is to be found in the Derridean 
notion of literature as a deferred reality, in which fictional narrative is rendered plausible
as a result of the functioning of the iterable, contextual and intertextual possibilities of 
textual representation. 
1.3.3 Deferred Reality
J. Hillis Miller has defined literature29 as “a strange use of words to refer to things, 
people, and events about which it is impossible ever to know whether or not they have 
somewhere a latent existence” (Miller 2002: 45). This definition is particularly relevant
to Derrida’s speculations regarding fiction, a subject which runs throughout his own 
texts: “My most constant interest, coming even before my philosophical interest I should 
say, if this is possible, has been directed towards literature, towards that writing that is 
called literary” (Derrida in Attridge 1992a: 33). Later in the same interview, he re-
emphasises the crucial significance of literature: “Experience of Being, nothing less, 
nothing more, on the edge of metaphysics, literature perhaps stands on the edge of 
everything, almost beyond everything, including itself. It’s the most interesting thing in 
the world, maybe more interesting than the world” (1992a: 47). For Derrida, literature not 
only exists in the world (as well as exceeding the world), but is a commentary upon and 
reflection of the world.30 His refutation of the language of literature as being somehow 
divorced from (or parasitical upon) everyday discourse, results in a conception of fiction
29 It should be emphasized once again that although the following discussion employs the term literature, 
this is in most cases co-extensive with the term fiction, and will be considered as such here. As mentioned 
earlier, Derrida does not regard fiction as necessarily literature; nevertheless his observations do have 
relevance to the reception, and production, of all fictional texts.
30 This claim has resonance with the realist position that “artistic expression and the experience of it is 
always about, an attempt to “comprehend,” our real world” (Paskow 2004: 64). 
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that places it firmly within the ambit of the experience of the everyday. It employs the 
same strategies and is subject to the same contextual re-interpretations as the language of 
factual representations, the principal difference being not in the words of a text 
themselves, but rather in the variable consequences of changing conventions, which in 
turn confirm the continuing iterability of any text. In addition, fiction – often considered 
as either frivolous or irrational – encapsulates the stratagem of the deconstruction of 
meta-narratives: “In this century, the experience of literature crosses all the 
“deconstructive” seisms shaking the authority and the pertinence of the question “What is 
… ?” and all the associated regimes of essence or truth” (1992a: 48).31
Derrida’s insistence upon the importance of the functioning of the fictional representation 
therefore not only considers the characteristics and potentiality of literary discourse, but 
also suggests a correspondence between fictional and factual texts. In texts such as 
“Ulysses Gramophone: Hear Say Yes in Joyce”, “… That Dangerous Supplement …”, 
“The Double Session” and “Plato’s Pharmacy”, Derrida continues the investigation into
the affiliation between so-called literary and non-literary language – either by examining
the strategies of specific authors (for example Joyce, Blanchot, Plato and Mallarm), or 
by considering the language of specific texts (Ulysses, Death Sentence, Phaedrus, Fable). 
In addition, many of his texts also include discussions that are specifically concerned 
with the production and reception of fiction in general. Two texts which have particular 
relevance for this study are the interview with Attridge, “This Strange Institution Called 
Literature” (already referred to above), and the essay “Psyche: Invention of the Other”
(1989).
Unlike a historical or other factual text that has explicit extra-textual reference to events 
or characters in the material world, every fictional text (while still linguistically and 
conventionally linked to the world) “gives news of a different and unique alternative 
reality, a hyper-reality. This reality does not seem to depend on the words of the work for
its existence. It seems to be discovered, not fabricated” (Miller 2002: 80). Thus, for
31 It is important to note that Derrida does not consider there to be an essence of literature; rather it is an 
indistinct and indefinable institution: “The existence of something like a literary reality in itself will always 
remain problematic … there is no assured essence or existence of literature” (in Attridge 1992a: 73).
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Derrida, a fictional text employs the terminology of invention as production,32 rather than 
the terminology of creation. Apart from the invention of machines, the only other 
“authorized” example of invention is the fictional narrative: “people invent stories
(fictional or fabulous) … Someone may invent by fabulation, by producing narratives to 
which there is no corresponding reality outside the narrative” (Derrida 1989: 322). As
commonly understood, the act of invention implies the process of creating something that 
did not previously exist, or at least a process of rearranging pre-existing elements into an
innovative and previously unavailable form. Yet invention is not of necessity an act of 
creation, particularly within the context of fictional composition. It is rather invention in 
the archaic sense of discovery: “invention finds or discovers things … invention can 
display its originality only in the value of form and composition. As for ‘ideas’, they 
belong to everyone; universal in their essence, they could not ground a property right” 
(1989: 313-4). In other words, it is only through utilising what already exists that 
invention is possible: “[Invention] unveils what was already found there or is still not 
created, is only put together, starting with a stock of existing and available elements, in a 
given configuration” (1989: 338). 
This notion, already discussed earlier in relation to the science-fiction text by Iain Banks, 
is dependent upon the limitless potential for textual (re)invention. However, Derrida’s 
interpretation expands the implications of this re-arrangement by seeming to suggest that
any fictional narrative exists independently of its author, and would continue to exist 
even if it were never actually written down. On a superficial level, this appears to be 
reminiscent of the Romantic assumption of the genius, whose act of composition was 
determined by his or her capacity to accumulate transcendent ideas which could then be 
re-assembled as linguistic structures and forms in order to create the perfect artwork. Yet 
a more nuanced reading suggests a fundamental difference: Derrida is not arguing that 
there is a literal, pre-existing and transcendent accumulation of ideas, but rather that any 
author necessarily employs existing social constructs and notions in order to invent a 
narrative: “There is no natural invention – and yet invention also presupposes originality, 
32 The notion of production is neither absolute nor determinate: “[F]or the moment I leave to the term 
“production” a certain indeterminacy” (Derrida 1989: 322).
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a relation to origins, generation, procreation, genealogy, that is to say, a set of values 
often associated with genius or geniality, thus with naturality” (1989: 316). 
However, although most texts are identified by a signature, which often lends recognition 
and status to the text (despite the infinite re-interpretation which serves to supersede the 
relevance of the author-function), textual invention transcends the signature to become
both an opportunity and an imperative for iterability: “Invention is not only that of a 
poetic fiction, a work whose production becomes the occasion for a signature, for a 
patent, for the recognition of its status as a literary work by its author and also by its 
reader, the one who judges … It also puts out a machine, a technical mechanism that one 
must be able, under certain conditions and limitations, to reproduce, repeat, reuse, 
transpose, set within a public tradition and heritage” (Derrida 1989: 333-4). An invention 
of a literary text is subject to the same iterable conditions that accompany all texts, 
resulting in a subjection to interpretation and re-interpretation in various contextual 
spaces. In addition, the fictional text remains fundamentally indistinguishable from any 
other type of text, at least until read and evaluated within the framework of an 
intersubjective interpretive community. “The discourse … will have to have its invention 
evaluated, recognised and legitimised by someone else  … the other as a member of a 
social community or of an institution” (1989: 315).
The iterable consequences of the invention of a text therefore result in a narrative that is 
dependent upon pre-existing ideas, events and contextual paradigms, as well as being 
simultaneously a text that is a “disordering mechanism, [which must] open up a space of 
unrest or turbulence for every status assignable to it” (1989: 335). It thus “always 
presupposes some illegality, the breaking of an implicit contract; it inserts a disorder into 
the peaceful ordering of things; it disregards the proprieties” (1989: 312). A fictional text 
is conceivably an effective disordering mechanism than other categories of text: “By 
inventing the possible on the basis of the possible – that is, something quite other that can 
also be quite ancient – a set of present possibilities … has to declare itself to be the 
invention of that which did not appear to be possible” (1989: 340-1). Such invention of 
the (im)possible leads from the notion of invention to the notion of a fictional text in 
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terms of its status within an iterable framework of reception. In order to investigate this 
notion more fully, it is essential to isolate two significant statements Derrida has made 
with regard to the relation literature has to the material world.
The statement which is most pertinent for this study is that “there is no literature without 
a suspended relation to meaning and reference” (Derrida in Attridge 1992a: 48). This is a 
direct refutation of the theory that holds that factual writing is distinct from, and therefore 
fundamentally unrelated to, the fictional text. Just as White has argued that historical 
discourse is characterised by the imagery, strategies and forms of fictional writing, so too 
are fictional texts dependent upon, and related to, meaning and reference in an external 
actuality. Literature is not merely an opportunity for a text to subvert discourse with a 
mischievous play on factuality; rather, “literature, in the neologistic sense in which 
Derrida formulates it, is at once more significant and more spectral. As [Derrida] puts it: 
‘the possibility of literary fiction haunts so-called truthful, responsible, serious, real 
testimony as its proper possibility. This haunting is perhaps the passion itself, the 
passionate place of literary writing, as the project to say everything’” (Royle 2003: 101). 
The fictional becomes inextricably linked with the factual; there can be no “truthful 
testimony” without the possibility of fiction and, as argued in the previous chapter, 
notions of testimony are inextricably related to the aesthetics of the textual 
representation. 
This is related to Derrida’s other statement regarding the possibility of literature: not only 
is it in a suspended relation with meaning and reference, but it is “an institution of fiction 
which gives in principle the power to say everything, to break free of the rules, to 
displace them, and thereby to institute, to invent and even to suspect the traditional 
difference between nature and institution, nature and conventional law, nature and 
history” (Derrida in Attridge 1992a: 37). The result of this radical irresponsibility is that 
the text may say anything “while remaining shielded, safe from all censorship, be it 
religious or political.” That this is an ideal, rather than a present state of affairs, can be 
seen by the continuing persecution of writers opposed to the dominant discourse of 
various societies and cultures. Radical textual irresponsibility is “the highest form of 
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responsibility [linked to] to the experience of a promise engaged, that is always as 
endless promise” (1992a: 37-8). The idea of irresponsibility is in itself a refutation of the 
view that fiction has no relation to the material world. (Ir)responsibility must have some 
relationship to that world, for if there were no such relationship, and no extra-textual 
reference, then fictional texts would have no meaning, and this notion of the ideal 
democracy would be incoherent. The “irresponsible” therefore has the potential to 
become “responsible” by actualising the relevance of the fictional text to social and 
political expression.
Consequently, the possibility of fiction in an ideal democracy is also the possibility of 
political freedom in the actual world. It is the potentiality of writing to depict or narrate 
anything, even if it disrupts or transforms the perceptions and prejudices of the potential 
reader. Without necessarily having a concrete extra-textual actuality, such a text can 
represent events and characters as if they had such an actuality – in other words, a 
suspended relation to the extra-textual. Fiction has both a social and a political 
connotation, functioning intertextually as cause and as effect. The theoretical implications 
of this hypothesis of literature as necessary to the functioning of any society, as well as
the suspended nature of fictional narrative, suggest that there exists the possibility of a 
fulfilment of the expectations of existing societies, as well as a simultaneous disruption of 
those expectations. The effect of this thinking is to extend the potential for cognitive, 
evaluative and aesthetic capabilities within various cultural and political contexts. 
In order to create the conditions for a suspended relationship to an external actuality, 
much fictional writing remains necessarily referential to a certain degree. The referential 
function is therefore never negated in a fictional narrative, but is itself always suspended 
or implied. The potential reader, to echo Coleridge, must frequently and consciously 
suspend disbelief33 – that is, he or she must enter into a implicit contract with the text that 
allows for the possibility (if not the actuality) of the verifiability of the text. This has 
33 Coleridge, in his Biographia Literaria, Chapter 14, writes that his Lyrical Ballads “transfer from our 
inward nature a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of 
imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith” (Coleridge 
1978: 518). This notion is equally relevant to the reading of prose fiction.
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resonance with the notion discussed earlier that fictional writing is a form of hyper-
reality, that “literary works refer not to the real world but to an independently existing 
alternative world” (Miller 2002: 76). Derrida employs the Sartrean conception of the text 
as functioning either as “transcendent” or as “non-transcendent” in order to clarify his 
discussion of literature: a transcendent reading is one that “means going beyond interest 
for the signifier, the form, the language (note that I do not say ‘text’) in the direction of 
the meaning or referent” (Attridge 1992a: 44). This would suggest that a fictional 
narrative, without an external referent, implies a non-transcendent reading – a reading
that does not extend beyond the language to an external actuality, even if the reader is 
able to achieve a suspension of disbelief – while a factual narrative is necessarily 
transcendent. Yet, as Derrida claims, “Literature has no pure originality in this regard. A 
philosophical, or journalistic, or scientific discourse, can be read in a ‘nontranscendent’ 
fashion … One can do a nontranscendent reading of any text whatever” (Derrida in 
Attridge 1992a: 44). It should also be noted that just as there is no text that is absolutely 
fictional or factual, so too is there no text that is absolutely transcendent or non-
transcendent. Each potentiality must inform the other in a process of iterable 
intertextuality that gives significance to the reception of the text: “[N]o text resists [a 
transcendent reading] absolutely. Absolute resistance to such a reading would purely and 
simply destroy the trace of the text” (1992a: 47). 
1.4 Fictional Texts and Interpretation 
To read a text is, in turn, to be open to expectations of (non-)transcendence. For example, 
in Peter Carey’s novel My Life as a Fake (2004), the central character causes a literary 
scandal by submitting poetry to a literary journal for publication in the name of a non-
existent persona. One poem begins as follows:
Swamps, marshes, borrow-pits and other
Areas of stagnant water serve
As breeding grounds…
The editor of the journal is subsequently deceived into endorsing both the talent of the 
non-existent poet and the aesthetic power of his poetry. Yet the “poem” is almost 
99
immediately revealed as being little more than a found verse re-formulation of “an army 
manual of mosquito eradication” (Carey 2003: 40), produced without altering the text in 
any way other than the arrangement of the structure of the sentences. This incident, 
though fictional, emphasises the possibility that a transcendent reading, even if opposed 
to a non-transcendent reading of the same text, may be substituted for the latter 
(depending upon the reader’s expectations regarding the text).34 To read the text in its 
original form, employing a transcendent understanding of it as a factual document, would 
be to understand it as a direct reference to the “swamps, pits and other areas of stagnant 
water” that provide the breeding areas of the common mosquito. Yet to read it in a non-
transcendental fashion suspends such reference, and the expectations of the reader are 
disrupted in order to incorporate the fictional implications that entail a suspension of 
disbelief. This is a clear illustration of how the mechanism of the iterable text serves to 
alter the perceptions and expectations of the reader with each instance of its reception, 
necessitating a diverse understanding of precisely the same narrative within varying 
contexts. Social, political and cultural contexts, as well as interacting with one another, 
also interact with the language, structure and style of the text in order to contribute to the 
various possible meanings of any future reading. The response to such a reading is 
determined more by the iterability of the text than by the specific words of the text. 
2. (Non)Fiction: Conclusion and Summary
The consequence of the iterability of a textual representation is that it challenges the 
assumption of a fact-fiction dichotomy, as well as the assumption that factual writing is 
superior to fictional writing. The notion that fictional writing is neither transcendent nor 
grounded in any external actuality has resulted in its being considered frivolous: for 
example, in the context of speech act theory, theorists such as J. L. Austin have labelled
fictional or literary texts as “non-serious”, “infelicitous”, “etiolated” and “parasitical” on 
normal (that is, factual) speech acts (Miller 2001: 59). However, this assertion that 
instances of non-factual representation do not constitute speech acts is ill-considered, 
34 This confusion – between a transcendent and non-transcendent reading – has certain ethical and aesthetic 
implications which will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter.
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given the fundamental similarity between the two modes of textuality. Derrida confronts
and reverses Austin’s linguistic strategy by pointing out that his critique is necessarily 
inclusive of the very elements of language that he seeks to dismiss: “For, ultimately, isn’t 
it true that what Austin excludes as anomaly, exception, ‘non-serious’, citation (on stage, 
in a poem, or a soliloquy) is the determined modification of a general citationality – or 
rather, a general iterability – without which there would not even be a ‘successful’ 
performative? … a successful performative is necessarily an ‘impure’ performative” 
(Derrida 1988: 17). In addition, the potential for fictional texts to say anything regarding 
the world places them firmly within the socio-political sphere; as such, they must be 
considered as both as serious as, and as equal in importance to, factual texts.
The (re)interpretation of any text, factual or fictional, is rooted in the juxtaposition of the 
experiences of the reader with the iterability of that text, which is simultaneously non-
transcendent and transcendent, and which provides a grounding in actuality while also 
giving an insight into that actuality, whether it is a deferred or a verifiable reality: “One 
can always inscribe in literature something which was not originally destined to be 
literary, given the conventional and intentional space which institutes and thus constitutes 
the text” (Attridge 1992a: 46). Such texts will then be subject to re-interpretation within 
differing contexts that obtain in the world, in a process of social and textual 
intertextuality and iterability. To privilege factual texts over fictional texts is to ignore 
this functioning, and to attempt to sustain what has been shown to be a false dichotomy. 
It is now possible to conclude with a definition of a fictional textual representation:
A fictional representation is an instance of an iterable text, 
representing actual and/or imaginary persons, situations and events, in 
which meaning is made possible through the presuppositions and 
contextualisation of the potential reader. Such a text has a deferred 
relation to actuality and a null denotation, although access to such 
actuality is mediated through the language and form of the text.
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This definition is almost identical to the definition given at the end of the previous 
chapter:
A factual representation is an instance of an iterable text, representing 
actual persons, situations and events, in which meaning is made 
possible through the presuppositions and contextualisation of the 
potential reader. Such a text has reference to an extra-textual actuality, 
although access to such actuality is mediated through the language and 
form of the text. 
It is now clear that the only important differences between the two modes of 
representation exist in the perception of the potential reader as to whether or not the text 
has a verifiable extra-textual reference. Although elements of aestheticisation and form 
will necessarily also serve to determine evaluation, these elements in themselves do not 
constitute a significant difference between the fictional and the factual: a realist novel 
may be less figurative and aestheticised than a historical text; a biography may take the 
structural form of a novel. Language necessarily precludes a direct correspondence 
between the object and the representation, thereby allowing the reader to introduce his or 
her own pre-suppositions (and suppositions). This implies that the defining aspect of any 
text is to be found in the interaction between the text and the contextual response of the 
reader. The resulting evaluation of the text has both ethical and aesthetic implications, 
and it will be argued in a later chapter that ethical considerations in important ways 
determine the aesthetic evaluation of an iterable text. However, having discussed in detail 
the implications of the reading of both factual and fictional texts, it is now possible to 
consider how such readings function in instances of the textual representation of 
violence.
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CHAPTER 6
VIOLENCE AND REPRESENTATION
1. The Notion of Violence  
As illustrated by the comparison between the descriptions employed by Harris and 
Koestler in the previous chapter, the effect of the representation of violence in a text is 
influenced primarily by the mode of aestheticisation employed by the writer. Thus, a 
textual description that is based upon a realist mode of writing will represent violence in 
a more vivid and graphic manner than a representation that relies on an increased 
employment of figurative language, which tends to attenuate the actuality of the violence 
for the reader. In any textual narrative, the language will always serve as a mediator 
between the object or event and its representation. It is therefore necessary to recognise
that many realist descriptions of violence aspire to remove, or at least diminish, the 
distance between the two. Conversely, many metaphorical descriptions of violence will 
attempt to avoid explicit recording of details.
Before such representations – either realist or figurative – can be discussed in any detail, 
it is essential to examine what the notion of violence entails; in other words, what is 
violence, and how does it relate to the conclusions regarding the characteristics of factual
and fictional texts as reached in the previous chapter. The word derives from Old French 
via the Latin violentia (impetuosity), although the roots of the word lie in both vis (force) 
and latus (to carry). Its present participle violans is a probable source for the modern 
English “violence”, and is therefore, etymologically speaking, indicative of a sense of 
forcefully carrying forward. (Audi 1972: 62). However, the term violence, as used in a 
contemporary context, is particularly difficult to define with any precision, as a 
consequence of the multifarious and wide-ranging understandings of the term in common 
usage, as well as the appropriation of the term within a variety of ideological and political 
contexts. Therefore, arriving at a plausible definition of violence involves a consideration 
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of a number of diverse theories. The political theorist C. A. Coady has identified three 
general types of definitions of violence: the wide, the restricted, and the legitimist (Coady 
1986: 24ff). These will now be discussed in more detail, although it must be emphasised 
that there is an inevitable conceptual intersection between the different types.
1.1 Restricted Definitions
The restricted definition is the most familiar type, concentrating on interpersonal acts of 
force involving physical injury. The Oxford English Dictionary definition is typical of 
this emphasis: “the exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on or damage to 
persons or property; action or conduct characterised by this”. Other examples of 
restricted definitions of violence would include "the exercise of physical force against 
someone who is thereby interrupted or disturbed, or interfered with rudely or roughly, or 
desecrated, dishonoured, profaned or defiled” (Keane 1996: 65) and the claim that “an act 
of violence occurs when injury or suffering is inflicted upon a person or persons by an 
agent who knows (or ought reasonably to have known) that his actions would result in the 
harm in question” (Coady 1986: 29). However, the most comprehensive restricted 
definition of violence is that of Robert Audi, so this will be discussed in more detail: “the 
physical attack upon, or the vigorous physical abuse of, or vigorous struggle against, a 
person or animal; or the highly vigorous psychological abuse of, or the sharp, caustic 
psychological attack upon, a person or animal; or the highly vigorous, or incendiary, or 
malicious and vigorous, destruction or damaging of property or potential property” (Audi 
1971: 60).1
Audi is insistent that any definition of violence must be vague, as the term violence is 
itself vague. He also points out that, despite the prevalence of violence throughout 
history, there has been not a single major thinker who has produced a thorough analysis 
of the concept. He develops his definition of violence by establishing a central definition, 
and then adding to it and modifying it until the final definition quoted above is reached. 
Such modifications include the consideration of psychological violence, the recognition 
1 It should be noted, however, that as Audi includes property in his definition, he goes beyond a strictly 
restricted definition.
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that certain sports (for example boxing and wrestling) involve violence that is neither 
illegitimate nor unjustified, and the argument that physical abuse is only one variety of 
violence. He also questions whether the notion of motivation or responsibility for an act 
of violence is coherent, as there exists the possibility of inflicting violence without there 
necessarily being any accompanying accountability (as in the case of the insane). 
Additionally, the relationship between violence and the violation of moral rights is 
intricate, and it remains indeterminate whether the one will always entail the other. 
What is obvious is that any violence to animate beings, and particularly vigorous 
violence, involves suffering or injury, or both. This becomes more complicated in the 
case of aestheticised or metaphorical representations, especially when the meaning of the 
term is altered in order to express emotions (such as disapproval or anger), or when it is 
contextually placed within differing textual conventions in which various words are 
indiscriminately and wrongly used as substitutes for violence. Such substitution would 
include the use of the terms force, terror, brutality and aggression. However, force can be 
used without violence, and violence can be used without force. Similarly, violence does 
not necessarily entail terror, and terror does not always include violence. The same 
reasoning can be applied to the notions of cruelty, brutality and aggression. For example, 
the laws of a state may force compliance, without necessarily involving violence as a 
coercive factor; conversely, much state propaganda – institutional violence – does not 
rely on force as much as persuasion.2 The physical violence common to sports such as 
boxing or rugby does not necessarily generate feelings of terror in the participants or the 
spectators; yet terror (without the prospect of violence) may be experienced when 
anticipating the imminence of something feared (stage fright, for instance). Similarly, 
although both cruelty and brutality imply the employment of violence, it is not the case 
that violence is always cruel and brutal. The question also further arises as to whether or 
not violence is always aggressive. Capital punishment in the United States, for example, 
is usually carried out with clinical precision rather than anger or aggression. Audi 
acknowledges that various disciplines may employ more specialised definitions that 
2 Proponents of the wider theories of structural and cultural violence would argue that violence does not 
have to be overt to be violent, and that the resulting oppression is a paradigmatic case of violence in action. 
This will be discussed in more detail in section 1.3.
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correspond more specifically to their interests (psychological, philosophical or 
sociological). However, the broader classification of violence, understood within the 
limits of the restricted definition, remains adequate for the purposes of most studies. 
The restricted definition as proposed by Audi is therefore the definition most appropriate 
to many of the realist texts that use violence in a graphic manner. A reader who is aware 
of the imagery of actual violence – through the media, fictional or factual narratives, 
films, and direct experience of violence – will be capable of transposing that awareness 
into an understanding of the violence that is represented. How that reader reacts to the 
violence, though, is dependent upon a variety of factors. These include comprehension 
(the relevance of the iterable text to the contextually bound reader, and the accessibility 
of the language within that context), verifiability (the mode of composition, as well as its 
relation to the expectations and socio-cultural positioning of the reader), aestheticisation 
(the degree of figurative language employed), and context (the intersection of the 
representation and the intersubjective conventions that position the potential reader 
within a certain historical milieu). The relative importance of each factor will be 
considered differently by various readers, thus resulting in infinite (re)interpretations of 
the same iterable narrative. For example, a reader may be distressed by the overt physical 
violence of a text, but be unmoved by the implied psychological violence. One reader 
may be resentful of the depiction of violence enacted upon a particular minority or social 
cluster, while another would consider it socially justifiable and aesthetically pleasing. 
The controversy surrounding the publication of the novel American Psycho is a clear 
instance of this diversity of opinion regarding the representation of violence. The text, 
which features graphic descriptions of violence against women, resulted in protests by 
those who felt that such depictions were an exploitation of the frequently enacted
violence against women3, yet it received simultaneous approbation from those impressed 
by its implicit allegorical critique of the decay of modern society.4 From the latter point 
of view, the extremity of the violence was considered a positive aspect of the text, 
3 Murphet 2002: 65-71 – Chapter 3: “The Novel’s Reception”.
4 An example of this is to be found in Norman Mailer’s review of the novel for Vanity Fair: “Children of 
the Pied Piper” (Mailer 1998: 1065-77).
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whereas in the former opinion, such violence was both unacceptably graphic and 
dangerously sexist. This example has obvious implications for a definition of violence: it 
is not satisfactory to concentrate solely on the restricted type of violence, while 
disregarding the others. Both legitimist and wide definitions need to be considered in any 
analysis of a text concerned with violence. 
1.2 The Legitimist Definition
A legitimist definition entails a theory that argues for or against the legitimacy of the 
state’s employment of violence to serve its own ends. This often becomes the locus of a 
critique of the abuses of state violence. For example, Arendt’s assertion that “violence is 
nothing more than the most flagrant manifestation of power” (Arendt 1970: 35) reflects 
the legitimist position, as does Wolff’s theory that violence is “the illegitimate or 
unauthorised use of force to effect decisions against the will and desire of others” (Wolff 
1969: 15). Both Wolff and Arendt’s positions are worth discussing in more detail in order 
to gain a clearer understanding of the legitimist position regarding violence. 
1.2.1 Robert Paul Wolff
Wolff’s conception of violence is based on a model of “philosophical anarchism”, which 
aims to challenge the very legitimacy of any social system based on domination and 
hierarchy. In such systems, violence is calculatingly used by power elites either to 
impede efforts at political transformation or to entrench inequalities of power, privilege 
and wealth. The concepts of violence and non-violence become confused, as they are 
based on the notion of legitimate authority, which in itself is seen as an incoherent 
assumption. Wolff investigates the relationship between power and authority, between 
legitimate and illegitimate political authority, and the ideological use of violence as an 
instrument of domination. He refuses to separate the definition of violence from the 
structure of the class struggle, thus producing a thesis that is a powerful critique of the 
belief that violence can be defined in a value-free and objective manner. Wolff defines 
power as the capacity to generate and thereafter enforce decisions of social importance. 
He then defines authority, although also a form of power, as a right to be earned rather 
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than enforced. The exercise of force – change through physical effort – is ethically 
impartial. It is a means to power, but never a guarantee of achieving it. Hence, power is 
exercised by means of the instruments of force, authority and social opinion. If violence 
is, as quoted earlier, “the illegitimate or unauthorised use of force to effect decisions 
against the will and desire of others”, it is inconsistent to consider murder as violent when 
capital punishment is not considered violent. Similarly, most agree that theft is an 
instance of violence, yet might argue that the same is not so for taxation. Violence, as a 
normative concept, becomes an implicit appeal to legitimate authority.
It is therefore erroneous to limit violence to physical injury, as political and institutional 
violence both depend upon the exercise of authority. Wolff claims that it is impossible for 
any state to have the absolute right of command applicable to all citizens who are obliged 
to obey. Democracy is not a valid system either, as it does not in practice allow for an 
authentic distribution of the legal apparatus. Yet society always concedes authority to an 
established government, and Wolff argues that this displays a superstitious belief in the 
capacities of the state, as well as a nave view of representative government. 
Additionally, if violence can be described as the illegitimate use of force, then it should 
never be employed as a political instrument; rather, if the use of force were permissible, it 
would not be violence (by definition), and if the use of force were violent, it would not be 
permissible. Consequently, if violence is illegitimate, then every political act is 
necessarily violent, and there can be no such concept as legitimate authority. There exists 
no coherent distinction between violence and the legitimate use of force, and the question 
of the appropriateness of, and justification for, violence is rendered equally incoherent. 
Even when social ends are achieved with minimal violence, this is unjustified as there is 
no clear line of distinction between legitimate and illegitimate forms of process. Just as in 
a dictatorship, the rights of a democracy are founded upon superstition and the myth of 
legitimacy. However, according to Wolff’s point of view, there is also no merit in the 
doctrine of non-violence, as it assumes the possibility of legitimate government, and non-
violence thereby becomes merely a subjective ideal without moral rationale. 
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Wolff identifies four conceptions of violence which correspond to four distinct socio-
economic classes. Firstly, for those with financial and political interests, violence is 
equivalent to illegality, and this class condemns all challenges to the authority of the state 
and all assaults on the rights of property. Secondly, the affluent, educated, technical and 
professional middle class welcome dissent and favour civil disobedience as long as it 
does not challenge their own socio-economic arrangements. Thirdly, the working and 
lower-middle classes (the white backlash), who have a political alliance with the old 
wealth regard violence as street crime, marches and riots. Lastly, the outclass and its 
sympathisers perceive the connotations of violence as reversed: the police and employers 
are violent, while their own violence is seen as legitimate – even though the rest of 
society suppresses it. Yet whatever class considerations are invoked, Wolff contends that 
no serious consideration should be afforded to the insistence that some forms of violence 
are more justified than others. Physical harm differs in degree and not in kind from non-
violent action. The myth of legitimate authority is a secular reincarnation of worship, and 
a belief in legitimacy is irrational. 
However, the consideration of an instance of actual violence and the representation of 
that violence exposes the problematic nature of Wolff’s position. If, as he asserts, there is 
no fundamental difference between legitimate and illegitimate violence, then the 
distinction between justified and unjustified violence is eliminated in favour of an 
absolute denunciation of all violence. Yet, in terms of such reasoning, a Holocaust 
narrative such as Filip Mller’s Eyewitness Auschwitz (1979) – part of which testifies to 
the insurrection of the sonderkommando and the resulting devastation of an Auschwitz 
gas chamber – represents an illegitimate undertaking, owing to the framework of the 
violence that informs the representation. In other words, although the violence of the gas-
chamber is to be condemned (because it is violent), the violence of the resistance to it is 
equally to be condemned (because it is violent). Thus every micro-narrative of violence 
becomes equally unacceptable. Yet, just as it was argued in the previous chapter that not 
all micro-narratives are equally acceptable, it is similarly the case that not all micro-
narratives are equally unacceptable. Wolff’s argument that any act of violence is 
illegitimate implies that any representation of violence is in its turn illegitimate. Again, it 
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is clear that the assumption of an absolutist standpoint is not sustainable. This does not in 
itself negate the importance of the legitimist position; however, for a more realistic 
example of the legitimist argument it is necessary to consider Arendt’s On Violence, 
which combines a wide definition of violence with the legitimist position.
1.2.2 Hannah Arendt
In the first part of the text, Arendt claims that in a century of wars and revolutions, 
violence has emerged as the common denominator. The technology of war means that 
there are no longer winners, that there can be no talk of victory (rather, she prefers the 
term deterrence), and that only poorer countries can actually afford to wage war without 
fear of annihilation. Violence is taken for granted, being a part of everyday life, and 
writers such as Sartre, Mao Tse-tung, Marx and Fanon seem to accept in their writings 
that it is part of any revolutionary struggle. Yet revolutions do not necessarily change the 
world, only its personnel, and the progress of science, having outstripped the progress of 
humanity, can no longer act as the standard for evaluating the latter. In the second 
section, she argues that in the political realm violence is often considered to be the 
flagrant manifestation of power. There are elements of both power and violence at the 
root of all forms of government, as Wolff asserts. Yet Arendt contends that it is the 
bureaucracy that is the most dangerous element in society, as it is a rule by Nobody. 
She also argues that the principal difference between power and violence is that power 
needs numbers to be effective, whereas violence needs implements. An extreme form of 
power would be all against one, and an extreme form of violence would be one against 
all, with the help of implements. Power cannot be equated with violence, as violence is an 
unsatisfactory means of establishing a democratic power base using the solidarity of the 
people. Violence may be able to destroy power, but it cannot create it. The result of 
violence will be further violence, rather than any stability offered by power. Just as Audi 
criticised the use of related terms as synonyms for violence, so does Arendt argue that 
there are crucial conceptual differences between terms such as violence, force, strength, 
authority, and power. It is tempting to regard power as violence; yet violence is the last 
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resort of a failing power structure, with revolution illustrating the gap between theory and 
practice: the chances of a successful revolution, she suggests, decrease with the 
technological advances of the state. Yet the gap between the implements of the rebels and 
those of the state is so vast that technology ultimately makes little difference. Only where 
power has disintegrated are revolutions possible. Violence is consequently a last resort of 
power to entrench an inadequate government; the state rules by violence when power is 
lost.5 Yet, whereas power requires legitimacy without justification as an appeal to the 
means of the past, violence requires justification through an appeal to a future end, but 
can never be legitimate. The further the ends of violence recede into the future, the less 
justifiable it is. Consequently, violence is not the opposite of non-violence, but of power. 
To speak of non-violent power is redundant. 
The third part of the text is a critique of various justifications for violence. For example, 
some argue that a propensity for violence and the quest for power are fundamental to 
human nature, rather than being a rational process. Sorel couches his exaltation of 
violence in non-political, biological terms, thus conceptualising violence in order to give 
support to the claim that it is a natural requirement for the intersubjective existence of the
human race. However, the danger of allowing for a legitimacy of violence is that if the 
objectives of violence are not quickly achieved, then the means threaten to overwhelm 
the end. In addition, the greater the bureaucracy, then the greater the attraction of 
violence, owing to the probability that no one individual will be held accountable for the 
consequences. Neither power nor violence is natural; rather, they are both political. 
Arendt’s arguments are firmly based upon the idea of violence as an institutional and 
political concept, in which the direct, physical violence of the restricted definition is just 
one more consequence of the “meta-violence” of the state.6 As far as representation is 
concerned, such violence would appear in books such as Hitler’s Mein Kampf, in the 
xenophobic press of any nationalist conflict, and in any text that purports to be, overtly or 
5 The increasing repression that marked the final years of the apartheid regime, in which the creation of a 
virtual police state took place (all to no avail), may be seen as paradigmatic of this phenomenon.
6 These concerns are explored further in other writings, particularly in her study of the machinations of 
genocide, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963), and in her first book, The 
Origins of Totalitarianism (1951).  
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covertly, an instance of propaganda. But to acquire a definition of violence that is 
predominantly applicable to the textual representation of violence, it is essential to 
investigate the broader implications of the wide definition of violence, particularly as 
advanced by John Galtung. 
1.3 The Wide Definition: Galtung and Cultural Violence
The wide definition, similar to the legitimist position, is primarily concerned with 
structural (or institutional) violence and thus includes “within the extension of the term 
‘violence’ a great range of social injustices and inequalities” (Coady 1986: 24). Such a 
definition allows for the two seemingly contradictory claims that violence can be 
eliminated from society, and that violence should be met with violence. An example of a 
definition of violence that could be considered as being of the wide type is that of John
Galtung, who identifies four classes of basic human needs that are negated through acts 
of violence. These needs are survival, well-being, identity and freedom. Thus, violence 
takes the form of “avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life, 
lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible” (Galtung 
1990: 40). The repudiation of these basic needs is a combination of direct, structural and 
cultural violence, the latter being an extension of structural violence.7 Cultural violence is 
“those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of existence – exemplified by religion and 
ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science … that can be used to 
legitimise direct or structural violence” (1990: 39). Cultural violence also includes 
institutional and nationalist symbols such as flags, military displays and national 
anthems.8 Yet, such symbols represent only particular aspects of a culture rather than 
embodying the culture in themselves, as it is not possible that entire cultures can be 
classified as violent. Cultural violence therefore functions by legitimising the symbology 
of the state, thereby legitimising the direct and structural violence that may possibly 
7 Direct and structural violence can be considered as two overarching categories or “supertypes”, with
cultural violence as the third supertype. Direct violence is an event – the physical harm done to an 
individual or individuals; structural violence is an institutional process of repression that varies in its 
effects; cultural violence is an invariant, remaining essentially the same for long periods.
8 In cases such as post-1994 South Africa, although the new flag and national anthem would be seen by 
many as an attempt at achieving cultural peace, others (such as the Afrikaans Right-wing) would view these 
as a violent imposition of cultural dominance by the new discourse. 
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result.9 Galtung’s “wide” notion of cultural violence looks at the way in which all forms 
of violence are legitimated in society; the way in which the resulting moral paradigm is 
altered or maintained, and the way in which the pervasiveness of the violence in society 
is obscured. 
Galtung broadens his definition of violence into a “Typology of Violence” (1990: 40), 
which is a total of eight different types of violence based upon the effects of structural 
and direct violence upon the basic needs mentioned above. Some of the categories are 
obvious, for instance killing (the negation of survival needs through direct violence), and 
maiming (the negation of well-being needs, also as a result of direct violence). Less 
obvious are instances of violence in which the perpetrators are shielded from the 
consequences of their actions. Thus, included under the category of maiming is the insult 
to human needs brought about by siege or sanctions, which often result in protracted but 
calculated suffering owing to malnutrition and a lack of medical attention. The impact of 
these deprivations inevitably affects the weakest in society to a greater extent. Another 
example is the category of desocialisation, which involves both alienation from one’s 
own culture and resocialisation into another culture, through (for example) the imposition 
of the language of the dominant discourse. An individual excluded from that discourse 
becomes further marginalised and violated by being compelled to adopt and express the 
prevailing cultural norms and conventions. 
Galtung’s typology emphasises the way in which violence effects a causal flow from the 
cultural via the structural to direct violence. The cultural indoctrinates society into 
considering the twin elements of repression and exploitation as conventional and normal. 
Any resistance to such indoctrination results in both direct violence and counter-violence 
as a cultural struggle within the structure develops. Both direct and structural violence 
necessarily create needs-deficits, or trauma, as violence will tend to breed violence (and 
counter-violence) within various cultural domains. Each domain becomes a possible site 
for cultural, structural and direct violence, with each domain having more or less 
9 The opposite of cultural violence would be cultural peace: those aspects and symbols of a culture that 
serve to justify and legitimise peace.
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influence over the violence possible in the other domains. For example, in the domain of 
religion, cultural violence is enabled through a belief in a transcendental God (and, 
usually, a corresponding idea of transcendental evil, personified by the figure of Satan). 
Indoctrinating certain elements of the population with a belief in being among the elect
will invariably lead to a cycle of structural and direct violence as a result of the Chosen 
People’s translating this belief into both direct and structural violence.10 Also essential to 
the implementation of cultural violence is the related domain of ideology: “With the 
decline, and perhaps death, not only of the transcendental but also the immanent God 
through secularization, we could expect successors to religion in the form of political 
ideologies, and to God in the form of the modern state, to exhibit some of the same 
character traits” (Galtung 1990: 46). When this occurs, the increased prospect of 
structural violence becomes evident. Many examples exist of such violence, the most 
virulent being that of discrimination, whether against women, other races or other faiths –
which overlaps with the notion of election discussed above. The ideology of nationalism
is also particularly conducive to structural violence, with its close links to pre-existing 
notions of divine election. In the ideological domain, the state inherits the right to destroy 
life, if not to create it. The combination of the ideology of the nation state with a 
theologically based chosen-people complex results in a particularly dangerous form of 
cultural violence, contributing to the intensification of situations such as the conflict in 
the Middle East, and the subsequent rise of religious fundamentalism in various forms.11
Two other domains which are particularly relevant to the representation of violence are 
those of language and art. The representational nature of the iterable text was shown 
earlier to be contextually dependent upon various factors, such as time, place, and socio-
political situations. Yet inter-subjectivity and convention also provide the structural 
apparatus necessary for the generation of cultural violence. For instance, many spoken 
and written languages utilise predominantly male pronouns, thus implicitly generating 
gender discrimination. Attempts to transform such language usage represent a deliberate 
10 This will be further elucidated in the discussion of Poe’s “The Pit and the Pendulum” in Section 2 below.
11 “The forces of discrimination, tyranny and cultural oppression are currently flourishing around the globe, 
in the West as well as in the Third World … The more optimistic postmodern theorists may think we live in 
a postmodern world where grand narratives are in irreversible decline, but in reality we inhabit a 
fundamentalist world where those narratives are in rude health” (Sim 2004: 19).
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cultural modification which is opposed to assumed cultural violence.12 Similarly, cultural 
violence may function through the medium of art. Any society can thus (re)invent itself 
in terms of its dominance over those considered antithetical to its own social and cultural 
paradigm.13 Conversely, art may serve as a verification of the ethical norms and cultural 
values demanded by both the state and the civil society which sustain that particular state. 
Works of religious dogma, nationalist xenophobia and political propaganda are the most 
common manifestations of this type of artistic cultural violence. Within any (or all) of 
these domains, violence can commence at any corner of the direct-structural-cultural 
triangle, and thereafter be transmitted to any other corner. Consequently, violence as a 
feature of the cultural domain is particularly relevant to the following discussion, both as 
representation and as an actual event.
1.4 A Definition of Violence
Before suggesting a possible working definition of violence that will be used in the 
following chapters, it is worthwhile to summarise the preceding theories of violence with 
reference to the classification of the types of violence suggested by Newton Garver. 
Garver claims that violence should be classified into four different kinds, based on two 
criteria: “whether the violence is personal or institutionalised and whether the violence is 
overt or a kind of covert or quiet violence” (Garver 1972: 49). The four kinds of violence 
can be summarised as follows: Firstly, there is overt personal violence. This would 
include the physical assault or use of force on the body of one person by another. 
Muggings, rape, assault, and torture: all of these instances of violence are overtly 
personal, although not necessarily exclusively so, as overt personal violence is frequently 
one of the consequences of overt institutional violence. Audi’s definition would be 
appropriate here, although his conception of violence also includes the psychological 
(covert violence) and violence to property. Overt institutional violence, the second 
12 To this may be added the possibility that to change from one cultural paradigm to another entails the 
possibility of new forms of cultural violence. 
13 The notion of the Other – that which is the not-I, which is different from the subject who observes and 
judges – will be discussed in more detail in later chapters. Examples of the Other in art include paintings 
such as Delacroix's The Death of Sardanapalus, which portrays the Oriental as both exotic and savage;
novels such as the Deerhunter series, which demonise the native American; and films such as The Eternal 
Jew, which was used to de-personalise the Jewish population in Nazi Germany.
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category, would include the types of violence identified in different ways by Wolff, 
Arendt and Galtung: national and international wars, police violence and capital 
punishment. This would entail the legalised and state-sanctioned violence of a country or 
institution against another state or institution, or against individuals opposed to that state 
or institution. Thirdly, there is covert personal violence. Once again, it is the use of 
violence by individuals against other individuals, but with the difference that the effect is 
primarily psychological. Covert personal violence is characterised by such methods as 
non-physical intimidation, the withholding of information or the creation of 
misinformation, and the deliberate establishment of a climate of fear. The fourth and final 
type of violence is that of institutional covert violence, characterised chiefly by the 
entrenchment and enforcement of ideologies upon a population by the state. Slavery, 
class/race/gender oppression, control of the media and the flow of information, as well as 
various forms of propaganda, are examples of this type of violence. Wolff’s thesis is most 
relevant here, while Arendt’s applies to a lesser extent.
These four types of violence are obviously not mutually exclusive. For example, 
institutional violence almost always involves the use of individuals who employ overt 
personal violence as a consequence of the sanction given them by the state, and personal 
violence often affects the ways in which the state will react institutionally. Likewise, 
covert personal violence is often accompanied by overt personal violence, which may, in 
turn, be state-sanctioned and therefore ideologically determined. In addition, there may 
be degrees of violence, although these are difficult (if not impossible) to quantify into a 
systematic and monolithic whole. Only with a degree of inter-subjective agreement may
any comparison may be made between, for example, overt personal and covert 
institutional violence, and even then this can be achieved only within the limiting 
confines of a direct comparison of individual instances of violence. Violence must also be 
considered as both an event and a representation of an event, whether or not such an 
event is historically verifiable in an external context. Thus, it potentially occurs (or has 
occurred) as an event in a temporal and spatial dimension, while involving a perpetrator 
of the violence, as well as a victim of that violence. To consider violence as an event does 
not preclude long-term instances of covert and indirect violence. As a representation, 
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violence is the textual articulation of the causes, effects, or occurrences of a possible 
event of violence.
The definition of violence that will be used in this study can therefore be divided into 
three separate, but interrelated, propositions:
1) Violence is an act of direct or indirect intended harm against a person’s body or
consciousness or property.
2) Such violence is determined by the normative and conventional possibilities of the 
society in which it exists.
3) Such violence is experienced either as an event, or as a representation of an 
event.
In order to explore the validity of these propositions, it is useful to apply them to an 
illustrative text. The chosen text is a short narrative by Edgar Allan Poe, “The Pit and the 
Pendulum”, which is particularly relevant to this discussion owing to its representation of 
various types of violence: institutional, structural, physical and psychological. It is 
therefore possible to employ this narrative to examine the effect that the actuality of an 
event of violence has on its own representation.
2. “The Pit and the Pendulum”
Violence exists both as an event and as a representation of an event, with the latter being 
subject to varying degrees of aestheticisation, which determine the potential reader’s 
attitudes towards, and perceptions of, the representation. By representing the different 
types of violence in textual form, the author aestheticises the experience (actual or 
imagined) of the violence, and situates it within the framework of the intersections of the 
differing types of violence (covert, overt, personal, and institutional). Yet, as for all 
instances of representation, the representation of violence is subject to the interpretation 
of a potential reader, prior to which it is neither factual nor fictional. Such a reader will 
likely be ignorant of the verifiability of the narrative, and will experience “The Pit and 
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the Pendulum” as an instance of an iterable text, in which meaning is actualised within
that reader’s contextual positioning. It is only in response to the confirmation of the 
fictional mode of the narrative that the reader may presuppose a deferred relation to 
actuality, and a null denotation. Such confirmation may be effected in a variety of ways. 
These could include prior familiarity with Poe’s oeuvre; the acquisition of supplementary
information (from critical texts, teachers, or interaction with other readers); or a general 
knowledge of the fictional canon.
Assuming that the reader has decided that the narrative is an example of a fictional text, it 
is now possible to investigate the representation as an example of deferred reality. The 
plot of “The Pit and the Pendulum” concerns the experiences of a (fictional) narrator, 
who has been captured and condemned by the courts of the Spanish Inquisition, and who 
faces the unnamed and unnameable horrors of the Inquisition’s dungeons. The aesthetic 
response to the text is, to a large extent, dependent upon the juxtaposition of verifiable 
instances of historical actuality and the fictional narrative that is positioned within that 
actuality. The violence represented in the narrative is therefore framed by the historical 
event of the Inquisition, and although the character of the narrator is an invention, the 
representation of the violence that he experiences is intensified by the reader’s 
recognition of that verifiable framework. The language employed by Poe to aestheticise 
the depicted violence is deliberately disconcerting, as he does not aestheticise the 
violence by means of a vocabulary that diminishes the intensity of the representation. 
Rather, he employs a language that heightens the experience of the violence by
compelling the reader to fill in the numerous “gaps” in the text (using Iser’s 
terminology)14with his or her pre-knowledge of the actual Inquisition. 
The representations of various aspects of the experience of violence are utilised in order 
to generate a sinister, but compelling, fictional narrative. The reason for the work’s 
continuing  reputation as one of the more violent of Poe’s tales is not so much a result of 
the descriptions of direct individual physical violence (descriptions of the kind that are to
14 For a discussion of Iser’s reader-response theory, including his notion of filling in the “gaps” when 
reading, see Chapter 3, Section 1 of this study, as well as the chapter “Asymmetry between Text and 
Reader” in Iser 1978: 166-169. 
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be found in texts such as The Black Cat, The Tell-tale Heart, or even The Murders on the 
Rue Morgue), but rather owing to the conflation of the various types of violence outlined 
in the previous section into the experiences of one individual (the narrator, a prisoner of 
the Spanish Inquisition). This ensures that “The Pit and the Pendulum” is significantly 
more violent than the narratives that concentrate primarily on the representation of direct 
violence. Poe skilfully accomplishes a subtle combination of cultural and structural 
violence, juxtaposed with the experience of psychological violence as a consequence of 
the threat of physical violence. The language of the text is further coloured by a 
concentrated use of metaphor when portraying violence. The combination of such 
imagery with the realistic representation of the gradual mental breakdown of the
protagonist creates a narrative of violence that is simultaneously appalling and powerful. 
2.1. The Structure of the Narrative
The text is divided into seven principal sections, each, excepting the last, framed by a 
period of sleep or “insensibility”. The Latin motto that precedes the narrative sets the 
tone for what will follow: “The unholy gang of torturers fed its long furies from the blood 
of the innocent and was not satisfied” (261).15 Taken from a quatrain composed for the 
gates of a market on the site of the Jacobin clubhouse in Paris, the inclusion of this motto 
by Poe indicates a certain intertextuality of violence as he explicitly links the violence of 
the Inquisition with the violence of Robespierre and the Jacobins during the French 
Revolution,16 although, interestingly, the prevailing ideologies and forms of  violence of 
each are very different: it is the concept of violence that links them, rather than the 
specific historical details. Each of the sections of the narrative contains at least one type 
of violence that predominates, although the other types are always present to some 
degree. The structure follows a clear development from institutional to direct violence, 
and from covert to overt violence: the first section and many of those following are 
clearly psychological in orientation (although this is largely determined by the 
15 All quotations from “The Pit and the Pendulum” are taken from the 1986 Penguin edition. 
16 Although the rest of the motto is more optimistic, claiming that violence will eventually be destroyed: 
“Now that the fatherland is safe, the cave of death is broken; where terrible death was, life and health 
appear”. This has reference to the brief and ultimately unsatisfying final paragraph of the narrative, in 
which the narrator is miraculously saved at the instant before his death.
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manoeuvrings of the structural violence which pervades the text) – the sentence of death, 
the terrible anticipation of execution, the unknown darkness of the pit, the awareness of 
the rats, and the threat of the pendulum. Yet, subtly at first, and then with more emphasis, 
the overt potentialities of violence emerge. The application of torture, particularly by 
means of denying sustenance, the attack by the rats, the nameless horror in the pit, and 
finally the contracting heated iron walls, forcing the narrator to the edge of the pit, are all 
instances of increasing personal overt violence. Only the brief deus ex machina that 
occurs in the last paragraph allows for any respite from the claustrophobic representation 
of that violence. An outline of the sections, and the type of violence prevalent in each, is 
set out below:
Section Event/s Type of Violence
I. 261-633 Death sentence, vision, 
insensibility, discussion of
dreams.
Institutional, leading to 
psychological with the implication 
of direct physical.
II. 263-264 Insensibility, memory, 
darkness, confusion.
Institutional, leading to 
psychological with the implication 
of direct physical.
III. 264-265 Swoon, fear, recollection of 
rumours of horror, 
measurement of wall.
Psychological, implying physical.
IV. 265-267 Sleep, food, measurement of 
wall, the pit, return to wall
Psychological, implying physical.
V. 267-270 Sleep, light, paintings on wall, 
tied to frame, no water, rats, 
the pendulum, horror
Physical, reinforcing the 
psychological.
VI. 270-274 Insensibility, descent of 
pendulum, escape
Physical, reinforcing the 
psychological.
VII. 274-276 Paintings on wall, heated walls 
beginning to contract
Physical, reinforcing the 
psychological.
Coda. 276 Rescue by the French – Deus 
ex Machina
Structural (in opposition to the 
institutional violence of section 1).
2.2 Institutional and Structural Violence
As can be seen from the table, two types of violence frame “The Pit and the Pendulum”, 
namely the institutional and the structural. The two terms may appear to be 
interchangeable; however, institutional violence is generally considered to be violence 
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propagated by the state or some other apparently legitimate body, whereas structural 
violence may be the violence of the State or the violence committed in opposition to the 
State. As was noted earlier, some critics – particularly Coady – have criticised the idea of 
structural or institutional violence as being too wide to form a meaningful part of an 
acceptable definition of violence, and prefer to omit it in favour of the restricted 
definition that emphasises personal or direct physical violence. Yet, in a detailed
discussion of the violence represented in any text, it becomes limiting not to include the 
effects of structural violence on the events of the narrative, an inclusion consistent with 
the second part of the definition formulated in section 1.4; such violence is conditioned, 
and made possible, by the normative and conventional possibilities of the society in 
which it is found. Poe’s concern is not so much with the structural violence of a particular 
society, but rather with the institutional violence of the Catholic Church in its most 
notorious and extreme manifestation: the Spanish Inquisition. The Inquisition (the 
Spanish Inquisition in particular) has become a part of the popular consciousness of the 
West, and a symbol for the worst excesses of structural violence.17 Maurice Bloch, in an 
essay on the relationship between violence and religion, argues that the two concepts are 
far more closely related than is generally realised (Bloch 1998: 163-178). There are at 
least three types of violence associated with religion: first, the violence caused by 
religion, such as religious wars and intolerance; second, the way in which religion can 
accompany violence, for example the role religion plays in military and/or ideological 
activity; and third, the violence that forms part of the religion itself, such as ritual 
sacrifices and symbolic representations of violence (for example, a crucifix). 
The narrator in “The Pit and the Pendulum” is subject primarily to the first two instances 
of religious violence. The opening paragraphs of the story emphasise the role of 
institutional violence as employed by the Inquisition at Toledo. The Spanish Inquisition 
began in 1478, and its most infamous Inquisitor was the Dominican prior, Tomas de 
17 However, the horrific reputation of the Inquisition, while not without historical veracity, is often 
exaggerated. Kamen writes that “the proportionately small number of those actually burnt is an effective 
argument against the legend of a bloodthirsty Inquisition” (1965: 187). Similarly, Hamilton argues that 
“Once the Inquisition was established, except for isolated instances, … the pyromania which had 
characterised lay attempts to suppress heresy came to an end” (1981: 57). Consequently, the institution 
referred to by Poe has more to do with the popular “legend of a bloodthirsty Inquisition” than with a 
verifiable historical reality. 
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Torquemada. It was under Torquemada that the Inquisition burnt 250 heretics between 
1485 and 1501 in Toledo, the setting for the narrative. Baigent and Leigh describe a 
typical Inquisition trial as follows: “In practice, the accused was tortured until he was 
ready to confess – which, sooner or later, he almost inevitably would be. At that point, he 
was carried into an adjacent room, where his confession was heard and transcribed. The 
confession was then read back to him and he was formally asked if it was true. If he 
replied in the affirmative, it was recorded that his confession had been ‘free and 
spontaneous’ … Sentencing would follow” (Baigent and Leigh 2000: 35). Contemporary 
accounts of the autos-de-fe added much to the reputation of the Inquisition as a medium 
for institutional violence that finds expression in Poe’s tale: the narrator is the victim of 
one of the most familiar forms of structural violence, and is wholly at the mercy of his 
persecutors. In the opening lines he is “unbound” by them; he is “permitted to sit”; he is 
addressed by “black-robed judges”, who, in “inquisitorial voices” proceed to announce 
the “dread sentence of death”. In addition, these judges have a “stern contempt of human 
torture” (I:261).18 Such language is common when describing structural violence; the 
employment of capital punishment as an ideological weapon, the institutional decrees that 
determine the fate of the individual, and the enforced subjugation are all features of a 
society in which the powerful dominate the weak, and in which institutional violence is 
legitimised by political, ideological - or, in this case religious - criteria. It should also be 
noted that in Poe’s narrative the language used is predominantly negative in tone, 
reflecting the point of view of the narrator in opposition to the institution that is 
persecuting him. The terminology of institutional violence is thus inverted and
(re)contextualised through the voice of the victim. Accordingly, those who are 
condemned by the Inquisition are “victims of its tyranny” (IV:267), the religious beliefs 
of his persecutors are “the charnel superstition of the monks” (V:268), and the experience 
of the victims is tempered by “the hope that triumphs on the rack – that whispers to the 
death-condemned even in the dungeons of the Inquisition” (VI:272).
18 All quotations are referenced by section and page number, based on the structural table showing the 
divisions of the narrative (see Section 2.1).
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The opening paragraphs emphasise this aspect of the fear caused by such violence, 
although the trial itself is not described apart from the pronouncement of the sentence of 
death. Capital punishment is in itself a prime example of institutional violence, as 
oppositions between authority/individual, contempt/fear, and perpetrator/victim are 
generated: the judges of the Inquisition have a “stern contempt of human torture” as 
opposed to the narrator, who is forced to accept the “decrees of what to me was Fate” 
(I:261). The oppression which characterises this opening section is notable for its use of 
the violence caused by religion, as well as the violence accompanying it, in terms of
Bloch’s analysis, yet it also presents the narrator as a type of sacrificial victim of the 
Inquisition. In particular, his incarceration in a dark dungeon/torture chamber with a 
nameless horror in the pit evokes episodes in legend and mythology where victims are 
sacrificed or forced into conflict against the horror of mythical creatures.19 This is further 
emphasised by Poe when the narrator refuses to describe the horror glimpsed in the pit: 
“Yet, for a wild moment, did my spirit refuse to comprehend the meaning of what I saw? 
At length it forced - it wrestled its way into my soul - it burned itself on my shuddering 
reason - Oh! for a voice to speak - oh! Horror - oh! Any horror but this! With a shriek, I 
rushed from the margin, and buried my face in my hands - weeping bitterly” (VII:275). It 
is a feature of structural violence that the oppressed are denied a voice, that the 
“unspeakable” (both literally and metaphorically, the refusal to describe, but also the 
confrontation with that which is appalling to describe), is a result of the overarching
control generated by the agents of the violence. To have a voice is to generate the 
possibility of dissent; to silence the voice is to control it. In addition, the victim’s 
rejection of articulation can be considered as a narrative strategy which serves to 
intensify the horror for the reader through the potential of narrative gap-filling. 
The suffering of the narrator as a result of institutional violence is confirmation of 
Arendt’s thesis that violence is not a natural phenomenon; rather, it is a process 
engendered by human action within the realm of human political affairs (Arendt 1970:
82). Consequently, structural violence may be regarded as a result of the socialising
19 Examples include the Norse hero Beowulf who battles the monster Grendel Beowulf, and the Teutonic 
hero Sigurd who slays the dragon Fafner in The Saga of the Volsungs. Both these myths depict a human 
hero in conflict with the horrors of the unknown and the alien.
123
process that, following the political and contractarian theory of Hobbes, is not possible 
without the threat of violence: “Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no 
strength to secure a man at all” (Hobbes 2005: 53). Hobbes also argues that most subjects 
give obedience not only in recognition of the threat of state violence, but also out of the 
conviction that the state will act against those who are violent. A teleological theory of 
socialisation will argue that the violence is consequently both defused and sublimated. 
However, it is more probable that the disciplinary and punitive violence of an institution 
has been redeployed and sanitised rather than eliminated. This is reflected in the 
narrator’s incarceration, secreted away from any potential witnesses, as well as in his 
own ignorance of the specific consequences of that incarceration: “there came thronging 
upon my recollection a thousand vague rumours of the horrors of Toledo” (III:264); also, 
“the death just avoided, was of that very character which I had regarded as fabulous and 
frivolous in the tales respecting the Inquisition” (IV:267). 
Any state (or, in this case, religious institution) may be little more than an instrument of 
domination, supported by a strong and armed force, whose subjects are permanently 
threatened by violence. In the case of structurally violent states or institutions – such as 
totalitarian regimes, or religious structures such as the office of the Inquisition – those 
directing the employment of violence rationally calculate the effect of the violence as a 
system for subjugating and terrorising entire societies, with the obvious intention of
eliminating any meaningful resistance. For example, the aim of the Inquisition was not so 
much to save souls, as to “achieve the public good and put fear into others” (an Inquisitor 
writing in 1578, quoted in Baigent and Leigh 2000: 67). Such excesses of cruelty are an 
inevitable addendum to the civilising process, according to Zygmunt Bauman, who 
argues in Modernity and the Holocaust that the removal of the means of violence from 
the individual and into the hands of the State is a recipe for barbarity, no matter how 
advanced the society is considered to be: “The Holocaust was born and executed in our 
modern rational society, at the high stage of our civilisation and at the peak of human 
cultural achievement, and for that reason it is a problem of that society, civilization and 
culture” (Bauman 1989: x). 
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This suggests that totalitarianism is not a mere accident of history; rather, civilisation co-
exists with mass murder. An indication of this juxtaposition of civilisation and barbarity 
is exemplified by the illustrations discovered by the narrator on the wall of his cell. Poe 
describes how the narrator is faced by offensive images painted on his dungeon wall, 
which are deliberately created with the intention of terrifying whoever views them, thus 
transforming art into a means of generating violence: “The entire surface of this metallic 
enclosure was rudely daubed in all the hideous and repulsive devices to which the charnel 
superstition of the monks has given rise” (V:268). Later, the paintings become part of the 
whole process of torture (see Section 2.5): “These colors had now assumed, and were 
momentarily assuming, a startling and more intense brilliancy, that gave to the spectral 
and fiendish portraitures an aspect that might have thrilled even firmer nerves than my 
own” (VII:274). 
One of Arendt’s arguments in her study is that violence needs implements in order to be 
effective, and that violence cannot be equated with power. The result is the potential for
institutional terror, where power has disintegrated and violence alone remains (Arendt 
1970: 7). This becomes particularly relevant to the discussion of “The Pit and the 
Pendulum”, especially in the passage in which the narrator speaks of his imminent 
demise: “That the result would be death, and a death of more than customary bitterness, I 
knew too well the character of my judges to doubt” (III:265). The combination of 
structural and direct violence implied in this passage also suggests a resistance to the 
institution. Although it is not stated whether the narrator has employed violence himself, 
he stands in opposition to the Inquisition and the society it represents. Despite the 
opposition of Wolff and others to any form of violence, the plight of the narrator implies 
that there are times and places where reactionary violence may be deemed necessary and 
justified. In this sense, structural violence (as opposed to institutional violence) becomes
closely related to the ideals of social justice. The deus ex machina of the ending is an
appropriate example: a French force overthrows the Inquisition, thereby saving the 
narrator but, in all probability, its leaders will set up a new political and social order 
liberated from the totalitarianism of the church (and therefore creating in its turn the 
conditions for a new constitution of institutional violence). 
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Although contentious, the justification of violence as a means to counter violence has 
been considered appropriate in extreme cases. Audi has identified three principles whose 
fulfilment may form the basis for such justification. Firstly, there must be justice: a state 
can be just only if it refrains from injuring, impoverishing or interfering with its subjects. 
In this sense, the Inquisition that sentences the narrator to the horrors he experiences can 
be considered as neither just nor legitimate. Secondly, there is the prerequisite condition 
of freedom, which argues for the most wide-ranging freedom possible within the limits of 
justice. Again, the isolated suffering of the narrator denies any justification for the 
violence employed against him. Thirdly, there should exist a structure of welfare. Audi is 
arguing here from a utilitarian viewpoint, suggesting “reasonable steps to maximise the 
proportion of happiness over suffering, giving primacy to the reduction of suffering over 
the increase of happiness, and to the increase of happiness below the minimal acceptable 
level of well-being, over comparable interests above it.” (Audi 1971: 81). There is little 
doubt that the aim of the inquisitors is completely contrary to these principles. Walter 
Benjamin (1978: 57-69) has argued that in order to identify whether or not structural 
violence is justified, it is necessary first to answer the question as to whether it is a means 
to a just or to an unjust end; – in terms of achieving that end, the violence must either be 
law-breaking (in terms of replacing an unjust system with a just system), or law-
preserving (as in the case of the state’s punishing criminals). Following Hobbes, 
Benjamin states that every solution remains impossible, if violence is totally excluded on 
principle. This suggests that there can be no justification for the extremes of violence 
committed by the Inquisition in this narrative, and the direct and structural violence of the 
French is consequently justified in its endeavour to combat the illegitimate violence of 
the religious institution.20
It has been noted that the corollary of structural violence is cultural violence, defined by 
Galtung as any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimise violence in its direct or 
structural form. Thus, religion, ideology, art, language and science all contribute as 
20 The justification of structural violence is presumably applicable only in cases where peaceful negotiation 
has failed. It is not clear in this narrative whether this is the case; however, it is unlikely that negotiations 
with proponents of a “Chosen People” would succeed (see Sim 2004, Chapter 4: “Religious 
Fundamentalism” pp59-101; as well as the discussion of the theories of Galtung in Section 1.3 above).
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aspects of culture to the continuation or propagation of institutionalised violence by 
providing the latter with an innocuous or acceptable faade (although this is not their 
primary purpose). As far as such violence is concerned, the archetypal violent structure 
has exploitation at its centre; this leaves marks on the mind and spirit, as well as the 
body. This is reflected by the narrator’s declining mental state as the full effects of the 
direct violence (which is a consequence of the institutional violence) are made known to 
him: “Long suffering had nearly annihilated all my ordinary powers of mind” (VI:271). 
In this case, the institutional violence of the religion of Inquisitorial Roman Catholicism, 
one of the primary tools of cultural violence and an ideology in its own right, is 
particularly relevant to “The Pit and the Pendulum”. As an ideology it debases the value 
of individual tenets and principles in favour of the dominant discourse. At this point, 
structural violence as a response to institutional violence becomes feasible. 
The omnipresence of institutional violence is personified in the suffering and exploitation 
of the victim of that violence. In “The Pit and the Pendulum”, the language of the
protagonist who experiences personal violence, both psychological and physical, reflects 
the consequences of institutional violence. He is not merely distressed by the 
proceedings; he is “sick to death”; he “shudders”; he sees lips “writhe with a deadly 
locution”; his sensations are “swallowed up in a mad rushing descent as of the soul to 
Hades” (I:261-2). Many of Poe’s descriptions are similarly figurative, to the point of 
deliberate aestheticisation. However, as suggested in Chapter 2, this is unavoidable as the
functioning of language presupposes an interpretive mediation between the reader and the 
concrete actuality of the violence. Thus a trope such as the “mad rushing descent…to 
Hades” becomes the principal means by which an interpretive response to the violence
may be effected. The power of the metaphor creates a cognitive framework through 
which the potential reader may re-contextualise and re-interpret the text in order to 
generate a personal significance. The trope of “Hades” assumes an extreme emotional 
response of despair and terror, owing to the cultural and social implications of the belief
in Hades (in Greek mythology), and its counterpart and successor – Hell (in Christian 
theology). The intertextual and intersubjective trace implied by the term Hades is also 
significant in light of Derrida’s view that the origins of language themselves are 
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figurative (Chapter 2, Section 1, p11). As a textual description, the tropic denotation of 
the narrator’s feelings is far more effective (and, paradoxically, more violent) than a 
straightforward effort at describing the same reactions in a language that avoids (as far as 
this is possible) figurative aestheticisation.
Such imposition of violence was the primary means used by the Inquisition to control the 
religious and ideological doctrines of the time and, as the narrator is only too aware, the 
use of torture is the favoured method that is invaluable to his persecutors. The formal 
sentence of torture was intended to extract the confession required by the Inquisition to 
execute a heretic at the stake, and, “if in the torture he should die or suffer effusion of 
blood or mutilation, it should not be attributed to [the torturers], but to him for not telling 
the truth”. (Baigent and Leigh 2000: 72). Moreover, “obdurate heretics … were not those 
who refused to recant, but those who were expected to disclose” (Hamilton 1981: 46). 
Although the exact reason for the Inquisition’s displeasure with the narrator is never 
revealed (apart from a reference to “Inquisitorial vengeance” (VII:275)), there seems to 
be sufficient justification for the judges to impose the ultimate sentence.21 However, as he
is yet to discover, the violence that he thought would end with his confession and 
subsequent execution will be maintained in an increasingly exaggerated manner, but with 
an emphasis on direct and psychological torture.
2.3 Overt Physical Violence
Direct personal physical violence is the type of violence that is most often accepted as 
definitive, following the restricted definition of violence such as that offered by Coady. 
In such a definition, violence is an event, rather than a process (such as in institutional 
violence), and is always perpetrated by a person or small groups of persons, and done to
another person or small group of persons. The result of overt physical violence is 
frequently physical injury, and in its extreme case, the taking of a human life. The civil 
21 His crime must have been serious, though. Baigent and Leigh note that, “in general, a death sentence was 
the last resort. Most Inquisitors preferred to keep a ‘'saved’ soul in a more or less intact body, which … 
testified to the mercy and greatness of the faith” (2000: 35). In addition, “it is worth emphasising that the 
Inquisition usually avoided the extremity of the stake whenever possible. Copious and extensive efforts 
were made to try and convert stubborn heretics”  (Kamen 1965: 187).
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and religious wars of recent times have gone beyond the limitations of structural violence 
into a fetishisation of direct violence, where there exists a marked absence of any moral, 
political or legal restraint. Robert Fisk, a journalist covering the Algerian Civil War in the 
1990s, writes that “the sadism as well as the scale of the attacks mark a new depth of 
savagery, something we have never seen before, entire villages liquidated by the knife, 
their population slaughtered en masse like animals, cut open, axed down, hacked apart … 
When we are taken to these flat, poor hamlets – Bosnian-style ghost towns of crumbling 
walls and collapsed roofs – even the cops and soldiers fall silent. Through shame or 
guilt?” (Fisk 2006: 701). Although such mass executions took place in earlier periods–
the Roman destruction of Carthage, the Crusades, pogroms in Eastern Europe – Fisk
suggests that the political, religious or nationalist motivation for earlier atrocities has 
been supplanted by violence for violence’s sake. Even if his point is debatable, recent 
events have evidenced a radical loss of humanity, and the disruption of any previous 
distinctions between the violence of war and the violence of crime. Fisk writes of a baby 
who “has its throat cut after a discussion among the intruders about the morality of killing 
children” (2006: 697).22 In effect, those who commit violence for violence’s sake call 
into question the legitimacy and efficacy of necessary violence, so threatening the 
“Burkean pact between the dead, the living and the unborn” (Keane 1996: 67). In many 
ways, the direct violence inflicted on the narrator is a consequence of a fetishisation of 
violence as imagined by Poe. Even if the religious motivation is in place, the excess of 
the violence implies such a fetishisation.
The experience of the narrator is divided between both the threat of direct violence, and 
the actual use of direct violence upon his person. Many of the threats against him are part 
of the psychological violence that he experiences; however, the actuality of the direct 
violence that lies behind those threats is what results in the psychological violence in the 
first place. For instance, consider the threat of the auto-da-fe: the literal meaning of this 
term is an “act of faith”, and it was the process of trial and public execution by fire. 
22 Although the Algerian War is a particularly horrific example, other twentieth century conflicts in 
Vietnam, the Middle East and Europe, as well as the civil wars in Bosnia, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and Iraq, have witnessed the same loss of distinction between the violence of war and the violence 
of crime, with a resulting fetishisation of direct personal violence.
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Although an actual auto-da-fe is not described by Poe, the awfulness of its possibility is 
acknowledged by the narrator: “The condemned to death, I knew, perished usually at the 
autos-da-fe, and one of these had been held on the very night of the day of my trial … 
Victims had been in immediate demand” (II:264). This supports Keane’s claim that direct 
violence is the denial of a subject’s individuality (we never know the name of the 
narrator, or anything about him save his experiences in the dungeon), as well as the 
assumption of an event that will typically end with the injury to, or even extermination 
of, the subject. The fact that the narrator is condemned to capital punishment may be 
considered (by some) as an indication that he is being executed for legal and legitimate 
reasons, despite the problematic nature of the institutionalisation of state (or, in this case, 
religious) violence. Yet, as Wolff has argued (see section 1.2 above), it is illogical to 
suppose that any violence is legitimate. It is only the context (and subsequent authority) 
of the discourse that allows for the perpetration of violence that varies with political 
circumstances. 
The calculating nature of the punishments inflicted on the narrator is directly relevant to 
Arendt’s argument suggesting that the phenomenon of violence cannot be dismissed on
ontological and biological grounds: in other words, to claim that violence is inevitable –
as it is part of the human condition – is to evade the contradictions that such a position 
entails. If such notions were essentially reasonable and verifiable, then violence would be 
both instinctual and irrational. In addition, the ontological-biological argument is 
effectively an ontology of pessimism which attempts to replace the doctrine of original 
sin, without suggesting a substitution for divine retribution. In response to this, Arendt 
argues that violence is only irrational when it involves the natural human emotion of rage 
directed against substitutes (see section 1.2.2 above). Violence is more often rational 
because it is employed in order to accomplish certain ends that justify it in the short term. 
By using violence in such a manner, the agent of the violence is committing a relational 
act, one that depersonalises the object of violence, thereby indicating a negation of any 
respect for that object. It is “a denial of a subject’s freedom to act in and upon the world”
(Keane 1996: 65). 
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The effects upon Poe’s narrator are in themselves depersonalising – “Long suffering had 
nearly annihilated all my ordinary powers of mind. I was an imbecile – an idiot” (VI:271) 
– but nowhere is this more apparent than in the nature of the pendulum itself, 
scientifically constructed to descend incrementally until it slowly, but inevitably, dissects 
its victim. This implement is clearly an instrument of violence of rational design, 
intended to cause the maximum suffering possible: “Its nether extremity was formed of a 
crescent of glittering steel … as keen as that of a razor” (V:269). The crescent "was 
designed to cross the region of the heart" (VI:271).  The rationality that had been integral 
to the operation of the apparatus is made even more apparent when the narrator escapes 
from the table to which he was strapped down: “I had scarcely stepped from my wooden 
bed of horror upon the stone floor of the prison, when the motion of the hellish machine 
ceased and I beheld it drawn up, by some invisible force, through the ceiling. This was a 
lesson which I took desperately to heart. My every motion was undoubtedly watched”
(VI:271). The violence inflicted upon the narrator now includes not only the 
psychological threat of direct violence (the pendulum), but also the institutional violence 
of continual surveillance. Foucault links this surveillance to Bentham’s notion of the 
panoptican, in which an observer in a central tower may observe many (isolated) 
individuals simultaneously, while being hidden from view himself. The prisoner, 
therefore, “is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject of 
communication … Hence the major effect of the Panoptican: to induce in the inmate a 
state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of 
power” (Foucault 1977: 200-1).23
It is clear that the use of such various types of violence damages both the temperament 
and the sense of personal value of the victim. This is illustrated by the effects that the 
violence has on the narrator. Repeatedly, the horror of the situation is overwhelming, and 
he lapses into insensibility: “all sensations appeared swallowed up in a mad rushing 
descent as of the soul into Hades. Then silence, and stillness, and night were the 
23 Bentham’s Panoptican employs bright lighting to constantly illuminate the inmates, whereas the narrator 
spends much of his time in complete darkness. Foucault therefore considers the panoptican as the inverse of 
the dungeon: “It reverses the principle of the dungeon; or rather of its three functions – to enclose, to 
deprive of light and to hide” (1977: 200). Nevertheless, the principle of  the violence implied by a constant 
surveillance by those in power is common to both.
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universe” (I:262); “My excessive fatigue induced me to remain prostrate; and sleep soon 
overtook me as I lay” (III:265). Apart from such episodes of unconsciousness, he is also 
reduced to uncontrollable physical responses to his situation: “I gasped and struggled at 
each vibration. I shrunk convulsively at its every sweep” (VI:271-2); “With a shriek, I 
rushed from the margin, and buried my face in my hands – weeping bitterly” (VII:275).  
This loss of selfhood is a direct result of the notion of violence encapsulated in Keane’s 
definition: “The exercise of physical force against someone who is thereby interrupted or 
disturbed, or interfered with rudely or roughly, or desecrated, dishonoured, profaned or 
defiled” (see 1.1 above). To this may be added Audi’s qualifier that physical violence 
must be “vigorous”: violence is “the physical attack upon, or the vigorous physical abuse 
of, or vigorous struggle against, a person or animal” (Audi 1970: 60), and Arendt’s 
assertion that violence must be instrumental (this is particularly appropriate to this 
narrative, with objects such as the pit, the pendulum, and the constricting walls all being 
instruments of the Inquisition’s violence). The narrator’s reference to torture surely 
encompasses all of the definitions and notions explored above.24 Inquisitorial torture was 
one of the most relentless means of inflicting direct violence: “The techniques of the 
Inquisition seemed designed, at least in theory, to keep absolute bloodshed to a minimum. 
Inquisitors had few compunctions or scruples, of course, about inflicting physical pain in 
the name of spiritual welfare … But most forms of torture – such favoured devices as the 
rack, the thumbscrew, the strappado and water torture – [were] contrived to cause 
maximum pain and minimum mess” (Baigent and Leigh 2000: 28). It is interesting to 
note in the light of this that many of the narrator’s experiences of direct violence do not 
include immediate suffering; rather, they conform to Galtung’s typology of violence 
regarding the insult to human needs through maiming. Thus instances such as the 
deprivation of sustenance, the exposure to hordes of rats, and the confinement in a cell 
without light all are instances of direct violence, even though the effects are not 
necessarily immediately physical, but rather designed to prolong the violence: “Neither 
24 The torture of the narrator prior to sentencing is not described in the text. However, the opening lines 
refer to his experiences: “I was sick – sick unto death with that long agony” (I:261).
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could I forget what I had read of these pits – that the sudden extinction of life formed no 
part of their most horrible plans” (IV:267: Poe’s emphasis).25
The violence against the narrator is, following Galtung’s theory, an insult to both human 
needs and life, and is all the more culpable as it represents an avoidable insult. Deliberate 
deprivation, starvation, malnutrition, and denial of medical attention are all an integral 
part of Poe’s narrative: “The blackness of eternal night encompassed me. I struggled for 
breath. The intensity of the darkness seemed to oppress and stifle me. The atmosphere 
was intolerably close” (III:264 – deprivation of light); “[The pitcher of water] must have 
been drugged; for scarcely had I drunk, before I became irresistibly drowsy” (V:267 –
deprivation of consciousness); “I saw, to my horror, that the pitcher had been removed. I 
say to my horror; for I was consumed with intolerable thirst. This thirst it appeared to be 
the design of my persecutors to stimulate: for the food in the dish was meat pungently 
seasoned” (V:268-9 – deprivation of water). The presence of the rats is another type of 
direct violence that corresponds to Galtung’s notion of misery: “[The rats] writhed upon 
my throat; their cold lips sought my own; I was half stifled by their thronging pressure; 
disgust, for which the world has no name, swelled my bosom, and chilled, with a heavy 
clamminess, my heart” (VI:273). The result of this violence is to depersonalise the 
narrator, to make him an object with little or no control over his destiny, his actions or his 
life. Even as he escapes one type of death, he encounters another – there is no way out: 
after escaping the pendulum, he realises that “I had but escaped death in one form of 
agony, to be delivered unto worse than death in some other” (VII:274). This last 
statement is revealing, as it contradicts the commonplace assumption that the ultimate 
violence is the extinguishing of human life. Yet this passage represents the possibility of 
death as a release, rather than as a violation.  
It has been argued above that, for a restricted definition of violence, it is necessary to 
avoid confusing the term violence with related terms such as misery, cruelty, force, 
power, aggression, terror and the like, most of which imply violence, but which are not 
25 Again, the pre-knowledge of potential violence fostered by the Inquisition acts as a form of 
psychological violence due to the cultural and structural conditioning of the population. 
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necessary causal phenomena of violence. Although the narrator experiences all of these at 
the hands of the Inquisition, they remain an adjunct to, rather than an integral part of, the 
narrator’s experience of violence. Often these subsidiary terms are employed as 
metaphors or similes for violence, when in fact they do not reflect the actuality of direct 
physical violence, and stretching the definition makes violence indistinguishable from 
notions such as misery, alienation and defilement. Yet they do serve to increase the effect
of the violence, particularly in the case of psychological violence, without necessarily 
being violent in themselves. Aggression may almost always involve violence, or at least 
suggest the threat of violence, but it does not follow that violence always consists of 
aggression. When the narrator is faced with the descending pendulum, he is surely 
threatened with extreme violence; yet the calculating construction of the machine seems 
to imply that there is little or no aggression – rather, there is calculated malevolence, with
the machine being an implement rather than an instance of violence. Similarly, force may 
involve violence, but not necessarily so, and violence need not include force. The narrator 
may be compelled into a state of imprisonment against his will, but much of the violence 
he experiences does not involve the physical use of force. However, the experiences of 
the narrator are in many cases instances that conflate these terms with the terms of the 
violence. Consequently, it is justifiable to consider the various adjunctive terms as an 
integral part of the overall denotation of direct physical violence as represented in this 
particular narrative. 
2.4 Psychological Violence
Psychological or covert violence is any type of violence that depends upon an attack on, 
or an abuse of the mental well-being of, an individual or group of individuals. In this 
sense, threats of physical violence, prejudice, the offering or withholding of information 
that may cause anxiety to an individual, and the physical violence done to the property or 
acquaintances of the individual may all be considered as being psychologically violent. 
Unlike many commentators on violence who prefer to concentrate on physical and/or 
structural violence (Keane, Coady, Benjamin, et al), the second part of Audi’s definition 
of violence deliberately includes the psychological as a form of violence: “Violence is the 
highly vigorous psychological abuse of, or the sharp, caustic psychological attack, upon a 
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person” (Audi 1971: 59). Similarly, Galtung asserts that “a violent structure leaves marks 
not only on the human body but also on the mind” (Galtung 1990: 40). Psychological 
violence may be a result either of direct violence or of structural violence, or a 
combination of these. Thus, although Keane prefers to limit a definition of violence to 
that which causes physical harm, he also considers the modern state an instrument of 
domination through which its subjects are “permanently under a cloud of threatened 
violence”, and such a rational and calculating potential for violence is used as “a 
technique of terrorising and demoralising entire populations, preventing them from 
engaging in organised resistance” (Keane 1996: 30). Again, the parallel with the 
Panoptican is apt: “The crowd, a compact mass, a locus of multiple exchanges, 
individualities merging together, a collective effect, is abolished and replaced by a 
collection of separated individualities. From the point of view of the guardian, it is 
replaced by a multiplicity that can be numbered and supervised; from the point of view of 
the inmates, by a sequestered and observed solitude” (Foucault 1977: 201). 
The panoptical structure of the Inquisition (its priest and judges representing Foucault’s 
“guardians”) has already been examined as a prime example of institutional violence, as 
well as the ways in which that violence results in overt physical violence. But perhaps the 
most disturbing aspect of the text of “The Pit and the Pendulum” is the covert violence 
that is inflicted on the narrator by the agents of institutional violence. The narrator, upon 
awaking in the dungeon, dreads his first glance at what surrounds him, “not that I feared 
to look upon things horrible, but that I grew aghast lest there should be nothing to see”
(II:264).26 When he does begin to explore his surroundings, he realises that “it seemed 
evident that mine was not, at least, the most hideous of fates” (III:264). Yet it is soon 
obvious that this optimism is erroneous, as throughout the text the narrator is made aware 
of the effects of his ordeal. The result is that he frequently desires the fate previously 
considered “most hideous”: “And then there stole into my fancy, like a rich musical note, 
the thought of what sweet rest there must be in the grave” (I:262); “Then, very suddenly, 
thought, and shuddering terror, and earnest endeavour to comprehend my real state. Then 
26 Here violence takes the form of a wilful removal of the limits of the explicable. The deliberate excision 
of any relation to what had previously passed as reality becomes an extreme application of violence. 
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a strong desire to lapse into insensibility” (II: 263); “Death would have been a relief, oh! 
how unspeakable!” (VI:272). 
It has been noted that the extinction of life is the extreme consequence of physical 
violence; it follows, then, that to create in the mind of an individual the desire for death is 
an extreme form of psychological violence. To do so further denigrates the dignity and 
self-respect of the narrator, and the psychological torture soon achieves the required 
effect: “By long suffering my nerves had been unstrung, until I trembled at the sound of 
my own voice, and had become in every respect a fitting subject for the species of torture 
which awaited me” (IV:267). The consequences of this state of mind include a refusal to 
accept what is actually happening as the narrator’s responses become increasingly 
irrational: “I half-smiled in my agony” (V:270); (VI:271); “And then I fell suddenly 
calm, and lay smiling at the glittering death, as a child at some bauble” (V:270). The 
violence has not caused only physical harm, but has also reduced the psychological state 
of the narrator to something less than human – that of an imbecile, or an idiot.
This suggests some of the effects of the psychological violence experienced by the
narrator; yet the question that still remains unanswered is how the violence is 
implemented. Initially, the pronouncement of the death sentence is psychological, 
sending the narrator into a swoon of “delirious horror” (I:261). Yet the true nature of the 
sentence is realised only after he has awakened from unconsciousness: “Was I left to 
perish of starvation in this subterranean world of darkness; or what fate, perhaps even 
more fearful, awaited me?” (III:265). It is this ignorance of one’s fate, and the 
anticipation of a feared unknown, that is perhaps the true characteristic of covert 
violence. The narrator is aware that this is the ultimate aim of his tormentors: “There was 
the choice of death with its direst physical agonies, or death with its most hideous moral 
horrors. I had been reserved for the latter” (IV:267). The institutional nature of the 
violence is cited in the rumours that had become associated with the prison of Toledo, 
“strange things narrated – fables I had always deemed them – but yet strange, and too 
ghastly to repeat, save in a whisper” (III:264-5). This is clearly a confirmation of the 
“cloud of threatened violence” identified by Keane. The horror of the rumours is
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intensified by the realisation that “the death just avoided, was of that very character 
which I had regarded as fabulous and frivolous in the tales regarding the Inquisition” 
(IV:267). This indicates a subtle link between the psychological and the covert violence. 
What had previously been only anecdotal (the institutionalised cultural violence) now 
becomes directly relevant, and the previous dismissal of the frivolous now transforms
itself into an immediate apprehension of actual, direct physical violence.
Following Arendt, it has been suggested that violence is by its very nature instrumental. 
The pendulum as object, the unnamed horror in the pit and the contracting walls are all 
instances of implements used to inflict physical violence, and the apprehension of such 
physical violence is a fundamental part of the psychological violence of the narrative. 
However, the threat (and the implement) need not entail exclusively a threat of physical 
harm. Often, exposure to distressing images or information will also have the desired 
effect. In this narrative it is the “artwork” that decorates the walls of the dungeon –
typical of the influence of cultural violence, but also distorted in order to suggest the 
physical violence that might follow – that serves as the instrument of psychological 
violence: “the figures of fiends in aspects of menace, with skeleton forms, and other 
really fearful images” (V:268). As the narrator becomes further disorientated owing to 
the extremes of violence inflicted on him, the images assume “a startling and most 
intense brilliancy, that gave spectral and fiendish portraitures an aspect that might have 
thrilled even firmer nerves than my own. Demon eyes, of a wild and ghastly vivacity, 
glared upon me in a thousand directions, where none had been visible before, and 
gleamed with the lurid lustre of a fire that I could not force my imagination to regard as 
unreal” (VII:274-5). Once again, personal psychological violence is effected through the 
machinations of institutional violence, as the threat of an eternity of damnation in Hell – a 
familiar threat in the history of Christian discourse – is exploited to instil alarm and 
compel conformity in those subject to the authority assumed by the Church. The effect 
that such psychological violence has on the narrator (although his religious beliefs are 
never revealed by Poe) corresponds with the conventional and contextual religious beliefs 
that would have been pervasive at the time, additionally serving to intensify the 
experience of the representation by the potential reader. There are many further examples 
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in the text of the characteristics and effects of psychological violence. What needs to be 
re-emphasised is that such violence rarely exists in isolation from instances of 
institutional and/or direct violence. On the one hand, it is the threat of physical violence 
that makes psychological violence possible; on the other, it is the structure of institutional 
violence that allows for covert violence, either directly (as in the case of Poe’s narrator), 
or indirectly (as in the case of the political or religious indoctrination of entire 
communities). Consequently, it becomes impossible to eliminate psychological violation
as an integral feature of any definition of violence. 
3. The Representation of Violence
The three main categories of violence – institutional, physical and psychological – are 
often mutually interdependent, and it is difficult, particularly in a text such as “The Pit 
and the Pendulum”, to consider only one type in isolation. Narratives that are instances of 
representations of violence will necessarily include all three types, although it is often the 
case that one type may be more obvious, or even predominate. In order to investigate the 
representation of violence effectively, whether in fictional or non-fictional form, it is 
necessary to acknowledge the inter-relationship that exists among the different types. 
With this in mind, it is possible to re-formulate the earlier definition of violence as a 
definition that will form the basis for the following discussion regarding the ethics of the 
representation of violence. Thus, the textual depiction of violence can be considered as:
The iterable representation of an act of direct or indirect intentional 
harm against a person’s body or mind or property which is 
comprehended by a potential reader whose experience of the 
representation is contextually determined.
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CHAPTER 7
REPRESENTING VIOLENCE
1. Representation of Violence and the Potential Reader
In order for a potential reader to read a textual representation of violence, he or she must 
engage with an iterable text that has no initial verifiability nor value, and that depicts an 
instance of direct or indirect harm to another. Yet, each new reading implies a process of 
interpretation and evaluation that will (re)situate the text within a specific social and 
cultural context. These processes reflect such external influences as reader expectation, 
canonicity, and ethical and aesthetical evaluation. The ethical discourse that is dominant 
in a particular context will contribute to the continued reception of a textual description 
of violence. It can therefore be asserted that there exists a correlation between the
aesthetic evaluation of a text and the ethical assumptions that exist within a particular 
socio-cultural context. The inter-subjective aspect of ethical values, considered in relation 
to the inter-subjective aspect of iterable textual representation, suggests an effective inter-
relation between aesthetic and ethical interpretation. This assertion that there can be no 
objective ethical values has important implications for the efficacy of evaluative enquiry:
The claim that values are not objective, are not part of the fabric of the world, is 
meant to include not only moral goodness, which might be most naturally equated 
with moral value, but also other things that could be more loosely called moral 
values or disvalues – rightness and wrongness, duty, obligation, an action’s being 
rotten and contemptible, and so on. It also includes non-moral values, notably 
aesthetic ones, beauty and various kinds of artistic merit … clearly much the same 
considerations apply to aesthetic and to moral values, and there would be at least 
some initial implausibility in a view that gave the one a different status from the 
other.
(Mackie 1977: 15)
Yet it would be erroneous to conflate ethical judgements with aesthetic evaluation, 
particularly when the two are closely interlinked through the reading of a text
representing violence. It is therefore essential to determine exactly what is implied by an 
ethical experience of representation, in terms of reader expectation within an interpretive 
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community, and to investigate how (and under what circumstances) such an experience is 
possible.
The ethical implications of reading instances of textual violence result from the dual 
nature of the representation. On the one hand, there is the act or event of violence that is 
represented in the text. This may be in contravention of the values and norms of a 
particular society, and as a result offensive to many potential readers. Yet, on the other 
hand, the ethical issues raised by the depiction of the violence may go beyond the textual 
depiction, thereby situating the text within a broader ethical discourse. Although to 
represent an act of violence is not necessarily to approve of it, it may be the case that a 
reader will confuse a representation of violence with an endorsement of the act itself, 
rather than reading it as a critique of that act, or as a critique of the society in which such 
an act is possible. The notion of iterability, however, does argue for continuing and 
infinite re-interpretation, and this would imply that a text, applauded in one interpretation 
for its stance against violence, will be strongly censured for rationalising, or even 
glorifying, violence in another interpretation. This chapter, therefore, will consider how 
competing ethical discourses construe the textual representation of violence, and how 
such interpretations both influence, and are influenced by, the aesthetic evaluations of the 
narrative by the potential reader.        
In “Lesson 6”of J. M. Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello, the protagonist is forced into an 
ethical dilemma owing to her reading a representation of violence – a text detailing the 
executions of the Wehrmacht officers who had participated in the plot to assassinate 
Hitler. The ethical dilemma is directly related to the graphic realism of the representation, 
supported by the historical fact of the violence: 
That is what Paul West, novelist, had written about, page after page after page, 
leaving nothing out; and that is what she read, sick with the spectacle, sick with 
herself, sick with a world in which such things took place, until at last she pushed the 
book away and sat with her head in her hands. Obscene! She wanted to cry … 
because such things ought not to take place, and then obscene again because having 
taken place they ought not to be brought into the light but covered up and hidden for 
ever in the bowels of the earth, like what goes on in the slaughterhouses of the world, 
if one wishes to save one’s sanity. 
(Coetzee 2003: 158) 
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The dilemma that Costello must confront is that between the act of reading (and being 
gratified by) the represented violence, and the impending remorse at her subsequent
distancing from the actual violence: “I do not want to read this, she said to herself; yet 
she had gone on reading, excited despite herself” (2003: 178). Coetzee, through the 
persona of Elizabeth Costello, is unable to resolve this problem of reception. Instead, the 
inadequate stipulation is made that some things ought not to be written, and that the 
writer who does venture to do so becomes complicit in the actual violence. This applies
particularly if the representation is excessively explicit, or relies on clich and 
sentimentality. However, to suggest that to represent violence is ethically questionable, 
and that to avoid it somehow prevents the violation of the integrity of potential readers, 
seems to be an abrogation of the latent possibility that representations of violence may 
generate an ethical response that would not necessarily be a mere glorification of 
violence. In addition, to avoid the representation of violence that has actually taken place 
(or that could conceivably take place), does not negate the actuality of the violence. For 
example, in Disgrace, Coetzee does not describe the rape of Lucy; yet the potential of the 
violent act remains implicit throughout the narrative, no less so than in the more overtly 
descriptive text read by Costello. The reader is as likely to fill in the gaps of the implicit 
violence as he or she is to bear in mind the graphic descriptions that both upset and 
fascinate Costello. 
The ethical predicament outlined in Elizabeth Costello encapsulates the particular 
problems that exist in the reading of a text that represents violence. There are therefore at 
least two questions that need to be considered. The first concerns the ethical and moral 
issues involved in the experience of reading; the second is how those issues interrelate 
with the determination of aesthetic evaluation. In other words, how is it possible that an 
experience of reading a description of violence may result in an ethical response that is 
not necessarily the same as that which would result from witnessing an instance of actual 
violence, and what would be the aesthetic implications of that experience? It has already 
been suggested that ethics and aesthetics are closely related in texts that depict violence. 
Although it may be possible to read a text as a linguistic construct without evoking 
further judgement, most representations of violence, whether the violence is direct or 
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indirect, structural or psychological, will be read within a framework of ethical values. 
The ethical connotations of the text will therefore interact with aesthetic considerations, 
influencing such factors as the appraisal of the proficiency of the representation, as well 
as the awareness of the metaphoricity and/or realism of the depiction. 
As has been established in earlier chapters, a textual representation is the iterable, 
contingent and context-dependent denotation of extralinguistic objects, events, properties 
and notions in the form of writing, such representation being open to infinite 
interpretation, but simultaneously constrained by communities of understanding which 
allow for inter-subjective and sufficient meaning to be generated with respect to any text. 
The ethical dimension of reading therefore takes place within that inter-subjective space; 
that is, the generation of meaning that precipitates ethical cognition by the individual 
within the context of his or her socio-linguistic community, and is framed by the ethical 
norms that necessarily exist within, and are determined by, that community. However, it 
will be argued here that most ethical norms are open to question with regard to a 
responsible and ethical reading of a text that is explicitly or implicitly violent, and that 
the notion of an ethical system is incoherent when applied to the notion of an iterable and 
contextual representation of violence. In addition, any discussion of such representation 
needs to consider how the language employed to depict acts of violence creates the 
conditions for the generation of an ethical response by a reader. 
There are at least three aspects that are instrumental in responding to a representation of 
violence. These are the inter-related concepts of expectation, aesthetic preference and 
justification, which occur respectively prior to, during, and subsequent to reading. The 
first, expectation, may be defined as the contextualisation of a potential reading prior to 
the reading of the text. The second, aesthetic preference, assumes the reader’s capacity to 
apply and modify that contextualisation within a particular framework throughout the 
experience of the text. The third, justification, is the capacity of the reader to recognise 
the reading of a representation of violence as a potentially aesthetic experience, which is 
based on the ethical criteria suggested by expectation and preference. These three aspects
will now be considered in more detail.
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2. Aestheticisation and Expectation
The language employed to represent or describe acts of violence, whether direct or 
indirect, individual or structural, is conventionally negative in tone: such acts are usually 
described as being committed or perpetrated against victims. The notion of violence is 
therefore considered as being destructive, and consequently detrimental to any 
conception of what (most) individuals would consider to be socially acceptable. The 
result of this negative lexicon is that a representation of violence intimates a pre-
determined ethical latency which becomes a crucial aspect of the creation of the ethical 
and aesthetic process when the text is read. As argued in Chapters 4 and 5, the degree of 
aestheticisation employed is largely responsible for the degree of realism experienced by 
the reader, and this has implications for the ethical response to the text. The 
aestheticisation of violence is the way in which violence is projected so that feelings of 
disgust and other negative emotions (fear, outrage, horror, and so on), that would 
accompany a real-life instance of violence, may be replaced with an appreciation of, and 
satisfaction with, an aesthetic or literary modality of representation. This applies more 
often in texts that are understood to be fictional, or at least historically removed from the 
context within which the reader is experiencing them. In such cases, the representation 
may modify the ethical response of the reader from the negative connotations of actual 
violence into the less negative connotations of aestheticised violence. For example, 
consider the following extracts, each taken from a text concerned with conflicts in 
Northern Africa
1. Fatima Ghodbane was wearing a veil in her classroom in the Mohamed Lazar 
school when they came for her in March 1995, six men armed with hunting guns and 
pistols … they tore off her veil, tied her hands, stabbed her in the face and then cut 
her throat [and] placed her severed head outside the classroom door. 
(Fisk 2006: 695)
2. On an undamaged portico clustered six thousand men, women and children, Jewish 
refugees. Legionaries who still had vivid memories of comrades who’d been burned 
to death on one such portico as a result of Jewish duplicity torched the portico, and all 
six thousand perished. At the same time, priests who tried to surrender were put to 
death.
(Dando-Collins 2002: 254)
3. Gradually people came to the end of the avenues; they hurled into the flames 
pearls, gold vases, cups, torches, all their wealth; the offerings became more and more 
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splendid and numerous. At last a man tottering, pale, and hideous with terror, pushed 
a child; then a small black mass could be seen in the hands of the colossus; it was 
swallowed up in the great dark opening.
(Flaubert: 1977: 240)
All three texts deal with accounts of atrocity, yet not many readers would react in the 
same way to each; the first, a recent and verifiable murder in Algeria; the second, an 
account of the sacking of Jerusalem almost 2000 years ago; the third, the fictional re-
creation of child sacrifice in Ancient Carthage. A reader will probably feel more 
revulsion at the immediacy of the first extract.1 Yet to read of the atrocities of the Roman 
Legions in the early Common Era will not evoke comparable feelings of horror and 
despair –the distancing effect of history situates the violence within a different ethical 
paradigm: a reader may still be disturbed by the violence, but often only in relation to his 
or her current contextual position. The juxtaposition of the historical representation and 
the contemporary context allows for a reaction to the violence, rather than for an empathy 
with the particular victims of that violence. Similarly, although the verifiable practice of 
child sacrifice in ancient Carthage may still evoke a negative reaction, the horror of the 
third extract again lies in the representation of the event, rather than in any specific 
empathy for individual victims. A reader may enjoy Flaubert’s novel as a fictional 
recreation of a historical era, and appreciate the historical information of Dando-Collins’s 
account of the fall of Jerusalem. Yet to realise that Fatima Ghodbane was actually 
murdered in recent times creates an immediate ethical response to the first extract, which 
is opposed to the meta-responses experienced when reading the aestheticised 
representations of the other two extracts. 
This notion of a pleasurable meta-response to aestheticised violence, as contrasted with 
the response to actual violence, has long been a topic of discussion in aesthetic theory. 
For example, both Aristotle and Hume considered the problem of an aesthetic response to 
an event that would usually cause anguish when experienced in actuality. Aristotle 
concluded that it is the means of imitative representation (the aestheticisation) that allows 
for a positive response. He claims in the Poetics that even the sight of unpleasant 
1 The author admits that to bear witness to the atrocity makes him complicit, even though ignoring atrocity 
does not erase it: “The moment I open the papers each morning, I feel I must look over my shoulder to see 
if anyone is watching me. Merely to look at these terrible images is a criminal act” (Fisk 2006: 695).
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representations such as corpses or “lower animals” is made pleasant by the excellence of
the imitation (Aristotle 1965: 35).2 Likewise, Hume’s essay “Of Tragedy” argues that any 
experience of a representation of tragedy (which, by its very nature, involves violence of 
one sort or another, be it institutional or personal), that in an external actuality would 
cause distress, is accompanied by two conflicting emotions. The first and dominant 
emotion is pleasure at the manner of representation. The second, subordinate, emotion is 
the negative emotion caused by what is represented. The former emotion, being the 
dominant one, absorbs the latter negative emotion without diminishing any of its 
intensity, thus increasing the feelings of delight in the aesthetic representation: “The force 
of imagination, the energy of expression, the power of numbers, the charms of imitation; 
all of these are naturally, of themselves, delightful to the mind: and when the object 
presented lays also hold of some affection, the pleasure rises upon us by the conversion 
of this subordinate movement into that which is predominant” (Hume 1757b: 126). 
Although this hierarchy of emotion is not absolute, and may be inverted by some readers, 
the continuing popularity of tragedy seems to suggest that the pleasure experienced 
through reading an aestheticised representation of violence tends to prevail over the 
attendant negative emotions evoked by the violent circumstances represented.  
An aestheticisation of a representation of violence therefore involves the imaginative re-
construction of a represented world in which the response to the portrayal is shaped by 
the mode of representation. The degree to which figuration, metaphor and other tropic 
devices are used also helps to establish whether the reader experiences the depiction as 
more or less explicit. When reading a text, the reader is placed in a situation where he or 
she is accountable for the imaginative construction of the events portrayed. Even in a 
linguistically unproblematic text, the particulars supplied by the author have to be 
interpreted and reinterpreted throughout the reading. The result of such reader-response 
“concretizing” is that “the reader makes implicit connections, fills in the gaps, draws 
inferences and tests out hunches ... The text itself is really no more than a series of ‘cues’ 
2 It is not necessarily the case that aestheticisation would result in appreciation, as there is always the 
possibility of revulsion. Aristotle’s argument, however, seems to emphasise the excellence of the 
representation, and not necessarily an appreciation of the subject-matter. These considerations are also 
inevitably dependent upon such aspects as the degree of mediation and the contextual space of the 
representation. 
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to the reader, invitations to construct a piece of language into meaning” (Eagleton 1983: 
76).3 Additionally, the social positioning of the reader is instrumental in establishing the 
ethical structure necessary for forming an aesthetic assessment. The expectations that 
influence the value of a fictional text will be affected by the aestheticisation of the 
narrative; those that influence the attributed value of a factual text will be affected by the 
verifiability of the narrative. Whereas aestheticisation is an accepted and even desired 
element of reading fictionally represented violence, the expectations of the potential 
reader of a factual account of violence would probably result in some hostility towards 
excessive degrees of aestheticisation. 
The ethical response of the potential reader is therefore significantly influenced by his or 
her expectations regarding the potential factual or fictional modes predominant in an 
unread text. To frustrate those expectations often results in a dramatic reconstitution of 
the aesthetic response of the reader. An example of this is the controversy surrounding 
Norma Khouri’s Forbidden Love, published in 2003. Supposedly a factual account of a 
Jordanian honour killing, the author admitted after publication that certain names, dates 
and locations had been fabricated, ostensibly to protect the individuals involved in the 
narrative. The response of the publishing company to the admission is revealing. In a 
radio interview, a managing director of the company announced that it would not publish 
the sequel to the book, because “if there are serious factual inaccuracies – which she has 
admitted to – then how do we know what to believe? You know, if the book is non-
fiction, everything within it has to be true, and she can’t pick and choose which bits are 
true and which bits are not” (quoted in The Star newspaper, 19 August 2004; emphasis 
added). What is significant about this example is that, prior to the author’s admission that
she had altered certain passages, the book had sold over 250,000 copies. In other words, 
the ethical judgment of the readers, grounded upon specific expectations based on issues 
of belief and verifiability, determined the positive aesthetic approval of the narrative. 
Despite the author’s protestations that she would “never call that book fiction, and I will 
never call that book a novel”, the ethical response to the non-verifiable elements of the 
narrative in many cases reversed this aesthetic response. It is therefore apparent that 
3 The discussion in Chapter 3, Section 1 has relevance to this argument.
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ethical expectations determined aesthetic evaluation before and after the revelations of 
fabrication, despite the text’s remaining identical throughout. What is paradoxical about 
this example is that, if the author had initially acknowledged that certain segments of the 
representation had with sound reason been altered (as was the case with Krog’s Country 
of my Skull), then the expectations of the readers would have been less compromised by 
any modification to the supposed factuality of the text, and the subsequent aesthetic 
response would have been more likely to remain positive.4
3. The Problem of Aesthetic Preference
If expectation is a precondition for reading a text, then aesthetic preference is the 
subsequent process through which that text is experienced. If ethics and aesthetics 
interact in representations of violence, then in order to be aware of how this occurs, it is 
necessary to consider the functioning of preference. The notion of aesthetic preference 
has frequently been assumed to be the province of competency. In other words, some 
individuals may consider themselves exclusively competent in the determination of a 
cultural paradigm through which certain standards of preference are considered 
appropriate, usually to the detriment of other standards of preference that do not conform 
to the dominant paradigm. For example, Hume claims in “On the Standard of Taste” that 
“a true judge in the finer arts is observed, even during the most polished ages, to be so 
rare a character; strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, 
perfected by comparison, and clear of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this 
valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are to be found, is the true 
standard of taste and beauty ... Though men of delicate taste be rare, they are easily to be 
distinguished in society, by the soundness of their understanding and the superiority of 
their faculties above the rest of mankind” (Hume 1757a: 140).
Hume’s conception of the “true critic”, he or she who personifies a justification of a 
certain taste, is further developed by the Kantian premise of “disinterestedness”: “Taste is 
4 The effect of expectation on texts whose factual status is placed in doubt will be discussed in more detail 
within the framework of postmodern ethics in Chapter 9, Section 2, where the similar case of 
Wilkomirski’s Fragments will be considered.
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the faculty of estimating an object or mode of representation by means of a delight or 
aversion apart from any interest” (Kant 1993: 165). Kant’s argument is that any 
individual who satisfies the condition of disinterestedness must necessarily experience 
the same reaction to an artwork as any other individual who also satisfies that condition, 
and such an experience is therefore indicative of an absolute criterion of judgement, 
liberated from any confining contextual partiality. Yet it has been maintained throughout 
this study that any text is necessarily iterable, and hence contextually dependent: there 
exist no universal or absolute standards of aesthetic preference, but only context-
dependent (re)interpretations of representations of an extra-textual actuality, be the text 
null or verifiable in its denotation. Both Hume and Kant tend to perpetuate an error by 
ignoring the context of the judgement. Since responses to any reading are determined by 
context and the iterable nature of the narrative, it is not convincing to privilege one 
standard of aesthetic preference over another, be that the preference of the majority or 
otherwise. To privilege the estimation of the majority is problematic as aesthetic 
preference cannot be determined solely on the basis of a superiority of numbers, and the 
minority position cannot be discarded merely because it is inconsistent with the majority 
outlook. A further problem, disregarded by proponents of an absolute standard of 
aesthetic preference, is that of the competency of the judges themselves. There can be no 
decontextualised and objective point-of-view regarding aesthetic preference; therefore 
any judgement of a text can only be subjective. This can be seen in the debate regarding 
Herbert Selby’s novel Last Exit to Brooklyn, in which differing responses to the text 
resulted in differing evaluations regarding the worth of the text.5
The development of a conception of aesthetic preference, once separated from notions of 
universality, can be influenced by a consideration of the role of ethics in its 
determination. However, it is necessary to reiterate that ethical judgement and aesthetic 
evaluation, are not identical, although the two inform and influence each other, and it is 
erroneous to attempt to conflate the two. A judgement of the aesthetically good is not 
equivalent to a judgement of the ethically good, and it is not legitimate to advocate that 
ethical and aesthetic concerns are interchangeable. For example, Nazi concentration camp 
5 The controversy surrounding Last Exit to Brooklyn will be discussed in detail in Chapter 8, Section 1.1.
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commanders listening to the music-dramas of Wagner and reading the texts of Goethe 
and Nietzsche cannot be censured for being aesthetically hypocritical, even though their 
ethical justifications may diverge from contemporary ethical opinion.6 Aesthetic 
preference, liberated from the universal, becomes a social construct, relative to socio-
cultural conventions which determine the intersubjective judgements available to the 
potential reader. Yet even the endeavour to manufacture the conditions necessary for a 
transgression of the prevailing standards of aesthetic preference is determined by the 
dominant standard. Transgression can take place – and can be defined as such – only in 
response to the terms dictated by the canonical texts which dominate the established 
criteria, and which through closely associated ethical norms determine any inter-
subjective aesthetic judgment. This also explains the seeming divergence of judgements 
within the same discourse, as most instances can be related (either positively or 
negatively) to the paradigms dictated by the current discourse or ideology. The suitability
of representations of violence must be established according to intersubjective standards 
of aesthetic preference and ethical rightness, that are in turn determined by the 
contextually prevalent ethical norms.
One response to this relativism of aesthetic preference has been that of the pre-critical 
approach, in which any critical awareness of the issues involved in the production, 
distribution and appreciation of a text becomes irrelevant to the initial aesthetic 
evaluation of that text. The leading proponent of the pre-critical approach was Susan 
Sontag, whose essay “Against Interpretation” argues for an “aesthetics-of-silence”, in 
which all art is empowered to resist the imposition of the intellectual will. In this view, 
the critic is involved in a process of the sterilisation of aesthetic preference, of creating an 
impenetrable intellectual aura around art which effectively robs it of its excitement, 
significance and relevance to the potential reader: “Interpretation ... violates art. It makes 
art into an article for use, for arrangement into a mental scheme of categories” (Sontag 
6 It is also not necessarily the case that their ethical reasons for reading a text are equivalent to their actions 
as exterminators. A reading of Nietzsche may be undertaken on grounds of philosophical enquiry rather 
than as a validation of a Übermensch philosophy, and Wagnerian music-drama may be enjoyed on auditory
or narrative grounds rather than as a vehicle for racial or nationalist considerations. The individual reading 
of a text is determined by inter-subjective prejudices and attitudes, but such intersubjectivity is not 
exclusively dependent upon only one possible ethical norm. 
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1966: 53). However, many of the proponents of the pre-critical school, by following an 
egalitarian position in rejecting accepted standards as elitist and opinionated, display a 
dogmatism and authoritarianism reminiscent of many other twentieth-century critical and 
literary-theoretical approaches.7 Given the iterable nature of the text, it is not possible to 
avoid interpretation, and even a cursory approach to a text must necessarily include 
elements of interpretation, even if these are not articulated in a recognisable critical 
discourse. A postmodern response to the pre-critical approach would need to question the 
implication of an individual standard of aesthetic preference which is divorced from both 
intersubjective interpretation and the possibilities of contextual iterability. 
It is therefore not possible to circumvent the notion of aesthetic preference altogether, as 
it exists as an important feature of the ethical dimension of reading and interpreting any 
text. This follows from the prevailing intersubjective, pre-existing aesthetics and ethics of 
a potential reader, combined with the precepts of reception theory and iterability. 
Aesthetic preference is essential to the reading process, and therefore contributes to the 
ethical process in which differing representations of violence are justified (or repudiated)
in the opinion of the potential reader.
4. The Justification for Violence in Texts
The reading of a narrative representing violence is a means towards an active response to 
that representation. This is not necessarily an enjoyable response; rather, an active 
response is one in which the reader experiences what Feagin refers to as a “meta-
response”. This is the consequence of an active involvement in a text while experiencing 
the representation, even if the emotions generated by the representation are considered 
negative. It implies that the potential reader can experience the emotions generated by a 
7 This can be observed in the writings of Leslie Fiedler, who "would make the gut reaction the be-all and 
end-all of art" (Guerin et al, 1992: 5). His essay "Cross the Border - Close the Gap" in Waugh 1992: 31-47
is a clear example of his theoretical position. It is sometimes ironic that critics argue against interpretation. 
In an appreciation of Susan Sontag’s career following her death in 2004, a Time magazine article noted that 
“she argued for a more sensuous, less intellectual approach to art. It was an irony lost on no one, except 
perhaps her, that she made those arguments in paragraphs that were marvels of strenuous intellection” 
(January 10 2005).
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violent occurrence without actually having to experience the trauma of the event: “The 
fact that pleasurable meta-responses to our sympathetic responses to tragedy are 
appropriate to art but not in life suggests one respect in which aesthetic emotions are 
different from the emotions of life … The peculiarity of the responses hinges on the fact 
that what one initially responds to is not real” (Feagin 1983: 313). Representation 
provides the framework for the meta-response, with such a response being evaluated in 
terms of the prevailing inter-subjective ethical constructs combined with the degree of 
aestheticisation present in the individual text. 
Yet the textual representation of violence encapsulates a paradox, which can be described 
as the contradictory notion of an aesthetically satisfying response to a representation of 
an instance of violence which would typically be considered objectionable or 
disconcerting in a verifiable, actual occurrence, as discussed earlier in relation to the texts 
of Fisk, Dando-Collins and Flaubert. That response suggests a particular ethical stance, 
which in turn influences the aesthetic response to the text. When the text in question is 
fictional, the reader reacts to it in a manner governed by the aestheticisation of the 
representation: hence the meta-response. The awareness that the violence is an instance 
of a null denotation allows him or her to experience it in a different manner from that in 
which it might be experienced or witnessed in actuality. The response that results in such 
a case is primarily ethical and aesthetic, rather than a direct emotional response. Yet 
factual accounts, as explained in Chapter 4, frequently employ the tropes and syntax of 
fiction, and such instances of violence are evaluated in a manner indistinguishable from 
the interpretation of fictional narratives. The result of this is that the reading and 
evaluation of non-fictional narratives is indistinguishable from the reading of fictional 
narratives except for the sort of reader expectation. Nevertheless, even if the expectation 
that a text is the representation of an actual event or person is vindicated, the reason for 
the continued reading of that factual representation of violence remains comparable to the 
reading of a fictional representation of violence. 
The notions of expectation and aesthetic preference have already been discussed. What 
needs to be further clarified is the third a priori condition for the development of an 
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ethical response to a narrative concerning violence: the notion of justification. The degree 
of justification afforded to a representation will generate an ethical space within which 
the text may be evaluated aesthetically, and is therefore essential to a discussion of the 
paradox of representing violence. Therefore three potential accounts of the paradox of 
responding to a representation of violence will be considered, namely catharsis, 
sensation-seeking, and the motive of justice.
4.1 Catharsis
The first mention of catharsis in a literary-critical context appears in Chapter 6 of 
Aristotle’s Poetics: “A tragedy is the imitation of an action which is serious and, having 
grandeur, complete in itself, done in language seasoned with embellishments, each 
appearing separately in different parts of the work, in dramatic rather than narrative form, 
accomplishing by way of pity and fear the catharsis of such feelings” (Aristotle 1965:
39). Yet the notion of catharsis has become particularly ambiguous in its various 
manifestations, and nowhere more than in its literary context. There exists much 
disagreement as to whether catharsis is a process of purgation, cleansing or purification, 
whether it is an experience of rational consciousness or an emotion, and whether it is a 
medical, psychological or literary phenomenon. Any definition of catharsis is therefore 
very much dependent on the critical or philosophical point of view of the writer. For 
example, Belfiore defines it as the “process of removing the shameless emotions that 
prevent the soul (sic) from acquiring, preserving or regaining emotional excellence” 
(Belfiore 1992: 340). Guinagh’s definition is more explicitly psychological, “a conflict 
model between two forces: one to express emotions, and the other to stop the expression 
of emotions” (Guinagh 1987: 15). Malcolm Budd offers two differing aesthetic 
definitions. On the one hand, it is a “pathological theory” which “construes catharsis as 
purgation and represents tragedy as affording a pleasurable relief of its distinctive 
emotions by means of a previous excitation of them” (Budd 1995: 110). On the other, it is 
the “refinement or purification of the tragic emotions effected by the disengagement of 
the emotions from that concern for the self in which they are found” (1995: 111). 
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Such variation of opinion regarding the exact nature of catharsis is closely linked to the 
fact that the word is used in at least two equally relevant Greek contexts.8 In the medical 
context, it refers to purgation: “tragedy gives the public a therapeutic stimulation of the 
passions and will drive the audience to a crisis, followed by relief and a calm pleasure” 
(Belfiore 1992: 261). In the religious context, it refers to the purification associated with 
ritual. A further interpretation is apparent in an ethical context, the Aristotelian 
framework through which the development of character is dependent upon the ability to 
rejoice and to feel pain correctly. An experience of a representation of distressing 
violence should, therefore, produce such harmony (through catharsis) by confronting 
“reasonable fears”.  This provides an opportunity to contemplate a paradigm of violence 
by observing its relation to feelings of repugnance, while not being physically threatened 
by the violence. 
Accordingly, depending upon the sense in which the term is employed, catharsis either 
excises or purifies emotions. The implication of this is that it facilitates a positive 
aesthetic experience of the representations of violence by either purging or purifying the 
excess of negative emotions that would be apparent in an encounter with actual violence. 
Yet to claim that catharsis removes a harmful excess of pity and fear is implausible, 
primarily because it is not necessarily the case that the potential reader is inherently 
possessed of such an excess. On the contrary, it seems more probable that for most 
readers the experience of reading violence arouses emotions rather than eradicating or 
alleviating them. To remove certain emotions from the reader’s evaluation of a 
representation of violence is also not necessarily beneficial. However, if neither type of 
catharsis is essentially relevant to the ethical or aesthetic evaluation of textual instance of 
violence, then most of the justifications for the representation of violence which rely 
upon such a theory become unconvincing, if not incoherent. In the case of such reliance, 
the notion of catharsis becomes more of an excuse, and less of a justification, for the 
violence. 
8 The word catharsis occurs 161 times in the authenticated works of Aristotle. 128 of these are used in a 
biological or medical sense, and the remainder are used in discussions of metaphysical, political or 
aesthetic issues (Belfiore 1992: 260). The dispute as to the definition of the term has resonance with
Derrida’s discussion of the pharmakon (as poison or cure) in “Plato’s Pharmacy” (Derrida 1981a: 61-172).
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Despite this, certain contemporary theories of catharsis persist in arguing that 
representations of violence “help people deal with real fears of things within and without 
themselves, even enabling them to rehearse their own deaths ... [such displays] help 
audiences to confront personal guilt indirectly, so that they might initiate real or imagined 
sins through the controlled trauma of the [representation]” (Zillmann 1998: 184). The 
indirect experience of violence is thus supposed to liberate the reader from negative 
emotion. Yet the application of this theory presupposes that conditions already exist that 
allow relief to manifest itself. The problem that arises is that “the presumption of fears, 
deficiencies, or impulsions is thus paramount … Unfortunately, it is this presupposition 
that gets in the way of providing testable verifiable proposals” (1998: 184). Another 
compelling argument against the cathartic potential of representations of violence is that, 
if it does result in purgation (or purification), then the repeated incidence of relief-
providing stimuli may promote the development of negative reinforcement. The 
consequence of this is that, if a reader is exposed to frequent instances of depicted 
violence, then even more exposure to even greater degrees of violence would be required
in order to achieve the same degree of relief. As a result of these and earlier objections, 
the argument for catharsis as a sole justification for the enjoyment or endorsement of 
representations of violence cannot be sustained. To conclude that such representation 
allows for a catharsis of those emotions that would otherwise cause or encourage actual 
violence cannot comprehensively elucidate the characteristics of representations of 
violence, or the gratification obtained from reading them. It is necessary, therefore, to 
examine two influential alternative theories that endeavour to justify an aesthetic 
response to the textual representation of violence. 
4.2 Sensation-Seeking
Edmund Burke’s essay “A Philosophical Enquiry into the Sublime and the Beautiful” of
1757 offers a precise articulation of what has become known as the sensation-seeking 
theory of violence. According to Burke, the vast majority of mankind is highly attracted 
to the violent and the tragic, to the extent that “there is no spectacle we so eagerly pursue, 
as that of some uncommon and grievous calamity.” Burke further asserts that “we shall 
be much mistaken if we attribute any considerable part of our satisfaction in tragedy to a 
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consideration that tragedy is a deceit, and its representations no realities. The nearer it 
approaches the reality, and the further it removes us from all idea of fiction, the more 
perfect is its power” (Burke 1998: 93).9 Burke’s hypothesis of the sublime is also based 
on the notion that the average human being is governed by a desire for (safe) sensation. 
This is consistent with certain recent studies (McCauley 1998: 150) which conclude that 
people with a high propensity for sensation or thrill maximisation have tendencies 
towards disinhibition, boredom and the need for yet more extreme experiences. This 
thrill-maximisation confirms the objection that representing violence encourages negative 
reinforcement as proposed in the previous section. This has been attributed to the 
“civilising process” in which aestheticised violence gives a means of filling the void left 
by the decreasing opportunities to experience violence directly (Goldstein 1998: 217).10
Similarly, Vicki Goldberg (1998: 27-52) has argued that as the dying and dead become 
removed from personal experience, so images of violence have increased. The idea is that 
as society becomes more enlightened, and consequently comparatively monotonous, the 
need for alternative sensations increases, as well as for experiences that challenge the 
ethical norms of society without significantly violating them. Those who fall into the 
category of sensation-seekers are more likely to respond positively to texts that operate at 
a low level of linguistic aestheticisation, such as Ellis’s American Psycho, Selby’s Last 
Exit to Brooklyn, and Harris’s Hannibal. Representations of institutional violence 
(without corresponding representations of personal violence) and highly aestheticised 
violence, as in Michaels’s Fugitive Pieces and Koestler’s Darkness at Noon, do not 
guarantee the required stimuli for thrill maximisation.11 However, such sensation-seeking 
often results in little more than habituation and negative reinforcement, as those who 
9 Although Burke argues that most people would prefer to watch the burning of London than a play (1988: 
94), to articulate the effect of the sublime concerning the representation of actual tragedy is often 
considered improper, despite the fascination felt by the witnesses. An extreme example of this is the 
response of the composer Karlheinz Stockhausen to the 9/11 attacks in America: “What happened there –
they all have to rearrange their brains now – is the greatest work of art ever” (Minor 2001: 1). The 
disapprobation that followed this comment, however, suggests that such a blurring of the distinction 
between art and actual disaster is ethically unacceptable to most readers: “Many perceived that what the 
German composer did was unspeakable … because he dared to articulate the ineffable and the horrific in 
the name of art” (2001: 2). 
10 That the “void” exists was starkly proven by the thousands of people who, from choice, watched the 
video of the execution of Saddam Hussein on the Internet. It is not necessarily the case that only those of a 
certain psycho-pathological makeup would wish to witness the actual death of another human being.
11 For examples drawn from each type of text, see Chapter 5, Section 1.2.
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initially respond to the scenes of violence are liable to experience an attenuation of 
emotional response through repeated exposure. 
This sensation-seeking, although consistent with reasons for the enjoyment of represented 
violence, is not necessarily a justification for those representations. The ethical and moral 
issues raised by sensation-seeking seem to be inherently unconstructive, and the value of 
texts such as Poe’s “The Pit and the Pendulum”12 is compromised by the negative 
implications of thrill maximisation, which implies the glorification of violence for its 
own sake. The ethical enquiry into representations of violence needs to take into account
the ethical issues at stake with regard to actual violence; consequently, sensation-seeking 
cannot be a factor in that enquiry. What is more significant is the notion of the justice-
motive, which determines to a far larger extent the inter-subjective evaluation of 
narratives.
4.3 The Justice Motive
The justice motive attempts to give a rationale for representations of violence through its 
dependence upon the punitive possibilities foregrounded by the text. In a large number of 
texts, from Beowulf to Hannibal, plots are dominated by situations in which the harmony 
of the social order is threatened by an external power, often represented by a character 
alien to the ethical norms of that society. Harmony may be restored only through the 
intervention of an heroic individual who is recognisably part of the threatened society, 
and who is able to counteract the destructive potential of the threat. Any acts of violence 
perpetrated by this individual are condoned and encouraged, with the result that such
instances become justified through the reader’s recognition of their necessarily punitive
nature. Such identification is thus considered satisfying to the potential reader whose 
socio-cultural context places him or her on the side of the hero. However, the violence of 
the protagonist has to occur in response to the violence perpetrated by the threatening 
figure: “any gruesome retributive killing has to appear just, and this appearance has to be 
prepared by witnessing the party to be punished perform increasingly despicable heinous 
crimes. This is to say that escalations in the portrayal of righteous, enjoyable violence 
12 This text is discussed in Chapter 6, Section 2.
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necessitate escalations in morally enraging, evil, and distressing violence” (Zillmann 
1998: 206). Readers who experience revulsion at the acts of the violent Other are hence 
deemed more liable to encourage the representation of punitive violence, thus effectively 
sanctioning the latter as aesthetically gratifying. The justice motive can be employed 
either to allow the reader to approve the violence necessary to eliminate any threat, or it 
can be excluded altogether in order to create sympathy and/or empathy for the 
protagonist (as in “The Pit and the Pendulum”, where the narrator is unable to effect any 
punitive violence in response to the violence enacted upon him). 
The justice motive is an element, explicitly or implicitly, of any representation of 
violence. In texts in which it is explicit, it suggests that certain specified instances of 
violence are to be celebrated, owing to their potential for serving punitive ends. In 
addition, such representations are often a reflection of the institutional violence that 
determines the character of the socially acceptable individual who is able to triumph over 
the menace of the alien. Yet this division of responses to representations of violence is 
subject to the same objections to violence suggested by Wolff in the previous chapter. 
Wolff argues that the violence of a murder and the violence of a legal execution are only 
distinguishable by means of recognising the assumed legitimacy of the latter.13 Similarly, 
each representation of violence is indistinguishable from the others as acts of violence, 
since they differ only in terms of degree and the conflict between the same and the Other. 
However, both explicit and implicit instances of the justice motive reflect a certain 
contextual positioning that influences not only the ethical appraisal of the value of a text, 
but also its subsequent aesthetic evaluation. The justice motive therefore provides the 
most compelling hypothesis with regard to the justification of the representation of 
violence as a condition for the ethical evaluation of an iterable text, even if this 
hypothesis is still flawed in certain respects.
13 The execution of Saddam Hussein, with its attendant controversy over his status as martyr or war 
criminal, is again relevant, as it highlights this ambiguity between the terms murder and execution. For 
many  Sunnis, his killing was murder, while for many Shiites it was justice.
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5. Concluding Remarks
It is therefore evident that there can be no single explanation for the appeal of 
representations of violence, although some theories, particularly the justice motive and 
elements of the catharsis theory, may clarify certain aspects of the paradox in certain 
cases. Contextual differences ensure that diverse ethical responses and evaluations are to 
be anticipated, with various degrees of aestheticisation allowing for differing degrees and 
types of aesthetic responses. Before reading, the text has no intrinsic value or meaning. 
However, once the process of reading has begun, then an implied ethical space is 
generated by the potential reader, subject to that individual’s inter-subjective application 
of expectation, aesthetic preference and justification. These factors, in turn, inform and 
are informed by the ethical norms and assumptions of the reader’s socio-cultural milieu. 
Yet the expectation of achieving universality is again shown to be unrealistic, as no 
single norm or system of values can satisfactorily elucidate the potential ethical 
understandings of a representation of violence. The next chapter will therefore articulate 
this problem further by examining some of the foremost normative ethical theories in 
relation to such texts, as well as elucidating some of the deficiencies of these theories.
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CHAPTER 8
NORMATIVE ETHICS AND THE REPRESENTATION OF 
VIOLENCE
1. Ethical Theory and the Textual Representation of Violence
The previous chapters have all served to outline the conditions necessary for an ethical 
response to the representation of violence. To summarise: 
1. Textual representation is the iterable, contingent and context-dependent 
denotation of extralinguistic objects, events, properties and notions in the form of 
written language, such representation being subject to infinite (re)interpretation.
2. The only significant difference between a factual and a fictional representation is 
the perception of the potential reader regarding the verifiability of the text.
3. Violence depicted in a text is the representation of an act of harm experienced by 
a potential reader whose understanding of the representation is contextually 
determined. The three conditions of expectation, aesthetic preference and 
justification also serve to influence this experience.1
Drawing on this summary, it is now feasible to reflect on the ethical dimensions of 
reading a representation of violence. As an example, consider the following extract. It
depicts a public execution in Paris in the nineteenth century: an instance of direct 
personal violence initiated as a consequence of institutional violence. The isolated extract
cannot be distinguished as being either definitively factual or fictional. As it stands, it 
could be a passage from a realist novel, a historical account, or even a fictional recreation 
of a factual occurrence.2 Since the reader has no direct access either to the context or the 
historical verifiability of the event, he or she is compelled to make certain ethical 
1 However, all three notions can be considered as being problematic in various respects (see Chapter 7, 
Sections 2 and 4).
2 Such de-contextualisation is not common, but is employed here to illustrate the way in which supposition 
and contextualisation serve to read the text in a particular manner.
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suppositions which are based on inter-subjective notions of taste, justification and 
expectation. However, the conclusions reached by the reader are subject to some 
modification when the previously concealed context is revealed, or when the assumed 
perspective is subsequently altered. The ethical response to a reading of the text is 
therefore largely a result of the (re)formulation of the contextual space within which the 
iterable narrative is (re)interpreted.3
[The crucifix] was carried round the foot of the scaffold, to the front, and turned 
towards the criminal, that he might see it to the last. It was hardly in its place, when 
he appeared on the platform, bare-footed; his hands bound; and with the collar and 
neck of his shirt cut away, almost to the shoulder. A young man – six and twenty –
vigorously made, and well-shaped. Face pale; small dark moustache, and dark brown 
hair … He immediately kneeled down below the knife. His neck was fitting into a 
hole, made for the purpose, in a cross plank, was shut down, by another plank above; 
exactly like the pillory. Immediately below him was a leathern bag. And into it his 
head rolled instantly. 
The executioner was holding it by the hair, and walking with it around the scaffold, 
showing it to the people, before one quite realized that the knife had fallen heavily, 
and with a rattling sound. 
When it had travelled around the four sides of the scaffold, it was set upon a pole in 
front, a little patch of black and white, for the long street to stare at, and the flies to 
settle on. The eyes were turned upward, as if he had avoided the sight of the leathern 
bag, and looked to the crucifix. Every tinge and hue of life had left it in that instant. It 
was dull, cold, livid, wax. The body also. 
There was a great deal of blood … A strange appearance was the apparent 
annihilation of the neck. The head was taken off so close that it seemed as if the knife 
had narrowly escaped crushing the jaw or shaving the ear; and the body looked as if 
there was nothing left above the shoulder.
The act of reading this passage will generate a number of different emotions in various 
readers, depending on the context of both the reader and the reading. For example, some 
may experience revulsion at the immediacy of the violence.4 Some, assuming that such 
an execution is an extension of a legitimate legal process, may feel a certain gratification 
in terms of their personal advocacy of capital punishment. Others may experience the 
satisfaction of voyeurism or schadenfreude. Yet no matter which sensation is generated 
in response to the text, it is consistently a direct result of an ethical reaction to reading the 
depiction. This is the import of the statement that every representation of violence
3 It is worth re-emphasising at this point that an unread text can be neither true nor false; similarly it cannot 
encapsulate ethical values in the abstract. Its ethical space must be generated through the contextual 
positioning of the reader who reads it.
4 Many may also experience revulsion at the realism of the representation – as pointed out earlier, less 
graphic representations are more likely to be considered ethically and aesthetically satisfactory by those 
who would be offended by a text written in a realist style.
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presupposes an ethical space, as it allows for an interaction between the act of reading 
and the ethical presuppositions of the reader regarding the context of the narrative. The 
structure of presupposition is determined by the intersubjective ethical norms of the 
community of which the reader is constituent to which the reader belongs; this is also 
influenced by the (non)fictional potential of the text (within its own socio-cultural 
context). 
It is apparent that the reactions experienced when the reader opens up an ethical space 
which was not previously available are also affected largely by the mode of composition. 
Hypothetically speaking, if the above passage were known to be an extract from a realist 
novel, then the ethical response would be experienced in a different manner from that 
evinced by a factual account: as a historical novel simulates history, the awareness of that 
simulation will be more likely to evince a meta-response (see Chapter 6, Section 4). This 
is not to suggest that the intensity of the response would necessarily be attenuated 
through experiencing a text as fictional rather than factual. However, if the representation 
is an instance of a deferred reality or null denotation, then the ethical implications would
not be directly applicable to any verifiable individual or community in an extra-textual
actuality. To reveal the context and genre of the text will therefore contribute 
significantly to the shaping of its ethical space. 
Thus: the passage is an extract from a newspaper report composed for the London Daily 
News in 1845 (Dickens 1845: 4-5). This places the representation in a verifiable and 
chronological framework. It is now known to be a non-fictional account of a historically 
distant occurrence. Another relevant piece of information that will affect the reader’s 
response is that it was written by Charles Dickens, an influential case of the Foucauldian 
signature of cultural value implied by the death of the author. Such data, revealed prior to 
reading the text, may result in many linking the text to Dickens’s more prominent 
fictional output, particularly the scenes in A Tale of Two Cities in which descriptions of 
the guillotine are handled similarly to the factual account. While this does not negate the 
historical veracity of the account, Dickens’s reputation as a famous novelist may result in 
the representation’s assuming more importance than the actual event. The reader’s ethical 
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evaluation of the text is largely determined by his or her knowledge of relevant 
contextual information (whether this was obtained prior or subsequent to reading the 
text). This information is never absolute, however. As argued in the discussion of 
Forbidden Love in the previous chapter, if it were later suggested to the same reader that 
the passage was, in fact, extracted from a work of fiction, then the resulting ethical 
evaluation would probably be radically transformed, to the extent of effecting a negation 
(or even a reversal) of any previous judgments regarding the text.5 This change would 
likely occur even if there were no suggestion of deliberate deception, although in such a 
case the severity of the transformation would be less acute.
It is therefore evident that pre-existing ethical concerns and expectations (together with 
varying standards of taste and limits of justification) determine the way in which any 
representation of violence will be evaluated. However, the sentiment expressed by 
Hobbes in The Elements of Laws remains the central difficulty when attempting to isolate 
the means by which such ethical concerns are articulated: “Every man, for his own part, 
calleth that which pleaseth, and that is delightful to himself, GOOD; and that EVIL which 
displeaseth him; insomuch that while every man differeth from other in constitution, they 
differ also from another concerning the common distinction of good and evil” (Higgin 
1999: 86). The problem of the very existence of a divergent number of normative ethical 
systems seems to be illustrated by Hobbes’s judgement regarding the parochialism of 
each. The assumptions of the value systems of deontology and utilitarianism will now be 
examined in some detail, firstly to clarify their claims to a universal conception of the
ethical, and secondly to apply those claims to reading representations of violence.6
1.1 Deontological Ethics 
Any attempt at establishing the foundations of an ethics of textuality must take into 
account three principle factors: the subject (or potential reader) who reads; the text; and 
5 For an example of how initial evaluations may be reversed owing to a change in the factual status of a 
text, see Chapter 8, Section 2. Dickens’s fiction may be regarded as giving a “true” picture, even though his 
characters are imaginary. 
6 There are numerous other philosophical accounts of ethics, including virtue ethics, hedonism and 
contractualism. However, the two mentioned above have been selected for discussion on the basis of their 
particular relevance to the normative production and reception of representations of violence. 
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the social, political and moral context in which such a reading may occur. Following the 
precepts of Kantian philosophy,7 the human mind (the subject) can be hypothesised only 
in terms of the way in which it thinks. Similarly, the world (the object’s of the subject’s 
experience) can be hypothesised only in terms of the way in which the mind is related to 
it: “Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts, blind” (Kant 1993: 
69). The result is that the human thinking subject is inextricably linked to the objects of 
the world. The world can be divided into two types of reality: the phenomenal (the world 
as it appears to us) and the noumenal (the world as it actually is). Kant’s basic premise is 
that the subject can experience the object in a coherent fashion only if the subject is 
orientated towards, or perceived by, the object. The possibility of cognition or knowledge 
in the thinking subject is therefore constituted on transcendental a priori grounds; 
cognition is assumed to be of universal significance as it is not rooted in any social or 
cultural context. Hence Kant can claim a universal account of rational cognition, although 
knowledge of the phenomenal world is inextricably linked to a subjective view of it: “So 
soon as we abstract in thought our own subjective nature, the object represented, with the 
properties ascribed to it by sensible intuition, entirely disappears, because it was only this 
subjective nature that determined the form of the object as appearance” (1993: 62). The
subject who reads is therefore experiencing the textual representation primarily in a 
Platonic sense: as an appearance within consciousness, with no access to the real world,
and mediated through the medium of the text and the “subjective constitution” of the 
empirical. 
The idea of the subject also becomes important to the notion of ethics in the Kantian 
system. Graham (2004: 115) has identified three main premises that serve to establish this 
system, namely intention, universalizability, and duty. The first of these argues that it is 
the product of a good will that is essential to ethics: the consequences of the actions of 
the subject, and even the actions themselves, are largely irrelevant to the conception of a 
good moral life. The second concept, universalizability, is based upon the notion of the 
maxim (defined as an action for a reason) and the subsequent obligation of adherence to 
7 Kantian philosophy is a complex and challenging area of enquiry, and the following summary is not 
intended to be exhaustive or definitive. Although some simplification is unavoidable, it provides the basic 
framework for an ethical conception of a text grounded upon Kantian precepts.
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the categorical imperative, which claims to transcend the subject’s cultural context by 
demanding rational principles of action that are assumed to be universal. As Kant’s 
conception of the categorical imperative is based on the precepts of practical reason
(principles of ethical reasoning not governed by any passions or emotions), this obviates 
the need to include a corresponding empiricism based on sensory experience. As a result, 
the third claim, that the moral life consists in duty for duty’s sake, asserts that obedience 
to the moral law for its own sake is a prerequisite of practical reason. Yet the 
consequence of a duty-bound ethics largely removes the subject as the principal actor 
within the ethical space, and replaces him or her with the dictates of the society or 
community which determine the practical nature of that duty.
It has been argued in this thesis that an autonomous, ahistorical and disinterested 
knowledge is unattainable. Nevertheless, it is constructive to examine how the 
particularly influential ethical theory of Kant can be applied to an ethics of reading. His
system is fundamentally based upon the second premise above, namely universalizability. 
This includes the application of the Kantian categorical imperative as defined in his 
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals: “There is, therefore, only one categorical 
imperative. It is: Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time 
will that it should become a universal law” (Kant 1785a: 86). By this, Kant insists that 
consideration of a particular course of action must include a consideration by the subject 
of whether or not it should be the case that every subject (each having the same 
reasoning) should act in an identical manner. A further imperative that Kant derives from 
this basic categorical imperative is the so-called “practical” imperative: “Act so that you 
treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of another always as an end and never 
as a means only” (1785a: 94). The obvious problem with the categorical imperative, 
however, is its supposition of universalizability, its assumption that all individuals, 
regardless of any particular context, will necessarily aspire to identical universal maxims. 
The flaw in this assumption is made evident when two maxims contradict each other: this 
results in the emergence of a dispute over which has ethical superiority: the universal or 
the historical. It will invariably be the case that the maxim of the dominant (or at least 
more powerful) discourse will prevail, a situation which tends to render the entire 
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conception of the categorical imperative incoherent. In other words, if any situation 
allows for one maxim to dominate whenever an ethical dilemma takes place, then the 
ideal of universalizability is necessarily undermined.8
The assumption of ethical dominance based on notions of a categorical imperative is 
relevant to the generation of an ethical space within a textual representation, as it allows 
for the probability of censorship in some form. That this is not confined to deontological 
ethics will be demonstrated in later sections. However, censorship tends to be most 
prevalent within the dictates of a duty-based ethics. A censor may be defined as:
1. A person authorized to examine various texts (books, letters, articles etc.) in order to 
suppress in whole or in part those considered obscene, morally unacceptable, 
politically unacceptable, and so on.
2. Any person who assumes the power to control or suppress the activities of others, 
usually on moral or political grounds.
With these definitions in mind, consider again the extract by Dickens. It may be 
hypothesised that Dickens’s maxim as regards the account of the event could be: “it is 
necessary to describe the event I witnessed in order to arouse opposition to capital 
punishment”.9 This maxim would then will the universality of free speech and an 
opposition to the institutional violence that legitimises capital punishment. However, a 
censor employed to safeguard the political foundations of that institutional violence could 
probably experience the extract as a disparagement of the state and its institutions: his 
(contrary) maxim might read: “No person shall undermine the legitimate practices of the 
state”. Yet another censor – one concerned with maintaining a certain imposed moral 
order – might employ the maxim that “no text shall depict violence in a manner that may 
corrupt the sensibilities of the reader”. The latter two maxims would necessarily 
contradict the maxim of the author. Yet, as the censors implement the values propounded
8 Yet this incoherence does not preclude many from employing the categorical imperative for their own 
ends while simultaneously assuming ethical authority. Graham quotes Arendt’s assertion that the Holocaust 
was made possible by “the odd notion … that to be law abiding means not merely to obey the laws but to 
act as though those concerned were the legislator of the laws that one obeys” (2004:121).
9 This is but one possible maxim, and it is used to illustrate the point that competing maxims negate 
universalizability. Although the extract does not overtly imply this maxim, it is suggested here as an 
illustrative possibility, rather than an as ethical position adopted by Dickens.
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in the dominant discourse – in this case, the state – they not only have the opportunity to 
participate in the determination of the ethical system that obtains within that discourse, 
but are mandated to enforce that system through the suppression of any narrative
considered to be subversive. Each contributor may in good conscience follow the 
precepts of his or her own conception of the moral law. Yet the differences of opinion 
that can and do exist render the categorical imperative ineffective in dealing with any 
incongruity. If the dominant ethics is deontological, then the categorical imperative will 
be employed to suppress objectionable texts, most commonly on religious, sexual, 
political or social grounds (the latter including representations of violence). To illustrate 
this further, a consideration of the attempted suppression of a representation of violence –
Hubert Selby’s Last Exit to Brooklyn – is instructive.10
Last Exit to Brooklyn is a fictional narrative which includes a series of episodes 
describing incidents in the lives of various New York characters of a lower economic 
class. The narrative includes graphically detailed depictions of direct personal violence, 
including scenes of brutal sexuality. The language is demotic, often omitting punctuation, 
and the narrative as a whole “portrays a hellish existence that appears to continue as the 
characters age” (Karolides, Bald and Sova 1999: 384). Although available in the United 
States for a number of years, the book’s publication in the United Kingdom in 1966 
resulted in “the sad and shameful case in which two British Members of Parliament, 
motivated by the desire to protect the public from reality, arraigned Last Exit under the 
Obscene Publications Act and – on 10th December 1966, at Marlborough Street 
Magistrates’ Court, London – had the satisfaction of hearing an order for the forfeiture 
and destruction of three copies of the book. Mr. Leo Gradwell, the magistrate 
responsible, pronounced that Last Exit, ‘taken as a whole, would tend to deprave and 
corrupt, and I cannot think, in spite of the evidence I have heard, that it can be justified 
by literary merit’” (Anthony Burgess, in Selby 1993: xiii). It is worth noting that the two 
Members of Parliament concerned were both of the British Conservative Party, a political 
10 Various texts that were suppressed on grounds of their representation of violence could be included in 
this discussion. Many of these are to be found in 100 Banned Books (Karolides, Bald and Sova: 1999). The 
case of Last Exit is therefore illustrative of the effects of the censorship that often results from adherence to 
a duty-bound ethic.
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organisation known for emphasising the notion of so-called traditional moral values, and 
that although over thirty expert witnesses were called to defend the literary and ethical 
value of the book, it was found by the jury to be obscene, and that “the effect of reading 
the book was to horrify, shock, disgust, and nauseate” (Karolides, Bald and Sova 1999:
385).11 This is an obvious example of the way in which differing conceptions of morality 
conflict with one another. On the one hand, there were those who considered the book 
objectionable not merely for themselves as readers, but for all potential readers. This 
assumption of ethical authority resulted in the imposition of the categorical imperative as 
an embodiment of a particular social preconception, and the perception of a repressive 
state morality attempting to impose ethical precepts. On the other hand, there were those 
who found the novel to be both socially relevant (owing to its critique of institutional and 
direct violence), as well as having literary value.12
The consequence of such divergence of opinion necessarily argues against a 
deontological theory of ethics, as any system which assumes a universal ethical authority 
cannot be considered practicable when applied to an iterable text that is subject to infinite 
re-interpretation within various contextual spaces. As texts, even Kant’s writings cannot 
be excluded from this principle. It is therefore necessary to re-evaluate the Kantian 
system with regard to the individual subject, as well as with regard to the community in 
which the potential reader is situated. Any community, to a large extent, acts to determine
and construct the inter-subjective attitudes, prejudices and beliefs of its constitutive 
subjects. However, the concerns of the potential reader that result in various individual 
responses to a narrative may deviate from those which involve the community as a 
whole, particularly when the ethical issues are politically or culturally imposed. The 
inter-subjective shaping of the reader needs to be considered in conjunction with the 
11 However, the ruling was reversed on appeal, and Last Exit became one of the last literary texts to be 
prosecuted under the Obscenity Act. Nonetheless, the moral stigma imposed by the “moral authority”
remained: “It is unfortunate that so many newcomers to Last Exit to Brooklyn will be approaching it in a 
muddle of expectation that, thanks to its long ordeal in the courts, has more to do with what has been said 
about the book than what the book itself says” (Burgess in Selby 1993:xiii). 
12 It is interesting to speculate on what grounds the thirty defence witnesses would have objected if the text 
had been found to have had no redeeming literary, social or ethical features. In this case, the categorical 
imperative of the freedom of speech would have been the only recourse, and as has clearly been shown 
here, such imperatives are incoherent in their assumption of universalizability.
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context of an individual experience of the text, even if the latter is dependent upon the 
former. 
There are two ethical questions that are relevant to any such experience. The first is an
ethical evaluation by the culturally situated reader, and the second is the ethical situation 
as depicted in the text. Although the two are interdependent, the question to be asked is 
how an interaction between the two areas of concern creates the conditions for an ethical 
experience of the text. Consider again the extract by Dickens. The text makes no explicit 
claims as to the author’s point of view at the time of composition. Although necessarily
employing tropic language, the narrative attempts to describe rather than to evaluate or to 
opine. Yet if Kant’s practical maxim – “act so that you treat humanity, whether in your 
own person or that of another always as an end and never as a means only”13 – is applied 
to the passage, then certain ethical issues become apparent. For Dickens to describe the 
execution, it is necessary for him to make use of the characters in the account as a means 
to a journalistic end – the story. The motivations for this may be diverse: for financial 
remuneration, for attracting readers, for publicity, or for an ethical reason such as 
objecting to institutional violence. Whatever the motivation, the characters in the text 
become subordinate to the broader concerns of the narrative in that they are used as a 
means to an end.14
This subordination occurs despite the assumption that even textually represented 
humanity is connotative of humanity in an extra-textual actuality. The question becomes 
even more problematic when the textual representation is known to be fictional. The 
individuals depicted in Last Exit to Brooklyn are described as existing in conditions of 
squalor and violence, and a potential reader may simultaneously empathise with, and be 
disgusted by, such depictions and such characters. Nevertheless, the characters do not 
actually exist in any verifiable actuality. Instead, they remain depictions within a deferred 
13 Kant 1993: 94
14 It should be emphasized again that the pre-knowledge of the reader is important. The victim of this 
execution is historically verifiable; therefore the depiction presents a different situation from the imaginary 
fictional construct of A Tale of Two Cities, even though the empirical foundation for both representations 
may be identical. Additionally, the historical character is clearly the more exploited individual in terms of 
being employed as a means to Dickens’s ends. It is difficult to argue that fictional characters, no matter 
how realistically they are depicted, are ethically disadvantaged by being used thus. 
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reality, which argues for a meta-response on the part of the reader, therefore affecting the 
ultimate ethical evaluation of the iterable text. Yet, as a deferred reality, the 
circumstances described by the narrative are extrapolated into a possible event. The
characters and situations described could occur, and plausibly might have occurred in a 
manner not identical to, but recognisably similar to, the events represented. The reader 
could then envisage the narrative as being potentially actual, if not verifiable, and could
thus formulate an ethical response to the text (even if that response were determined by a 
meta-emotional reaction). Another possible reading would be to regard a fictional state of 
affairs as either symbolic or paradigmatic of an actual ethical situation, even if the text is 
not didactic. This would accommodate the possibility of a broad ethical conception as 
guiding an ethical inference in instances of null denotation, that could nevertheless be 
applied in actuality, following the Kantian principles of intention, universalizability and 
duty. Yet, as has been illustrated, the conditions for any such formulation will be 
established by the dominant norms of the society in question. As any aesthetic evaluation 
is to some extent influenced by an ethical evaluation, a further consequence of this 
imposition of moral norms is that the dominant discourse also influences the subsequent 
aesthetic value of a narrative, and hence its potential for inclusion in the prevailing 
canon.15
Such problems regarding the imposition of a deontological ethical system suggest that 
any system of ethics based on the necessity of following the dictates of duty cannot 
consistently assume a universal ethical space when someone reads a textual 
representation of violence. The entire notion of obligation is subject to the conventional
and contextual attitudes of discourses external to the text, and it makes little sense to 
endeavour to impose an incoherent universalising ethical system upon an iterable 
narrative. This becomes even more evident when the prevailing discourse is hostile to the 
text in question, as in the example of Last Exit to Brooklyn. It can therefore be concluded 
15 This can often lead to a contradiction between ethical and aesthetical evaluations. For example,
Shakespeare’s Henry V owes much of its canonical status to an ethics of patriotism that permeates the 
drama (as was particularly pertinent in Britain during the Second World War); yet it contains episodes in 
which the king acts in a manner contrary to common ethical opinion – for instance, the order for the 
massacre of French prisoners in 4.6.53-55. Later readings of the play therefore value its openness to 
ambiguity and its sensitivity to the challenges posed in wielding political or military power.   
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that deontological ethics are inappropriate with regards to an ethical (re)evaluation of an 
iterable representation of violence. 
1.2 Utilitarianism
The Kantian ethical system postulates that the notion of duty is the fundamental 
requirement of moral enquiry and worth; however, it has been argued that an 
unacceptable consequence of this system is that it allows for the potential for censorship 
and the suppression of texts which are unacceptable to those whose authority determines 
the ethical maxims of society. In other words, the argument that this system of ethics has 
universal relevance is not unproblematic. In contrast to this imperative to duty, the 
doctrine of utilitarianism emphasises the consequences of any action, with a
corresponding highlighting of the importance of happiness and the potential for its 
realisation: “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as 
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the 
absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure” (Mill 1861: 99). 
This statement is a re-formulation of the “Greatest Happiness Principle” of Bentham, and 
reflects a point of view that is fundamental to contemporary conceptions of morality: “[It]
is not an exaggeration to say that utilitarianism has come to be the main element in 
contemporary moral thinking. A great many people suppose that there can be no serious 
objection to the moral idea of maximising happiness and minimizing unhappiness, both 
in personal relationships and in the world at large” (Graham 2004: 133). 
However, it is necessary to distinguish between two different conceptions of 
utilitarianism, namely act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. The former argues that it 
is purely the actions of the individual that result in the maximisation of happiness for the 
greatest number of people; the latter argues that this is open to abuses that will not be 
acceptable to society, despite any maximisation of happiness. Rule utilitarianism argues 
that any actions are necessarily moderated by rules and norms that govern human 
behaviour. For example, even if killing someone will result in a more general happiness 
(for the purposes of organ harvesting, for instance), the injunction or rule against murder 
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will obtain in most cases. As rule utilitarianism is a more flexible interpretation of 
utilitarianism, it is this form of the theory that will be considered in this discussion.
If it were the case that the maximisation of happiness is the primary ethical impulse for 
many individuals, and if it is the case that there is a close interplay between ethical 
evaluation and aesthetic judgement when reading representations of violence, then it must 
follow that rule utilitarianism plays a crucial role in the ethical judgement of textual 
representations of violence and any subsequent aesthetic determination. The significance 
of a representation of violence is established in utilitarian terms by evaluating its 
potential for generating a positive response within a community of potential readers. Yet 
such an assumption is both problematic and inadequate, as once again a normative ethical 
system maintains an assumption of universality regarding the cognition of such terms as 
happiness and pleasure. 
The difficulty in defining happiness is inextricably linked with the problem of 
immeasurability in attempting to quantify an emotion or state of mind. Even if this were 
hypothetically possible, it is not obvious what the exact meaning of happiness might be, 
and how that definition might be limited in order to attain universal ethical appeal. Mill’s 
claim that “by happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain” leads to the 
objection that utilitarianism is no more than an egotistical mode of thought that not only 
allows for, but encourages, a hedonistic approach, depending upon how the notion of 
pleasure is conceived and (re)contextualised within any given community. This, in turn,
may encourage actions that could be construed as offensive to those whose conception of 
pleasure is opposed to the hedonistic approach. The potential consequence of this 
possibility as applied to the act of reading would be the production and distribution of 
texts that are deliberately contrary to what many people would consider acceptable. Yet 
the philosophical doctrine of utilitarianism, despite having a strong hedonistic bias due to 
its emphasis on pleasure, does not allow for egotistical hedonism. This arises out of the 
ethical prerequisite that the welfare of society as a whole is more significant than the 
personal fulfilment of individual needs. In addition, any society will have in place 
communal sanctions and safeguards. Consequently, the dissemination of texts widely 
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deemed to run contrary to a general expectation of happiness would be considered 
unacceptable.16 Rather, a utilitarian thinker would argue for generalised benevolence –
the happiness of an individual may be important, but it is not more important than the 
general happiness of all. 
In order to explore the problems of this theory as applied to the violence represented in 
texts, consider again the novel Last Exit to Brooklyn. It was argued that this text was 
subject to censorship because the depiction of violence in the narrative deviated from the 
Kantian maxim adopted by certain discourses. In a similar manner, utilitarianism can also 
be suggestive of normative conceptions of happiness, and consequently normative 
conceptions of what is acceptable or not acceptable in a society at any given time. The 
following extract from the novel is illustrative of how utilitarian theory can be applied to 
the representation of violence. It describes an instance of direct physical violence that 
takes place when a soldier is attacked by members of a Brooklyn gang:
He tried to roll over on his stomach and cover his face with his arms, but as he got to 
his side he was kicked in the groin and stomped on the ear and he screamed, cried, 
started pleading then just cried as a foot cracked his mouth, Ya fuckin cottonpickin 
punk, and a hard kick in the ribs turned him slightly and he tried to raise himself on 
one knee and someone took a short step forward and kicked him in the solarplexus 
and he fell on his side, his knees up, arms folded across the abdomen, gasping for air 
and the blood in his mouth gurgled as he tried to scream ….” 
(Selby 1993: 7). 
Because rule utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory which requires an informed moral 
choice regarding any matter, the utilitarian is required to consider all the possible 
consequences of any action. In order properly to apply this requirement to the extract, it 
is necessary to investigate the issues involved from the point of view of the historically 
situated reader, as well as from the point of view suggested by the tone of the narrative. 
In the first place, consider a potential reader who is opposed to the above representation 
on utilitarian grounds. Such a reader would argue that the consequences of reading such a 
passage would minimize rather then maximise the general happiness, hence effecting a 
deprivation of happiness for many. This on its own would contradict any arguments for 
16 It should be noted that just as egotism is rejected by utilitarianism, so too is altruism. A text that puts 
others’ interests above our own is also contrary to the ideal that everyone’s interests are to be equally 
regarded.
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the moral worth of the text. The reasons for this disqualification would be based on an 
estimation of various consequences of reading the text. These could include the 
following:
1) The text represents a level of violence that would result in emotional and aesthetic 
disturbance to the sensibilities of many readers. As more readers would be disturbed 
than pleased by the explicit and graphic representation of violence in the text, the 
consequences of reading it are negative, and therefore ethically unacceptable.
2) The text represents a level of violence that may influence others to emulate the 
actions of the text. This argument is based on the possibility that the violence 
represented is not only disturbing, but also has the unacceptable consequence of 
provoking actual violence.17 As any such acts influenced by the reading of the text 
will probably result in more pain than pleasure to society as a whole (the only 
pleasure experienced being that of the perpetrators of the violence), the consequences 
are negative and therefore ethically unacceptable.
3) The violence of the text is heightened by depictions that avoid aestheticisation. As a 
result, the violence is made explicit rather than being moderated by the employment 
of figurative tropes. This aspect of the text would result in many readers either 
choosing to abandon the reading because of an inter-relation of aesthetic and ethical 
qualms, or not reading the text at all in response to negative reports concerning the 
representation. Any counter-claims made for the text’s social relevance or aesthetic 
worth would then be considered subordinate to the sensationalist potential of the text. 
The non-aestheticisation of the violence becomes a negative factor with negative 
17 That this is a fairly prevalent concern can be seen by the number of books banned or suppressed as a 
result of their representations of violence. These include A Clockwork Orange, Lolita, Naked Lunch, Last 
Exit to Brooklyn, and One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest. The charge against the latter was that it 
“glorify[ies] criminal activity, ha[s] a tendency to corrupt individuals, and contain[s] scenes of bestiality, 
bizarre violence, and torture, dismemberment, death, and human elimination” (Karolides, Bald and Sova 
1999: 362). Proponents of the opinion that those experiencing representations of violence will be likely to 
commit actual violence also frequently refer to the reading habits of serial killers as evidence for this view. 
For example, Ian Brady was apparently obsessed with the sado-masochistic texts of the Marquis de Sade. 
(http://crime.about.com/od/murder/p/brady.htm Accessed 2 November 2007).
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consequences for the reception and enjoyment of the text, and is therefore ethically
unacceptable.  
These are just three possible considerations of the negative consequences of reading a 
representation of violence such as Last Exit to Brooklyn. However, a potential reader 
could be a utilitarian whose conception of the work was based on positive consequences 
that would refute the three points given above. In this case, the reasons for a 
consequentialist approval of the text (and refutation of the stated negative consequences) 
could read as follows:
1) An extremely graphic representation of violence may result in an emotional and 
aesthetic disturbance to many readers, but it is precisely such agitation of feeling that 
will have the positive consequence of negating much of the indifference to the social 
and cultural issues that are identified in, and critiqued by, the text. Therefore, despite
its representations of extreme violence, the text serves a moral purpose and is 
ethically acceptable.
2) To claim that the text negatively influences the potential for (or makes possible the 
conditions for) actual violence is to ignore the capacity for violence inherent in such 
readers in the first place. To remove responsibility from the reader is to be open to 
the erroneous conflation of a chain of consequences with a chain of responsibility. 
Another problem inherent in the chain of consequences is the unpredictability of 
determining exactly what might or might not happen as a result of reading the text. It 
is often too easy to use hindsight as a guide to moral reasoning; but there is no 
possibility of isolating the ultimate consequences of reading the text, even after the 
event, and there can be no elementary event that can be identified as being the
fundamental cause of all the following consequences. Any text is necessarily iterable, 
and therefore open to infinite interpretations by an infinite number of readers in 
differing contexts. It is not possible consistently to apply a utilitarian norm to each
potential reader, as each likely consequence is not only refuted by each possible 
contradictory consequence, but is also subject to a variety of ethical spaces in which 
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moral judgement is articulated. Another contradiction is that the violence of many 
conventional canonical texts equals or exceeds the violence represented in Last Exit, 
sometimes through a preoccupation with violent events, as well as through the 
language of the representation. For example, Hamlet contains various instances of 
direct, institutional and psychological violence. Yet the canonical status of the drama
has created a body of criticism that recognises that it is not preoccupied with 
violence for the sake of violence (unlike, for example, Titus Andronicus). Yet even 
Titus is not subject to the accusations of the glorification of violence that are 
common against texts such as Last Exit to Brooklyn. This lack of consistency negates
any universalising assertion concerning the negative consequences of the violence 
characterising the latter narrative. In addition, and in pursuit of the first argument, the 
descriptions of violence may positively influence many readers better to consider, or 
even actively to promote, an opposition to institutional violence. The consequences 
of such an influence would be positive, and therefore the text serves a moral purpose 
and is ethically acceptable.
3) The conscious aestheticisation of the representation in order to alleviate the 
explicitness of the violence would be to mitigate its potential for effect, with the 
consequence that its reception would have less impact, both aesthetically and 
socially. To argue for an overtly figurative representation at all times is to ignore not 
only the inherent potentiality of different modes of representation, but also the
potential for aesthetic effect. This point of view refutes the Aristotelian argument that 
imitation is in itself the aesthetic objective of art, even if it represents the disturbing 
or the socially unacceptable; in the Poetics, Aristotle writes that: “[A]lso inborn in all 
of us is the instinct to enjoy works of imitation. What happens in actual experience is 
evidence of this; for we enjoy looking at the most accurate representations of things 
which in themselves we find painful to see, such as the forms of the lowest animals 
and corpses” (Aristotle 1965: 35, italics added). This is not to argue that all 
representation should endeavour to be realistically descriptive (even if this were 
possible), but rather that the reading of any text depends on differing types of 
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representation which are contextually bound to the aesthetical and ethical 
expectations of the reader.   
This gives some idea of the problems of reading a text under the influence of utilitarian 
ethics. Yet another complexity lies in the creation of the ethical space in which the actual 
description offered by the extract occurs. As far as the ethical difficulties raised by the 
events represented in the narrative are concerned, the characters in the representation are 
acting in a manner contrary to expected utilitarian social norms. Read in isolation, the 
extract gives no indication of the reasons for the assault on the soldier (and indeed, even 
in the context of the whole chapter, there is no justification for the savagery of the 
attack). However, let it be assumed that the assault was justified. An act-utilitarian would 
not see the events described as being morally questionable. If the assault on one
individual would prevent the general unhappiness of many, then there is no moral 
problem. Yet a rule-utilitarian would argue that social norms and expectations would 
militate against such an attack, unless the consequences of avoiding it were too obvious 
to ignore (in which case a new rule could be formulated allowing for such instances). 
This, however, suggests a problem with a normative system of utilitarianism: rules and 
norms may be transformed or even re-invented to suit certain situations as they occur. 
Although opportunistic amendments to reframe universal rules are not necessarily part of 
the ideal utilitarian system, there exists the possibility that any incommensurability 
between the notions of justice and welfare can be conveniently modified: “any such 
conflict can readily be eliminated by carefully refining the rule to take account of these 
special circumstances; in other words by coming up with a different rule. It follows that 
on the rule utilitarian account of the matter there is no real dilemma … act and rule 
utilitarianism are co-extensive” (Graham 2004: 148). 
The result of the contradictions and ambiguities of utilitarian thought is that, despite its 
centrality to contemporary ethical opinion, any utilitarian judgement regarding the 
ethical evaluation of a textual representation of violence will be problematic. A 
utilitarian moral pronouncement is dependent upon the pre-existing ethical views of the 
potential reader that are suggested by the inter-subjective social and historical context. A 
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utilitarian system is therefore subject to the same contextual problems as a deontological 
system, even if the former does attempt to adjust contingencies in order to accommodate 
differing demands or expectations. Consequently, the system should be treated with 
equal caution when considering the evaluation of the ethical concerns relating to the
textual representation of violence. 
2. Towards a Postmodern Ethics of Reading 
A conclusion that should be considered is that normative systems and theories of ethics 
are inadequate when faced with iterable representations that, owing to their depictions of 
instances of violence, create the possibility of multi-faceted ethical readings. Firstly, it is 
important to take account of a reading that acknowledges the contextual position of the 
reader who engages with the text; and secondly, it is pertinent to acknowledge a reading 
that recognises the relevance of the ethical implications of the context of the 
representation. For example, to read a history of the Roman Republic is not automatically
to agree with the ethical thought of the time (although it is not inconceivable that some 
might agree with the Roman ethics). There needs to be a division between the context of 
the potential reader’s assumptions, and the context of the text. Moreover, the problems 
that exist within normative systems are further exacerbated by ethical thought which is 
often not equipped to deal with extreme situations that occur beyond the boundaries of 
what is considered normal within any particular discourse at any particular time. Many 
acts of violence, as well as their representation in an iterable textual form, include such 
examples of extreme situations. John Gray in Straw Dogs recounts the story of Roman 
Frister, a concentration camp inmate whose theft of another inmate’s cap saved him from 
execution, but resulted in the execution of that other inmate. Gray’s conclusions suggest 
the complacency and inadequacy of contemporary ethical thought when faced with 
extreme violence: “Moral philosophy has always been an exercise in make-believe, less 
realistic in its picture of human life than the average bourgeois novel. We must look 
elsewhere if we want anything that approaches the truth … Morality is supposed to be 
universal and categorical. But the lesson of Roman Frister’s story is that it is an 
inconvenience, to be relied upon only in normal times” (2002: 90). Although this 
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statement may initially seem to be a navely wholesale dismissal of familiar forms of 
moral philosophy, accounts by Beevor of the Second World War, Fisk of the conflicts in 
the Middle East, and Herr of Vietnam,18 suggest that moral values which are generally 
conceived to address the norm become, in extreme situations at the least, inherently 
problematic. This can also be seen in fictional texts in which violent situations become 
subject to critically focused, ethical scrutiny. For example, in Heart of Darkness, 
Marlowe returns to Brussels after witnessing extreme violence in the Congo. The result 
of his journey is an ethical re-evaluation of his notion of how individuals function within 
their own conception of a normal society, ignorant (wilfully or otherwise) of the violence 
perpetrated in the name of that society: “I found myself back in the sepulchral city 
resenting the sight of people hurrying through the streets … They trespassed upon my 
thoughts. They were intruders whose knowledge of life was to me an irritating presence, 
because I felt so sure they could not possibly know the things I knew” (Conrad 1983: 
113). 
In addition to extreme situations, the criticism that morality is a convenience or an ideal 
rather than a practical norm is also characteristic of the paradox of “moral luck”: “A 
person can be morally responsible only for what he does; but what he does results from a 
great deal that he does not do; therefore he is not morally responsible for what he is and is 
not responsible for” (Nagel 1979: 163). Nagel gives the example of a concentration camp 
guard who would never have become one if the Nazis had not come to power – his 
situation was determined by circumstances beyond his control. Similarly, if a reckless 
driver kills a pedestrian, he is considered to have acted unethically; if he gets home 
without incident, he escapes censure. Moral luck can also be applied to the ethical 
process involved when reading representations of violence. Although the contextual and 
inter-subjective positioning of a potential reader necessarily influences the ethical
evaluation, circumstance and luck also play a role in that process. As far as reading is 
concerned, moral luck suggests that any ethical interpretation is established largely by 
18 Berlin (2202) by Beevor; The Great War for Civilisation (2006) by Fisk; and Dispatches (1979) by Herr 
are all texts in which ethics becomes no more than a relative term. This would be the likely case in any 
historical account of conflict or other extreme situations. This claim will be extended and defended in 
Chapter 9. 
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conditions outside the control of the potential reader, the result of which is that any 
ethical interpretation of the text – whether within the context of the reader’s experience or 
within the content of the narrative – is largely dependent upon external criteria which 
constrain the choice and opinion of the reader, and which necessarily preclude any 
attempts at universalising ethical space. Although Nagel’s paradox may lead to a position
where all ethical action is simultaneously random and pre-determined, it does expose the 
inadequacy inherent in a nave assumption of ethical authority. It also serves to re-
emphasise that any ethical position must be considered relatively with respect to the 
circumstances surrounding each moral choice.  
This leads to the implication that the dictates of normative ethics are often superseded by 
personal choices. The idea of such a subjectivist ethics provides a useful counterpoint to 
the systems of deontology and utilitarianism. The ethics of egoism are based on the 
assumption that what is desirable for the individual is the basis of ethical endeavour and 
the foundation for the generation of value.19 Hence, a rational egoist would argue that one 
ought to fulfil personal desires, as there is no other rationale for meaningful action. This 
is coextensive with the implication of psychological egoism that no person will 
consciously act in a manner contrary to his or her desires; desire is therefore the ultimate 
consideration in leading the good life. Even if the action itself is not desired, the 
consequences of the action must be, and therefore the notion of “wanting” still 
determines the subjective action. For example, a person who alleviates the suffering of 
others through charitable donation will gain personal satisfaction in performing such an 
act, even if his or her actions result in some form of personal material loss.20 What 
matters in determining the ethical life is the desires of the individual; any ethical 
conventions and normative systems of the state or civil society are secondary, an obstacle 
to be overcome (or at least bypassed) on the path to personal satisfaction. The 
philosopher who did more than any other to advance the notion of egoist ethics – and in 
19 Note that there is a subtle difference between selfishness and egoism. The former disregards all others’ 
feelings in favour of a promotion of the self; the latter includes others’ feelings insofar as they correspond 
to what is most desired for the self.
20 Note that this claim for ethical fulfilment through the satisfaction of desire is contrary to the Kantian 
concern with duty: a person who fulfils any desire (including the desire for satisfaction) when seeking to 
act ethically is not disinterested, and therefore (according to Kant) not acting in a genuinely ethical manner. 
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the process became of particular importance to postmodern thinking – was Friedrich 
Nietzsche.
Nietzsche’s ethics of egoism is of particular relevance to this discussion of the ethics of 
representing violence, owing to its interrelation with aesthetic considerations. As there 
can be no ethical phenomena, but rather only a “moral interpretation of phenomena”, then 
the choice of how to act “ultimately has to be made on aesthetic grounds. The idea of the 
free creativity of the artist is decisive in this choice” (Megill 1985: 31). The free artist can 
create or invent the conditions for a confrontation with pre-existing ethical systems which 
have lost their validity, if not their normative power, owing to a negation of theistic 
authority (the “Death of God”). It follows that if the notion of religious authority is 
ethically extraneous, then any theological claims for a foundation of ethical behaviour are 
questionable. Instead, the solitary and independent artistic individual – the Übermensch –
must challenge the residue of such an ethical system through the predominance of his 
own will to power and sense of purpose. The Übermensch is someone who determines 
his own values, and has the self-mastery to implement these values in everyday life: “a 
man to whom nothing is forbidden, except it be weakness, whether that weakness be 
called vice or virtue” (Nietzsche 1968: 113). Nietzsche’s initial role models for the 
Übermensch were the artists Goethe and Wagner, and consequently his notions of the 
transcendence of normative ethical systems were largely founded upon aesthetic, rather 
than political or social, considerations: “To give ‘style’ to one’s character – a great and 
rare art! He exercises it who surveys all that his nature presents in strength and weakness 
and then moulds it to an artistic plan until everything appears as art and reason” 
(Nietzsche 1974: 290). This is closely interlinked with his assertion that the development 
of ethical authority is a feature of class-based (and religious) conventions of right and 
wrong, which has various implications for the interpretation of representations of 
violence. 
One potential consequence of an assumption of a Nietzschean ethics is that any potential 
reader may individually determine the framework of the ethical space generated by the 
reading of any text. A person may choose to read (or not to read) any text simply because 
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he or she wants to do so, and the resultant ethical judgement is dependent upon personal 
choice alone. Contrary to the dictates of much ethical theory, the reading assumes a 
personal moral (and hence aesthetic) evaluation of the text, one not necessarily imposed
by structures and imperatives external to the desires and preferences of the individual
reader. There are, however, two main objections to this idea. The first, discussed in detail 
in earlier chapters, is that it is not possible wholly to disregard culturally imposed notions 
of value and ethics. To argue for an insulated interpretation of any text is to deny the 
functioning of both iterability and inter-subjectivity. The crucial and disruptive 
antecedent of iterability becomes the locus of the destabilisation of the context affecting a 
particular ethical and aesthetic evaluation of a representation of violence. Secondly, there 
exists the potential for the imposition of an ethical framework by the dominant discourse, 
despite egoistic claims for individual responsibility. This is owing to the contradictory 
notion that the text which the individual may consider morally acceptable in terms of his 
or her own preferences should be considered appropriate for all. John Stuart Mill 
recognises (and criticises) this egotist impulse in On Liberty: “The practical principle 
which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of human conduct is the feeling in 
each person’s mind that everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom 
he sympathizes, would like them to act” (Mill 1999: 33). 
Thus, an egoist who is offended by a narrative such as Last Exit to Brooklyn, in terms of
his own experience of distaste at its explicit representation of violence, may anticipate 
that all other readers would experience a similar response. In the same way , an egoist 
who finds the text to be a constructive critique of institutional and direct violence in 
society will anticipate that all other readers should have a similar opinion of it. If such an 
egoist is in a position of influence, then his or her personal opinion may be extrapolated 
or even imposed upon those not in positions of authority. Therefore the contradiction that 
characterises the Kantian imperative – that contradictory maxims undermine assumptions 
of the universal – is also a flaw of egoism, as there is no possible consistency as to which
desires are broadly acceptable when generating an ethical judgement. On the contrary, it 
appears that in terms of an unadulterated egoism everything and anything is permitted. 
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However, it has been argued that any text is subject to a number of determining factors 
prior to ethical or aesthetic evaluation. Firstly, it must be read and understood in some 
form. The fact that various readers exist in the same time, place and milieu creates the 
conditions for inter-subjective opinion, which in turn allows for recognisably similar 
interpretations of the narrative, even if the judgements pronounced upon it are varied. 
This variety has implications for the ethical aspects of the representation: although these 
are based on the same intersubjective patterns that influence the cognition of the text, 
problems arise as competing systems of ethical thought fail to establish their own ethical 
standards that can coherently be applied to society as a whole. Although the dominant 
discourse may attempt to impose ethical norms and standards, these must be considered 
as no more than contingent and temporary owing to the iterative nature of the text which 
allows for infinite re-interpretation within infinitely variable contexts and  a multiplicity 
of intersubjective societies. Last Exit to Brooklyn no longer provokes the same opposition 
that it did upon its initial publication. On the contrary, the edition used for this study is 
published as a “modern classic”. The fact that the evaluation of the text has been 
modified from a novel that “depraves and corrupts” to the status of a classic, with all the 
canonical implications that this suggests, is the most obvious indication of the difficulty 
in claiming any type of universality for the ethics or aesthetics of any text.21
The canonisation of texts is a process which is continually shifting. For Selby’s novel to 
reach the status of a modern classic is not indicative of a teleological progression 
indicating that it has achieved its ultimate position in the canon. There are many who 
would still regard the text as obscene and its representations of violence as ethically 
objectionable. If such a grouping were to dominate critical discourse in the future, then it 
is likely that the status of the text would once again be modified in order to accommodate 
the prevailing ethical norms of that society (which would not preclude it from still being 
acceptable within other discourses and societies). This discussion has necessarily been 
21 This process can also work in the opposite direction. Many critics, while not denying Shakespeare’s 
centrality to the canon, query the assumptions that have determined that centrality. Gary Taylor, arguing 
from a materialist and New Historicist theoretical perspective, argues that no text’s position in the canon is 
assured: “Shakespeare's works are no more immortal than the scores of plays by the great Greek dramatists 
that have evaporated. Those plays succumbed to the fall of old power structures and the rise of new 
ideologies … Texts are material objects, like buildings; without maintenance they decay” (Taylor 1989: 
378-9).
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selective, and has not attempted a comprehensive survey of the gamut of moral 
philosophy. Nevertheless, in view of the theories investigated above, the conclusion that 
there can be no single ethical standard with which to judge a representation of violence 
suggests that there must rather be a plurality of ethical systems and kinds of thought in 
order to accommodate various ethical situations in different contexts. Yet even such a 
position seems inadequate, as it may allow for an ethics of convenience in which readers 
may discard those ideas not appropriate to their purpose at the time of reading a particular 
text. Consequently, although some degree of pluralism is unavoidable, it is also necessary 
to investigate another mode of ethical enquiry into texts that feature representations of 
violence, namely the seemingly contradictory field of postmodern ethics. Such an enquiry 
will be undertaken with reference to the extreme example of violence, the Holocaust. Yet 
before this can take place, the ethical and aesthetic implications of such texts need to be 
investigated in more detail.
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CHAPTER 9
THE CASE OF FRAGMENTS
1. The Holocaust Narrative
Acts of genocide, particularly in the twentieth century, constitute a crucial failure of 
ethical responsibility and regard, and by investigating in more detail examples of the
Holocaust narrative, it will become clear that the responses to such representation – and 
particularly the responses to the representations of direct, institutional and psychological 
violence – are governed by ethical as well as aesthetic concerns, both of which will 
influence future evaluations of these texts. The conclusions reached regarding this 
process can then be applied to certain postmodern conceptions of ethics which are 
appropriate to such representations. The following texts were deliberately chosen to 
reflect different methods of representing the violence of the Holocaust, and each will be 
considered from the point of view of the characters depicted in the narrative, as well as 
from the point of view of the expectations and intentions of readers of the narrative. 
Consider the following four quotations, each drawn from one of the chosen texts. The 
extracts, taken out of the context of their narratives and historical space, are all similar in 
tone, style and mode of narration. Each is narrated in the first person, each is an example 
of direct violence (informed by institutional and psychological violence), and each 
portrays in a descriptive passage one single event within the context of the Holocaust.
1.
After a while I heard the sound of piercing screams, banging against the door and also 
moaning and wailing. People began to cough. Their coughing grew worse from 
minute to minute, a sign that the gas had started to act. Then the clamour began to 
subside and to change to a many-voiced dull rattle, drowned now and then by 
coughing. The deadly gas had penetrated into the lungs of the people where it quickly 
caused paralysis of the respiratory centre. (115-6)
2.
I saw a photograph of Jews being shot in Russia. The Jews were in a long row, naked; 
some were standing at the edge of a pit and behind them were soldiers with guns, 
shooting them in the neck. It was in a quarry, and above the Jews and the soldiers 
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there was an officer sitting on a ledge in the rock, swinging his legs and smoking a 
cigarette. He looked a little morose. Maybe things weren’t going fast enough for him. 
(150-1)
3.
His tone of voice became increasingly brutal. “Do you see that chimney over there? 
See it? Do you see the flames? (Yes, we did see the flames.) Over there – that’s where 
you’re going to be taken. That’s your grave, over there. Haven’t you realised it yet? 
You dumb bastards, don’t you understand anything? You’re going to be burned. 
Frizzled away. Turned into ashes.” (41)
4.
I hear a strange crack – and someone besides me drops to the ground without a sound. 
In disbelief and horror I stare at the little boy. His face lies there in the sun, absolutely 
white, but no blood on it. I’m surprised there’s no blood. But his forehead is all 
pushed in, there’s a deep hollow in it, exactly the same size as the ball. I keep looking 
down – still no blood, but I know the little one is dead. (78-9)
Despite the evident similarities of these extracts, each is from a Holocaust narrative that 
is subtly different from the others owing to its peculiar mode of composition. Thus, one is 
a work of fiction, another is autobiographical but written as if it were a novel, a third is 
both factual and historical, and one, initially assumed to be factual, was later proven to be 
fictional in its autobiographical detail. Despite these differing literary and linguistic 
constructions, all employ a style of language that is primarily descriptive, a style which 
attempts to avoid the deliberate aestheticisation of the violence represented. Yet, even 
with knowledge of this contextual information, it is still not possible confidently to 
determine which extract belongs to which text. Similarly, the extracts which are 
representations of historically verifiable events cannot be distinguished from those that 
are fictional. Although the texts may be read, and subsequently evaluated, without any 
prior knowledge on the part of the reader, any contextual information in the narrative 
serves to facilitate a more inclusive process of ethical-aesthetic evaluation.1 Knowledge 
of the context of any particular text does not in itself determine subsequent ethical and 
aesthetic evaluations of the text, but rather aids in the formulation of a more coherent 
response, particularly if the information is inter-subjectively accessible. 
1 There are texts where no such information is available, and as a result the events depicted are not 
verifiable, even if probable. In such cases, evaluation has to take place with the proviso that the conclusions 
reached as to the veracity of the text are necessarily contingent and dependent upon future access to 
information. 
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Here then is the pertinent information about each extract.2 The first, from Eyewitness 
Auschwitz by Filip Mller (1979), is extracted from memoirs that are both personal 
testimony and historical narrative, a text that is considered verifiable and factual. The 
second is taken from Bernhard Schlink’s novel The Reader (1997), which, in contrast to 
Mller’s narrative, is fictional – even though that fiction is set within the recognisable 
framework of a historical occurrence. The third extract is from Night by Elie Wiesel 
(1960), a narrative combining factual occurrences and testimonies within the conventions
of a fictional narrative (often referred to as faction). This autobiographical novel is 
deliberately ambiguous as to the distinction between fact and fiction, though the 
protagonist, Eliezer, is clearly a vehicle for Wiesel’s own testimony.3 The final extract is 
taken from Binjamin Wilkomirski’s Fragments (1995), a controversial text which was 
proffered as a true but fragmented memoir of the author’s experiences as a child in the 
concentration camps. However, after investigation it was determined that the details of 
Wilkomirski’s involvement as a child victim of the Holocaust were little more than a 
fictional interpolation within the textual conventions of Holocaust narrative. The 
following discussion will concentrate primarily on the Wilkomirski text, but with 
frequent reference to the other three texts, within the framework of an ethics of reading 
textual violence.
One purpose of this chapter is to investigate the impact of expectation and ethics on the 
process of evaluation of such texts, and the interrelation that exists between ethics and 
aesthetics when attempting such an evaluation. Consequently, when the verifiability of a
text such as Fragments is found to be contrary to the expectations of a potential reader, 
then both ethical concerns and aesthetic evaluation are subject to re-formulation. 
Evaluation becomes conditional upon context. This will be demonstrated in the 
2 These texts can also be considered within Barthes’s notion of text/context/intertext: each extract is 
understood in relation to a common context, and the intertextuality that necessarily occurs when reading 
them. They each function, and are therefore experienced, specifically within the complex relations and 
multiple meanings that are made possible by the potential influence of, and expectation raised by, Holcaust 
literature as a genre. (see Barthes: “How Many Readings” in S/Z 1974: 16).
3 Francois Mauriac, in the preface to Night, tells of his meeting with Wiesel, and how the text (although 
written as a novel) is a personal testimony to the suffering of Wiesel and all victims of the Holocaust: 
“What I maintain is that this personal record, coming after so many others and describing an outrage about 
which we might imagine we already know all that it is possible to know, is nevertheless different, distinct, 
unique” (in Wiesel 1960: 8).
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discussion of the controversy surrounding the “Wilkomirski affair”,4 especially when it 
becomes clear that any alteration to the perceptions of a text will probably be 
accompanied by a re-interpretation (and re-evaluation) of that text by the same readers 
who initially formed judgements about it. Such a re-interpretation of the narrative is not 
possible solely in terms of the words of the text, nor with regard to any aesthetic or 
ethical implications initially assumed through reading the narrative. Instead, it 
commences in terms of the reader’s inter-subjective and contextual response to the 
altered verifiability of the details of the narrative. Although the words of the text remain 
identical, it is this damaging generic shift that is more often subject to critical scrutiny.
2.  The (Re-) Interpretation of Fragments
2.1 The Wilkomirski Affair
The debate regarding ethics is indicative of the relativity and contextual determination 
that must necessarily exist within any assumed ethical position. Additionally, whenever
an ethical stance is proclaimed, implicitly or otherwise, the outcome is similarly 
contingent upon, and open to, current and future critical re-evaluation. Nevertheless, it is 
often the case that when an aesthetic conclusion is reached regarding any representation
of violence, following the relevant determination of the criteria required by any particular 
ethical system, then that conclusion is considered (by the proponents of the system
governing the conditions of judgement) to be unassailable. For example Last Exit to 
Brooklyn, discussed in the previous chapter, is a text that was evaluated as being ethically
and aesthetically objectionable by the proponents of one particular ethical system 
(primarily because of the violence of its representation), while simultaneously being 
evaluated as ethically and aesthetically satisfactory by the proponents of another system,
with each justifying their conclusions through appeals to differing contextual criteria of 
acceptability. 
4 The term “The Wilkomirski Affair” is taken from the title of Stefan Maechler’s expos of the fraud 
perpetrated by Wilkomirski in presenting his text as truthful testimony (Maechler 2001). 
187
That text was accepted by both parties as being distinctively and unambiguously 
fictional, and the expectations regarding its ethical and aesthetic qualities were based 
upon that assumption. However, a fictional textual depiction is in most cases 
indistinguishable from a factual depiction, and a factual account is almost always 
identical to a fictional account, particularly when the context and generic identity of the 
text remain unclear to the reader. The interpretation of the iterable text, rather than being 
narrowly confined to the text, is therefore dependent upon expectation, knowledge and 
context. When these are challenged or disproved in some way, the resultant tergiversation
is often disproportionate, despite the words of the text remaining unaltered. The recent 
furore surrounding the publication of Norma Khouri’s Forbidden Love has been cited in 
Chapter 5 as an example, and this disjunction between text and context is equally
apparent in the Wilkomirski affair, which offers a clear example of how the evaluation of 
a representation of violence can often consist of the imposition of expectation and a 
reliance on imposed ethical imperatives. 
In 1995 Binjamin Wilkomirski published his memoirs of his early childhood in two 
concentration camps during the Holocaust. This text – Fragments: Memoirs of a 
Childhood, 1939-1948 – was acclaimed as a document that, through its narrative power 
and graphic depictions of the author’s experiences, was aesthetically and ethically 
equivalent to other canonical Holocaust texts such as The Diary of Anne Frank and Eli 
Wiesel’s Night. Jonathan Kozol, writing in the Nation, October 28, 1996, comments that 
“this stunning and austerely written work is so profoundly moving, so morally important 
and so free from literary artifice of any kind at all that I wondered if I even had the right 
to try to offer praise” (Kozol 1996). The Internet book site, bookpage.com, includes a 
review by Michael Rose, who identifies the major ethical issues raised by the text. He 
urges readers to confront the violence depicted in the text because it accurately reflects 
the horrors of the Holocaust, as well as confirming it as a “reproach to wilful innocence
… [I]t does not get any worse than this. Until you confront the things that are recounted 
in this book, you will not have reached the limits of conceivable inhumanity. In all times 
and in all places, people have visited dehumanizing cruelty upon other people. Every bit 
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of that unredeemable history is compressed, concentrated, and surpassed in this little 
memoir”.
Fragments was endorsed by the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, and won the National 
Jewish Book Award for 1996. In France it was awarded the Prix Mémoirs de la Shoah, 
and in Britain it won the literary prize of the Jewish Quarterly. Wilkomirski undertook a 
number of lecture tours to promote the book and to recount his war-time experiences. 
However, Daniel Ganzfried published an article in August 1998 which attacked 
Fragments as “an internalized collection of images by a man whose imagination has run 
away with him”, and argued that “Binjamin Wilkomirski, alias Bruno Dossekker … 
knows Auschwitz and Majdanek only as a tourist” (quoted in Maechler 2001: 129).
Following this, various other sceptical readers challenged the veracity of Wilkomirski’s  
account. Stefan Maechler, a Swiss historian, undertook an investigation into the affair at
the behest of the book’s publishers, and his conclusion was that “the elements of 
Wilkomirski’s story are full of contradictions both in their particulars and in regard to 
historical reality. Above all, however, they are incompatible with his own biographical 
reality. There is not the least doubt that Binjamin Wilkomirski is identical with Bruno 
Grosjean, and that the story he wrote in Fragments and has told elsewhere took place 
solely within the world of his thoughts and emotions” (2001: 268). In short, concluded 
Maechler, Wilkomirski had invented his personal history as a victim of the Holocaust, 
and had asserted that the text produced consisted of factual (if fragmented) memories,
when in actuality it was a fictional narrative set within a verifiable historical context. 
Disapprobation quickly followed the revelations. Many of the awards were withdrawn,5
television and publicity appearances were cancelled, and the text of Fragments became 
unavailable except in second-hand bookshops, and as an appendix to Maechler’s report. 
5 Interestingly, not all the awards were withdrawn, as some felt that there was not enough evidence that 
Wilkomirski had misrepresented the truth of his childhood. Some also felt that his narrative was valuable 
with or without verifiability. For example, the American Orthopsychiatric Association (ORTHO) awarded 
him the seventh Hayman Award for Holocaust and Genocide Study “in recognition of his writings and 
collaborations with clinicians, which have furthered the understanding of genocide and the Holocaust” 
(Maechler 2001: 156). This indicates that, for a few readers, the value of the text lay in its textual evocation 
of the Holocaust, rather than in the verifiability of its composition. However, for many other readers, the 
latter became the crucial element in re-evaluating the text.
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Favourable aesthetic judgment of the text was transformed into antipathy in response to 
Wilkomirski’s duplicity and his manipulation of the expectations of his readers’ notions 
of historical truth, even though these were largely extra-textual considerations. Following
this reversal of critical and public opinion, the affair was seized upon by the micro-
narrative propagated by right-wing revisionist historians as a means of promoting the 
theory that the entire event of the Holocaust was imaginary; they argued (fallaciously) 
that if this one text was proven to be fake, then all Holocaust memoirs must also be 
considered suspect. An example of this line of argument can be seen in the comparison of 
Fragments with Wiesel’s Night when the former was used to discredit the latter: both 
were thereby alleged to be little more than deliberately false testimony. Professor Arthur 
Butz, writing in a revealingly anti-Semitic essay in The Journal of Historical Review, 
argues that Wilkomirski’s memoirs “are contrasted for example to Elie Wiesel, who 
cannot be discredited on the basis of identity, since he is a Jew who was actually interned 
at Auschwitz. Against Wiesel’s concoctions society has yet to develop an effective 
defence, by listening to revisionists instead of its current leaders. Wilkomirski’s 
Fragments is no more or less plausible, in itself, than Wiesel’s Night … My point right 
now is that Wilkomirski was discredited only on the basis of identity. We can also 
observe that the Wilkomirski book shows that the filthy imagination that was required to 
create Elie Wiesel’s Night is not unique to Jews” (2000 www.heretical.com/miscella
/butz2. html). This last sentence in particular is revealing in that it explicitly reveals the 
ideology assumed by the writer (which up until this point had not been overtly apparent) 
through an ad hominem attack on the entire Jewish community. That he subscribes to a 
minority micro-narrative can be seen in his complaint that society as a whole rejects 
revisionism, instead being sympathetic to the perception of the Holocaust determined by 
the dominant discourse (the “current leaders”). The verifiability of Wilkomirski’s 
deception is not at issue so much as its usefulness in confirming an ideological standpoint 
based upon a contextual ethical appraisal.
The questions that arise from the controversy surrounding Wilkomirski and Fragments 
underscore numerous implications for the reception of fictional and non-fictional texts, 
particularly when the reader is confronted by the various ethical dimensions implicit 
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within the aesthetic evaluation of a text that depends upon representations of violence for 
its ethical and aesthetic effect. The following discussion will therefore concentrate on this 
ethical/aesthetic dimension of the varying responses to the text, as compared with the 
responses to texts such as Night, The Reader and Eyewitness Auschwitz that make different 
claims with respect to historical veracity and representations of violence, and which 
therefore arouse potentially differing ethical expectations in the potential reader.  
2.2 The Aesthetic Evaluation of Fragments
An essential concern when considering the text of Fragments is the aesthetic response to 
the text prior to the disclosure of its inherent fictionality. In other words, it is necessary to 
examine the prevailing conditions for evaluation when it was initially assumed that the 
text was a factual testimony of a child’s experiences of the Holocaust. The critical 
opinion of the work was generally positive, with laudatory reviews and the awarding of 
the numerous literary prizes mentioned above – although this was tempered by some 
commentators’ criticism of a “pornography of violence”.6 The text is, as the title 
suggests, fragmentary: impressions, ideas, almost random in their presentation, which are 
recounted as if any formal narrative continuity would somehow diminish their effect. 
Wilkomirski claims that “My earliest memories are a rubble field of isolated images and 
events. Shards of memory with hard knife-sharp edges, which still cut flesh if touched 
today. Mostly a chaotic jumble, with very little chronological fit … If I’m going to write 
about it, I have to give up on the ordering logic of grown-ups; it would only distort what 
happened” (Wilkomirski 1995: 5). He then claims that he is “not a poet or a writer. I can 
only try to use words to draw as exactly as possible what happened, what I saw; exactly 
the way my child’s memory has held on to it; with no benefit of perspective or vanishing 
point” (1995: 5-6). These two statements, in particular, form the basis of the ethical 
perspective proposed to the reader, which will in turn determine to a large extent the 
aesthetic judgement applied to the text. Although it is impossible now to evaluate the text 
from the perspective of its being a verifiable document of historical events, it is necessary 
for the discussion which follows to focus on the narrative without considering that a fraud 
was perpetrated, and that the events are not historically verifiable. It will then be clear 
6 See Maechler 2001: 277
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that ethically, as well as aesthetically, the text reflects the concerns of the other texts that 
function within the intertextual field of Holocaust literature. 
The Holocaust may be regarded as a testament to the possibilities and consequences 
inherent in an unthinking and uncritical adherence to an exclusionary ethics which 
culminates in the denial of the right of the excluded to exist. The justification for the 
adoption of a dominant discourse which results in the negation of the ethical status of 
others becomes – perversely – an appeal to rationality and logic when implementing a 
strategy of exclusion. Anyone approaching the Holocaust must necessarily confront both 
the enormity of the historical event, as well as his or her own personal response to it. 
Wilkomirski’s autobiographical claims are asserted within the framework of this 
confrontation, and through avoiding narrative logic and sequential structuring, he 
attempts to circumvent the necessity of merely telling another story. Instead, he produces 
a text that through its very juxtaposition of disparate “shards of memory” provides an 
aesthetic representation that is all the more poignant for its assumption of a childlike 
innocence far removed from the “ordering logic of grown-ups”. The events are generally 
depicted in a sparse writing style, employing short sentences that again suggest an 
impression of innocence: Wilkomirski’s attempt to “use words to draw as exactly as 
possible what happened”.7 The effect of this is a sequence of scenes which renders 
inconsequential the fragmented style of the text by enabling the reader to witness 
disparate events from the perspective of a child. The assumption is that the reader can be 
transformed into a witness through the representations of the narrator. For example, 
consider the following description: 
What I saw on the ground, up against the wall, was the two bundles, still lying there, 
or rather, what was left of them. The pieces of cloth were undone, lay around all torn, 
and in among them the babies on their backs, arms and legs outspread, stomachs all 
swollen and blue. And where once their little faces must have been, a red mess mixed 
with snow and mud. 
Nothing else to see – except the skulls were smashed open.
7 However, as has been concluded in a previous chapter, any attempt at factual writing is compromised by 
the limitations placed upon representation by the inevitable and unavoidable strategies of fictional writing, 
and the play of différance in language.
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A mass of yellow, sticky-shiny stuff had flowed out and was splashed against the 
wall, on the ground, and right across the path I had to follow. My stomach heaved 
with horror and disgust. 
(1995: 104).
The graphic nature of this description achieves two effects. Firstly, it puts the reader in 
the place of the narrator in such a way that he or she is led vicariously to experience the 
violence of the scene through a re-interpretation of the testimony of the narrator. The 
testimony therefore is transferred to, and indirectly becomes part of, the reader’s 
consciousness. Secondly, as the representation has little in the way of attenuating 
figurative or aesthetic  language, the horror and terror experienced by the narrator is 
intensified, thereby increasing the probability of empathetic dismay felt by the reader 
when engaging with the text. The representation achieves an ethical effect which, through 
its very violence, becomes almost anti-aesthetic, a negation of the Aristotelian claim that 
there is beauty to be found in the mimetic portrayal of corpses.8 Even though each 
individual reader will relate to (and therefore experience) the depiction differently 
according to his or her own cultural and historical context, and even though iterability 
over time will ensure an infinite variation of interpretation of the details of the 
representation, the sparse and brutal descriptive style of writing constructs a scene that 
will remain ethically unacceptable to most readers. If the scene had been portrayed 
differently, with a greater reliance on figurative language, then the immediacy of the 
violence represented would almost certainly have been correspondingly reduced. 
The aesthetic evaluation of Fragments is founded not so much on the quality of the 
writing (thus dependent upon criteria of textual effect, skilful turns of phrase, and 
effective employment of figurative language), as on the reliance on a sparse and 
descriptive style for recounting events that would be diminished by the use of such 
strategies. The resultant ethical and emotional responses of most readers would be 
characterised by empathy, sympathy, and outrage at both the individual acts of violence 
8 Aristotle’s theory may be valid in many instances of aesthetic representation – and principally in fictional 
or artistic contexts – but when it forms an integral part of a testimonial description, such as that extracted 
above, the verifiable immediacy of the violence emphasises an ethical response which tends to subordinate 
any potential aesthetic response, even in such cases of false testimony.
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represented in the text, and at the institutional violence that makes such individual acts of 
direct violence possible. This is largely dependent upon the reader’s ethical situation. In 
other words, the response to the text is essentially determined by the ethical space of the 
potential reader, who is situated, and responds, within a certain historical and contextual 
milieu. As occurred with the re-categorisation of Fragments, any radical revision of the 
ethical context and intertext of this space will probably result in a negative response to, 
and consequent re-evaluation of, the (unaltered) text. 
2.3 The Ethical Re-evaluation of Fragments
However, the ethical re-evaluation that formed the basis of the reaction to the exposure of 
the fictionality of Fragments was not informed by aesthetic considerations: the narrative 
remained unaltered, the text after the exposure remained identical to the text before the 
exposure. Yet the fact that ethical assumptions can at any moment transform aesthetic 
evaluation, even in a given text, is a clear indication that it is ethics rather than aesthetics, 
at least in the case of representations of violence, that is instrumental in determining the 
formation of value judgement. A further question is whether there would be a re-re-
evaluation of Fragments, if another investigation were to vindicate Wilkomirski and 
discredit Maechler. However, assuming that Wilkomirski did fabricate his Holocaust 
experiences, it is necessary to investigate the basis of the ethical critique of the text 
through the experience of the narrative as a combination of verifiable events (in terms of 
the general historical record of the Holocaust) and the fictional situations invented by 
Wilkomirski. 
Some commentators, while relegating the re-evaluated text to the realm of empty 
narrative, and even kitsch, suggest that Wilkomirski did not necessarily set out 
deliberately to falsify his account. Richard Evans, commenting on the “bizarre mental 
world [of those] in the outer reaches of ‘Holocaust studies’”, writes that Wilkomirski 
“had made the whole story up from a mass of survivor literature which he had somehow 
internalized and digested until he had become convinced that the experiences these books 
recounted were his own” (Evans 2001: 261). It is worth repeating Derrida’s comment that 
“[i]f reading and writing are one, as is easily thought these days, if reading is writing, this 
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oneness designates neither undifferentiated (con)fusion nor identity at perfect rest; the is 
that couples reading with writing must rip apart” (Derrida 1981a: 64-65), because  if it is 
the case that Wilkomirski became “convinced that the experiences these books recounted 
were his own”, then the intertextuality of Fragments becomes determined largely by the 
(con)fusion of Wilkomirski’s thoughts combined with a Holocaust intertext. The 
consequence of this is that “there is every indication that Wilkomirski found his own 
narrative true and authentic because it unleashed such stunned silence, such waves of 
sympathy. Perhaps he did not really believe his story, but he did believe in his own telling 
of it” (Maechler 2001: 273). Maechler also suggests that “Wilkomirski’s book has 
created this sort of resonance because in a certain sense he does relate authentic facts –
that is, his own nightmares. He puts into words events he has created by self-hypnosis 
and possibly by other techniques, experiencing them so intensely that he possibly 
considers them true memories. His book is true in the emotionality it evokes, in the 
density of its horrors; that is perhaps also why so many genuine survivors have found 
their experiences expressed therein” (2001: 277-8). Testimonial textuality, verifiable or 
not, becomes a kind of implicit inter-textuality in which (actual) memories of Holocaust 
survivors resonate through the (fictional) text, thereby blurring the distinction between 
the imagined and the actual. 
If the effect of the text of Fragments has been to create a plausible narrative based upon a 
personal understanding (as opposed to experience) of the Holocaust, then an ethical 
injunction against falsehood becomes less of an issue in determining ethical culpability.
In addition, like any text, it becomes a site for multiple interpretations. This is evidenced 
by the fact that, even after the invention had been exposed, various individuals and 
groups continued to support the author and his text. For example, Deborah Lipstadt (the 
academic whom Holocaust denier David Irving attempted to sue for defamation)
continued to use Fragments in her lectures on “Voices of the Shoah”. Other sources 
overtly dismissed the effect of the revelations on the aesthetics of the work. Maechler 
quotes an editorial in the St. Galler Tagblatt that argues that “the horror that Wilkomirski 
describes through the eyes of an uncomprehending child still retains its collective and 
historical, albeit not its biographical, truth” (in Maechler 2001: 287). 
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By situating his text within a historically familiar framework using events and characters 
common to conventional public perceptions, Wilkomirski succeeded in creating a 
realistic impression of the Holocaust, if not the verifiable specifics of its actuality. This 
found particular resonance in the collective memory of many in the West for whom the 
Holocaust has assumed paradigmatic proportions. Wilkomirski merged historical detail 
with a fabrication of his own involvement. As it has already been argued that any text can 
approach an external world only indirectly, the events narrated in Fragments are no more 
nor less actual than any other factual or fictional representation. Yet, as Maechler argues, 
once the link between the first-person narrative and the historical record is shown to have 
been fabricated (through a generic and perceptual shift from autobiography to fiction), 
the initial aesthetic empathy created by the text is diminished: “What was a masterpiece 
becomes kitsch. Lacunae previously filled by readers with some knowledge of what is 
unutterably horrible are suddenly left empty. The text … is mercilessly reduced to its 
sheer material value. What remains is childish speech. The book is no longer an 
incarnation of horror” (Maechler 2001: 281). Not only is the link between the narrator 
and notions of verifiability compromised, but the relationship between the text and the 
expectation of the reader is irreparably damaged by this generic and contextual shift. Yet,
as the preceding discussion seems to indicate, the choices facing the reader of Fragments
must of necessity be informed by moral choices that are aporetic – the “not knowing 
where to go” (Derrida 1993: 12). 
In Derridean terminology, drawing on the meaning of the Greek word, an aporia is a
logical difficulty: “Once a system has been ‘shaken’ by following its totalizing logic to its 
final consequences, one finds an excess [which] can only be conceived as neither this nor
that, or both at the same time” (Alan Bass, translator’s introduction: xvii-iii in Derrida 
1978). The inconsistencies and doubts that arise in the experience of representation and 
ethics can thus appropriately be described as aporetic. The inevitability of an aporetic 
reading is particularly relevant to the ethical (and hence aesthetic) evaluation of 
Fragments: “Where the figure of the step is refused to intuition, where the identity or 
indivisibility of a line is compromised, the identity to oneself and therefore the possible 
identification of an intangible edge – the crossing of the line – becomes a problem. There 
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is a problem as soon as the edge-line is threatened” (1993: 11). The “edge-line” that is 
threatened by the Wilkomirski case becomes emblematic of the aporia of moral choice 
inherent in any textual representation of violence. As the interpretation of a text is both 
iterable (in terms of future potential readers), and contextually situated (by individual 
readers within a specific socio-cultural milieu), Fragments represents an aporetic 
condition in which the intertextual actuality of the Holocaust as event and as text results 
in a narrative that becomes a site for multiple interpretations, while simultaneously being 
problematised by notions of verifiability and veracity.   
It is therefore clear that the ethical and aesthetic problems raised by any consideration of 
Fragments are both ambiguous and perhaps even insoluble. As was argued in the
previous chapter, the conventional notion of a normative ethics is inadequate when 
attempting to resolve the issues inherent in the plethora of meanings and plurality of 
contexts that are inescapably a part of any reading any textual representation of violence. 
The text of Fragments has no inherent meaning; rather, it suggests the infinite openness 
of any text to reading(s). When considered as a factual text, it portrays certain situations 
which are read in terms of an ethical response, and in a manner that allows for a generally 
favourable aesthetic evaluation. However, when evaluated as largely fictional –
particularly as a fiction revealed as opposed to a fiction proclaimed – the initial 
judgement of those same ethical situations becomes compromised, and the feeling of a 
betrayal of the reader’s expectations leads to a potentially negative aesthetic judgement of
the text. This aporetic situation is a clear case in point showing where a postmodern 
notion of ethics becomes an appropriate approach to the evaluation of the representation 
of violence. An ethical standpoint that fails to acknowledge an aporetic reading of an 
ethically ambiguous text, preferring to subordinate it to a normative systemisation of 
ethical imperatives, is attempting to impose a single moral perspective, which will also 
have possible negative implications for an aesthetic evaluation of the representation. The 
problem that exists regarding the Wilkomirski case, however, is that the ethical issues 
raised by the situations described in the representation become compromised through a 
damaging generic shift, and consequently the text becomes assessed in terms of that 
change of context rather than in terms of the ethical representations within the narrative. 
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Even though the words remain unchanged, the narrative will always be subject to re-
reading, and its meaning becomes increasingly unstable. It is only through a postmodern 
reading of the text that a reader may acknowledge the iterable, and hence variable,
potential of representation, a potential that serves as a means to ethical and aesthetic 
responses in the historically situated reader.
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CHAPTER 10
POSTMODERN ETHICS 
1. The Possibilities of Postmodern Ethics
It was suggested earlier that the conventional notion of a normative ethical system is 
intrinsically inadequate when confronted with the plethora of meanings and plurality of 
contexts that are inescapably part of any reading of violence in a text However, by
acknowledging the potential suggested by postmodern notions of the iterable text, an 
appropriate response to such a text may be attempted, as such readings allow for an 
appreciation of the iterable nature of the text that in turn shapes the ethical and aesthetic 
(re)interpretations of the potential reader. This is not to suggest that a postmodern reading 
is the only reading – this would merely replace one dogma with another – but rather that 
such a reading is better suited to interpreting a text within the framework of iterability 
and plurality. Similarly, a coherent postmodern reading would not necessarily exclude 
considerations articulated by normative ethical systems, but would rather include them in 
a pluralist understanding of the text. In contrast, an ethical system or theory that tends to 
refuse a pluralist approach, and instead attempts to subject the text to normative 
systemisation, is imposing both an ethical and an aesthetic imperative on the reader of the 
narrative.1
Yet the notion of postmodern ethics seems intrinsically contradictory. Postmodernism, in 
its refutation of systemisation and its consequent rejection of the idea of an exclusionary 
ethics, has been subject to much criticism for endorsing an ethical relativism that 
disregards many of the fundamental principles which are assumed by conventional moral 
1 It should be noted that the term “ethics” as used throughout this study so far suggests the inter-subjective 
behavioural expectations and value-systems that are evident within a community or society. However, 
Levinas uses the term as a reflection of individual interaction and responsibility to the Other. Therefore, in 
discussions of Levinas’s notion of the ethical, the latter use will be implied.
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philosophy. In addition, the negation of the meta-narrative, and hence any notion of a 
fixed authority, seems to advocate the preclusion of any notion of a personal morality or 
public ethics. Yet some thinkers recognise the negative implications of an outlook that 
dismisses ethics altogether. Zygmunt Bauman, in particular, is highly critical of 
philosophers who argue for a movement away from the ethical. For example, he 
questions the methodology of theorists such as Gilles Lipovetsky, who assert that the 
postmodern era is characterized by “liberation” from moral worries: “Lipovetsky, like 
many other postmodern theorists, commits the twin errors of representing the topic of 
investigation as an investigative resource; that which should be explained as that which 
explains. To describe prevalent behaviour does not mean making a moral statement” 
(Bauman 1993: 3). Bauman similarly rejects the notion of moral relativism, where any
moral position is defensible within its own cultural and social context: to argue for the 
non-universalizability of ethics is not to endorse nave relativism, but to recognize the 
normative attempt to disregard differences, thereby “channelling … moral capacities to 
socially designed targets” (1993: 12). Other commentators have called upon the more 
radical theorists to relate their conjectural positions to the practice of daily life: “Many 
postmodernist thinkers still need to come to terms with their implied ethical bottom line, 
which … should be, not an indifferent relativism, but at best a tolerance of the fact that 
the values involved in different works of art and different ways of life are, as a matter of 
undoubted fact, incommensurate, and often in conflict” (Butler 2002: 122). 
It is therefore evident that postmodern ethics have the potential for a practical relevance 
with regard to human existence and conduct (and the textual representation thereof), 
rather than remaining a theoretical and abstract critique of normative ethics, with little or
no useful implications for the individual reader. Such relevance is even more apparent in 
the representations of occurrences of tension, conflict and violence. Although starkly 
different from a postmodern position, Gray’s comment that ethics is only a convenience 
for normal times is reinforced by Levinas’s condemnation of the suspension of the ethical 
in practice: “The state of war suspends morality; it divests the eternal institutions and 
obligations of their eternity and rescinds ad interim the unconditional imperatives … War 
is not only one of the ordeals – the greatest – of which morality lives; it renders morality 
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derisory” (Levinas 1969: 21).2 To apply normative standards of morality to extreme 
situations (such as those depicted in the Holocaust narratives cited in the previous 
chapter) is to insist upon absolute (and hence unattainable) standards of ethical conduct 
from individuals whose very existence depends on a suspension of the imperatives 
associated with conventional ethical systems. It is to impose unrealistic ethical criteria on 
persons and situations beyond the experience of those evaluating such decisions and 
actions.  
What postmodern ethics does suggest is an alternative to the coercive potential of ethical 
systems that rely on both prescription and proscription. This is clear in the ethical 
concern apparent in the work of theorists such as Levinas, Derrida (albeit obliquely) and 
Bauman. All have engaged with the possibility of the ethical within a postmodern context 
without sacrificing or denigrating the ethical impulse (for Levinas, the ethical impulse is 
vital), and their conclusions exhibit an overriding concern with the relationship with, and
responsibility to, the Other, as well as an awareness and critique of normative ethical 
systems. Of the three, Bauman remains the theorist whose work is most relevant to a 
practical consideration regarding the postmodern ethics of representing violence. The 
philosophy of Levinas and Derrida is often abstract and removed from such practicality, 
even when they do apply to specific circumstances (such as in Derrida’s consideration of 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission).3 Nevertheless, an 
understanding of the terminology employed in the writings of Levinas (and in the 
writings of Derrida on Levinas) is necessary in order properly to consider the postmodern 
ethical thought of Bauman. It is for this reason that certain components of this specialised 
vocabulary, combined with the complex question of différance, need to be clarified prior 
to any further consideration of the theories of Bauman as applied to the violence of the 
Holocaust narratives discussed in the previous chapter.   
2 This is why Levinas aims to establish ethics as “first philosophy”. His position, discussed further in 
Section 1.1 below, is metaphysical rather than conventionally normative. However, it is worth 
distinguishing between the ethical theory of Levinas (phenomenological or otherwise), and the practical 
critique of applied ethics as articulated by Gray.
3 Derrida: “Archive Fever”, seminar given at the University of the Witwatersrand, August 1998. (Hamilton 
et al 2002): Derrida engages with the concrete by questioning the notion of forgiveness as a political end, 
rather than as an end in itself. 
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1.1 Levinas 
Faced with the ambivalence, aporia and contradictions of ethical choice, it may appear 
that the recompense of adhering to a normative ethical system is that it provides the 
individual with the means of negotiating the complexities of moral issues by formalising 
various rules, laws or methods through which the initial consequences of actions may be 
considered, evaluated and acted upon. In such a manner was the potential of moral 
convention realised, and if consequences are unforeseen, or rules found to be inadequate, 
then it is always possible for the individual to claim that he/she did what was possible or 
expected at the time. There is further some provision for the formulation of amended 
and/or new rules. In a postmodern ethics, however, such an attitude is no longer adequate. 
Instead, the ambivalence and uncertainty of the ethical moment becomes manifest. Rules 
and conventions which favour adherence to a code or to an imperative are challenged by 
the demand of, and encounter with, the Other4. To recognise this is to replace 
predictability with uncertainty, and to acknowledge some doubt as to whether our actions 
are appropriate in the circumstances. The self comes to the realisation that the standard of 
ethics set by a direct confrontation with the Other cannot be met; rather, it can only be 
attempted within specific social and personal contexts. It is this attempt to engage with 
the Other that is the crucial feature of the philosophy of Levinas, particularly as discussed 
in the early strongly phenomenological text Totality and Infinity (1961, English 
translation 1969), as well as in the later Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence (1974, 
English translation 1981), a text in which Levinas attempted to move beyond the 
constraints of phenomenological methods and their assumptions.5
The primary issue that situates Levinas outside the scope of normative ethical systems is 
his assertion that ethics is not merely a branch of philosophy, but rather fundamental to it. 
Ethics is therefore first philosophy. In other words, ethics precedes ontology; not in the 
sense of a chronological (an ontological) “before”, but rather in the sense of a rejection of 
4 Throughout this Chapter, a capital O will be consistently used for “Other”, although the lower case form 
may appear in direct quotations from various texts cited.
5 Apart from these texts (which offer differing versions of the ethical), the texts of Davis 1996, Bauman 
1993, Critchley 1999 and Furrow 1995 have been consulted in order to acquire a general overview of 
Levinas’s theory, which is particularly complex and abstract. Some simplification is inevitable; however, 
the purpose of this overview is to isolate elements of Levinas’s thought which are relevant to Bauman’s 
conception of postmodern ethics, rather than to attempt a comprehensive critique of Levinasian theory.
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the hierarchy suggested by ontology: “Western philosophy has most often been an 
ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral 
term that ensures the comprehension of being” (Levinas 1969: 43). Consequently, 
ontology suggests a “territory without morality”, from whose perspective “moral 
relationship can only be a later addition, an artifice, never fully legitimate, forever an 
alien and awkward body, forever questionable and cast in a position in which apology is 
constantly demanded and never really accepted” (Bauman 1993: 71). It is in consequence 
of ethics being a “later addition” that the Other loses individuality through becoming 
subsumed within the Same, thereby becoming subject to the oppression implicit in the
power of the dominant I. By refusing to recognise the Other as Other, the Same as 
dominant I erects a barrier supported by the notion of the community, in which 
membership is defined through exclusion. The result is an increased potential for 
violence and discrimination: “The people inside the community feel that they are good, 
even elect, civilized, noble and right-minded … the borders of morality are the borders of 
the community, and as a result those outside it are often not even regarded as human 
beings. The community thus opens the door to persecution” (Sofsky 2002: 74).
It may therefore be claimed that to ignore philosophies that disregard the moral 
relationship with the Other could result in persecution, and even genocide, of that Other. 
The Holocaust is the most obvious example of the collapse of ethical regard, and in 
Otherwise than Being, Levinas dedicates the work “[T]o the memory of those who were 
closest among the six million assassinated by the National Socialists, and of the millions 
on millions of all confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred of the other man, 
the same anti-Semitism.”.6 The indifference to the plight of the Other implicit in much 
ontological thought generates the space that may bring to fruition an event such as the 
Holocaust, and that allows for places such as Auschwitz. Derrida acknowledges this 
potential for violence in his early discussion and critique of Levinas‘s Totality and 
Infinity, “Violence and Metaphysics”: “Incapable of respecting the Being and meaning of 
6 To emphasise Levinas’s concern with totalitarianism based on his own experience of institutional 
violence is not to commit any form of an intentional fallacy, but rather to situate his ethical theory within a 
broader ethical framework of which he had direct experience. “Levinas maintained that the forebodings, the 
reality, and the memory of the Holocaust always dominated his thinking” (Peperzak, in Levinas 1996: ix).
Levinas himself is careful to emphasise the philosophical rationale of his argument in its own terms.
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the other, phenomenology and ontology would be philosophies of violence. Through 
them, the entire philosophical tradition, in its meaning and at bottom, would make 
common cause with oppression and with the totalitarianism of the same. The ancient 
clandestine friendship between light and power, the ancient complicity between 
theoretical objectivity and techno-political possession” (Derrida 1978a: 91). 
The actualisation of violence and oppression, with its attendant potential for atrocity and 
cruelty, must be considered as a failure of humanity as a whole. Just as Adorno questions 
the possibility of the aesthetic after Auschwitz,7 so too does Levinas query the possibility 
of ethics in a post-Holocaust world, a world in which the project of modernity is 
complicit: “The essential problem is: Can we speak of an absolute commandment after 
Auschwitz. Can we speak of morality after the failure of morality” (quoted in Furrow 
1995: 140). The representations of the violence of the Holocaust militate against absolute 
commandments, and instead re-emphasise that the failure of morality made explicit by 
such violence is the result of violence against the notion of the Other. 
To avoid any dismissal of the Other, the I am for must necessarily be considered before 
the I am. The “I am for” is actualised when I strive towards the Other as neighbour, one 
who transcends the faceless and anonymous accumulation of humanity. In such a manner, 
I not only give active direction to myself as a moral agent and part of humanity, but also 
the Other as an integral part of that same humanity. The meeting with the Other becomes 
“an encounter with the human in the total nudity of its eyes” (Sim 1998: 304). The Other 
is revealed as irreducible to the Same, and inexhaustible, just as I am irreducible and 
inexhaustible: “The nakedness of the face is not what is presented to me because I 
disclose it, what would therefore be presented to me, to my powers, to my eyes, to my 
perception, in a light exterior to it. The face has turned to me – and this is its very nudity. 
It is by itself and not by reference to a system” (Levinas 1969: 74-5). There is a special 
significance of the “face” for Levinas which is apparent throughout his career. In a 1988 
interview, Levinas asserted that “the absolute nakedness of a face, the absolutely 
7 “Cultural criticism finds itself faced with the final stage of the dialectic of culture and barbarism. To write 
poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric. And this corrodes even the knowledge of why it has become impossible 
to write poetry today” (Adorno 1967: 34)
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defenceless face, without covering, clothing or mask, is what opposes my power over it, 
my violence, and opposes it in an absolute way, with an opposition which is opposition 
itself” (Bauman 1993: 72). This opposition becomes an opposition against the Same, the 
dominance of which is assumed by any endeavour towards the universalisation and 
absolute grounding of the ethical.
To acknowledge exteriority,8 where both the Other and I cannot become objectified as 
one, nor wholly defined as other; “makes possible the pluralism of society” (Levinas 
1969: 291). It grounds both the social impulse, as well as the notion of human
responsibility. The exposure to the gaze of the Other, just as he is exposed to my gaze, 
results in an acknowledgement not only of the exteriority of the Other, but the interiority 
of my self as witnessed by the gaze of the Other. This becomes a particular responsibility 
of the individual ethical agent, rather than being mere obedience to a universal imperative 
or utilitarian systemisation. In such a manner is the nave notion that the “we” is the 
plural of the “I” negated, as the “I” has a multi-dimensional nature that only becomes 
“we” when I command the Other, and am commanded by the Other. The result is that 
“our moral party is not one of fusion, of dissolving my saintliness and your alterity in a 
common standard that obliterates the individuality of both” (Bauman 1993: 53).9 Yet  the 
question that remains is directed towards the likelihood of avoiding such subsuming of 
the Other into my ideas, personality and prejudices. The Other must therefore be 
approached with neutrality, without expectation – particularly when the Other has the 
potential not only of being a victim, but also the potential of being an oppressor. There is 
a responsibility to the Other that must operate without the necessity of reciprocal 
responsibility – this is crucial for Levinas.
8 “Exteriority” is that considered as “other-than-Being”; this thinking is flawed, however, because “by a 
process of recuperation … the other-than-Being turns out to be part of Being after all, only erroneously or 
provisionally separate from it” (Davis 1996: 35). In Totality and Infinity, Levinas writes that “Being is 
Exteriority … Such as conception would in the end destroy exteriority, since subjectivity itself would be 
absorbed into exteriority [which would] encompass the very interiority that justified this appellation” 
(Levinas 1969: 290).   
9 For a discussion of Levinas’s conception of the standards of saintliness, see Bauman 1993: 51-3: Saints 
are described as doing things which “[go] beyond and above ‘sheer decency’ or ‘the call of duty’” (1993: 
52).
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This responsibility of the ethical agent is a crucial part of Levinas’s ethical conception.
True responsibility lies in refusing to use the standards of my morality as something with 
which to measure ethical standards in others. Responsibility is truly for the Other as my 
unconditional consent to his command: “The freedom of another could never begin in my 
freedom, that is, abide in the same present, be contemporary, be representable to me. The 
responsibility for the Other cannot have begun in my commitment, in my decision.” 
(Levinas 1981: 10). Bauman argues that this results in the only foundation that ethics 
requires: taking responsibility by accepting that I am already responsible, with all the 
ambivalence that that leap entails. In stretching out towards the Other, the ambivalence 
and responsibility of ethics become the only foundation for the ethical agent: “I am I in 
the sole measure that I am responsible, a non-interchangeable I, I can substitute myself 
for everyone, but no-one can substitute himself for me” (Bauman 1993: 7). This 
“relationship of substitution” is therefore not a relationship in the sense commonly 
understood, as it is from the I to the Other with no reciprocity, no expectations, and no 
assumption of dialogue. Instead, “I” is substituted for the Other as if I were the Other, 
thus being both responsible to, as well as responsible for, the Other, prior to any 
responsibilities I may assume for myself. This manages to circumvent one of the central 
problems of moral philosophy: the prevalence, even dominance, of egocentric ethics, 
what Levinas refers to as an “egology”.10 To claim substitution and responsibility 
“circumvents another problem of egology, the claim that all my interests are interests of 
the self, since my moral responsibilities are in the first instance for the Other … This is 
more of a dialectical confrontation such that face to face grounds both the Other and 
oneself without reducing or absorbing either to the other” (Werhane 1995: 64-5).
Such ethical responsibility to the Other is largely shaped by what Levinas refers to in 
Otherwise than Being as “the Saying and the Said”. The latter, referring to the utterances 
and statements of ordinary discourse that are subject to normative criteria of verifiability 
and convention, implies the former, which is the encounter with the Other inferred 
through each such utterance or statement. In other words, whereas the Said is the 
10 “The ideal of Socratic truth thus rests on the essential self-sufficiency of the same, its identification in 
ipseity, its egoism. Philosophy is an egology” (Levinas 1969: 44).
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necessary outcome of the meeting with the Other, the Saying (or, alternatively, “to Say”) 
is the condition for the face-to-face which acknowledges the inexhaustibility of the Other 
prior to essence: “This Saying has to be reached in its existence antecedent to the Said, or 
else the Said has to be reduced to it. We must fix the meaning of this antecedent … 
Saying signifies otherwise than as an apparitor presenting essence and entities” (Levinas 
1981: 46). The Saying therefore not only constitutes the Self and the Other relationally 
through the exteriority of the latter, before the discursively formalising nature of the Said 
grounds him/her in the systemisation of Being, but also makes possible the phenomenon 
of language within the ethical impulse: “The Saying is the sheer radicality of human 
speaking, of the event of being in relation with an Other; it is the non-thematizable ethical 
residue of language that escapes comprehension, interrupts philosophy, and is the very 
enactment of the ethical moment from the Same to the Other” (Critchley 1999: 7).11 For 
Levinas, the possibility of meaning, when governed by the Said, is rule-bound owing to 
its dependence upon the ontological (even if it does assist in the facilitation of ordinary 
human interaction). Yet in the space manifested by the Saying, language provides the 
possibility of a transcendence of representation, an “extended epiphany” in which the 
Other and I become constituted in relation to one another. The possibility of language 
therefore provides the grounds for ethical interaction; conversely, the ethical arises as a 
precondition for the generation of language. Furthermore, just as the Saying provides the 
condition for language, so too does it provide the conditions for justice, which may be 
described as ethical responsibility placed within the “full light of the public order” 
(Levinas 1969: 212). To deny the Saying is to deny justice, thereby allowing for potential 
instances of tyranny and oppression as a result of an egocentric discourse that depends 
upon the systemisation of, and blind obedience to, the network of rules and obligations 
implied by a primacy of ontology and a subsequent dominance of traditional moral 
philosophy.  
11 Werhane (1995: 61) has argued that this reliance on a (pre)-language that both constitutes the Same and 
conditions the encounter with the Other is echoed in the rejection of an egocentric ethics through language 
in the later thought of Wittgenstein, where Wittgenstein not only asserts the impossibility of a private 
language (language is repeatable, reproducible and comprehensible to a community), but also questions the 
possibility of the Self as wholly interior.
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Yet the actuality and manifestation of justice, although germinated in the encounter with 
the Other, exists only when the encounter with the Other has been exposed to the third, 
the “neighbour of my neighbour”. No longer is ethics prior to ontology since the very fact 
of the third Other determines the ontology of the society, the imposition of duties above 
rights and the creation of community. “The other who is the Third can be encountered 
only when we leave the realm of morality proper, and enter another world, the realm of 
Social Order ruled by Justice – not morality” (Bauman 1993: 113). The ambivalences and 
competing ethical systems of society now intrude upon the consciousness of the 
individual agent. It is at this point that the ethical space is exposed to the practice of 
postmodern ethics as described above. This is the moment of choice, and within that 
choice, the acknowledgement of the ambivalence inherent in the notion of ethics owing to 
notions of context, convention and what may be considered a normal society (see Note 20 
below). Postmodern ethics therefore facilitates the encounter with the Other and the 
limitless responsibility towards exteriority, and suggests a potential for ethical practice. It 
is at this point that the reading of an iterable text makes possible an ethical effect upon 
the reader in response to the demands of the Other.
1.2 Derrida: Re-reading Levinas
Levinas’s ethical thought is less concerned with debating specific ethical dilemmas than 
with the context in which a choice is to be made, and many of the instances of textual 
representations of violence cited in this study seem to suggest a setting aside of Levinas’s 
account of the encounter with the Other. Therefore, a more practically orientated 
approach to postmodern ethics is necessary, and this can be introduced through the 
medium of the re-readings of Levinas by Derrida. It was mentioned earlier that Derrida 
approaches the question of ethics obliquely and with some hesitation, and some 
commentators have noted that Derrida’s reluctance to engage directly with ethics is 
determined to a large extent by the necessity of critiquing (deconstructing) the 
philosophical discourse of ethics as it has been conventionally understood, prior to any 
suggestion of a postmodern ethics.12 In Limited Inc a b c …, Derrida responds to the 
12 “Derrida’s hesitance about speaking without hesitation on ethics and politics – one might even say his 
avoidance of these matters – is essential to the deconstructive enterprise … deconstruction is a 
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question of the ethical by asserting that to characterise such issues (under the rubric of 
‘unconditionality’) seems “essentially associated with philosophemes that themselves call 
for deconstructive questioning. Through these difficulties, another language and different 
thoughts seek to make their way” (Derrida 1988: 153). Derrida’s ethical horizon, 
although not explicit, is nevertheless inextricably linked with the pre-ontological notion 
of ethics as first philosophy as suggested by Levinas, and it is possible to acquire some 
insight into Derrida’s project through his writings on Levinas, particularly in the texts
“Violence and Metaphysics” and Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas. These texts offer various 
possible areas of enquiry that are of relevance to this study of the ethics of representing 
violence: one would be the nature of the term ethics; another the presence of the third, or 
the neighbour of my neighbour; and yet another Derrida’s notion of hospitality (and the 
arrivant) as this both refers to, and complements, Levinas’s notions of the Other, 
responsibility, and justice.
Derrida’s deconstructive orientation towards conventional approaches to language leads 
towards a view of ethics that is understood as aporetic and iterable, therefore suggesting
meanings that lie beyond traditional moral philosophy. In Altrits Derrida writes that: “I 
believe that when Levinas speaks of ethics – I wouldn’t say that this has nothing in 
common with what has been covered over in this word from Greece to the German 
philosophy of the 19th Century, ethics is wholly other, and yet it is the same word” 
(Critchley 1999:16). Ethics becomes anterior as well as exterior to ethical responsibility, 
while simultaneously implying a reliance on conventional ontological notions of 
morality. De Vries claims that, for Derrida, “[r]esponsibility, the whole drama of decision 
and testimony, of act and passion, would thus consist in the reiterated engagement of this 
very difficulty – or aporia – of engaging … the ethical, the political, and the religious. [It 
compromises the infinite] by translating it into an inescapably limited set of principles 
and rules, laws and customs” (2001: 174). 
‘philosophy’ of hesitation, although it must be understood that such hesitation is not arbitrary, contingent , 
or indeterminate, but rather, a rigorous, strictly determined hesitation: the ‘experience of undecidability” 
(Critchley 1999: 42). Critchley also argues that “an ethical moment is essential to deconstructive reading … 
deconstruction ‘is’ ethical” (1999: 2)
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The notion that the infinite is necessarily reduced to the finite or the practical, and the
reliance of “first philosophy ethics” on ontology, forms the basis of Derrida’s critique of 
Levinas in “Violence and Metaphysics”. Derrida’s critique is apt, as it suggests an 
engagement with the concrete that is discordant with Levinas’s insistence that first 
philosophy ethics can only be considered prior to ontology. Levinas is charged with 
employing the very structures he sought to subvert while asserting an ethics as first 
philosophy, in order to make that assertion possible in the first place: “By making the 
origin of language, meaning, and difference the relation to the infinitely other, Levinas is 
resigned to betraying his own intentions in philosophical discourse. The latter is 
understood, and instructs, only by first permitting the same and Being to circulate within 
it” (Derrida 1978a: 151). As a result, ontological terms rooted in Western discourse and 
moral philosophy –hospitality, responsibility, justice – are employed in terms of ethics as 
first philosophy. Such terms are then re-inscribed by society in commonplace perceptions 
of principles, rules, laws and customs, and become an integral part of their practical 
vocabulary. Yet despite Derrida’s claim that Levinas’s ethics goes beyond the boundary 
of what can be considered ethics in day-to-day discourse, there still exists an unavoidable 
tension between the demands of the ethical Saying and the actuality of the ontological 
Said. 
Perhaps following the unavoidability of such a tension, Derrida re-enters the ethical 
debate, re-interpreting ethics and responsibility as “absolute hospitality”.13 In Adieu to 
Emmanuel Levinas, he raises the question of “the relationships between an ethics of 
hospitality (an ethics as hospitality) and a law or politics of hospitality, for example, in 
the tradition of what Kant calls the conditions of universal hospitality in cosmopolitical 
law: ‘with a view to perpetual peace’” (Derrida 1997: 19-20).14 Derrida then asks the 
question whether it is even possible that an absolute hospitality (as proposed by Levinas)
is able to complement (or even create) the conditions for law or politics: “How, then, are 
we to interpret this impossibility of founding, of deducing or deriving? Does this 
13 Up until the death of Levinas, and the publication of Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas in 1997, Derrida had 
paid relatively little explicit attention to Levinas’s thought apart from the essay “Violence and 
Metaphysics” of 1978. However, Levinas remains an implicit influence on Derrida’s writing.
14 Levinas considers ethics as constitutive of an a priori state of peace (as opposed to Kant’s ethical thought 
which looks forward to an ideal of peace as an interruption or end of a perpetual state of war).
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impossibility signal a failing? Perhaps we should say the contrary. Perhaps we would, in 
truth, be put to another kind of test by the apparent negativity of this lacuna, this hiatus 
between ethics (first philosophy or metaphysics – in the sense, of course, that Levinas has 
given to these words), on the one hand, and, on the other, law or politics. If there is no 
lack here, would not such a hiatus in effect require us to think law and politics 
otherwise?” (1997: 20-21). 
Derrida’s shift to modifying ethics (or hospitality) can rather be considered as the 
possibility of a movement towards law and principles, in other words towards a praxis as 
opposed to a les practicable theory of ethics. Similarly, the notion of absolute hospitality
can be considered as being feasible through a similar striving towards an ethics that can 
be applied in concrete situations; the infinite becomes subsumed within the finite, and the 
finite within the infinite. If this were not the case, then the notion of absolute hospitality 
would become subject to the potential criticism of irrelevance.15 However, this 
relationship between absolute hospitality and law is necessarily aporetic. Derrida 
accordingly asks “whether the ethics of hospitality [in Levinas’s thought] would be able 
to found a law and a politics, beyond the familial dwelling, within a society, nation, State 
or Nation-State” (Derrida 1997: 20). 
One possibility posited by Derrida that may possibly bring about a conjunction between 
the abstract and the actual within the context of hospitality – the future and possible 
ethics – is the figure of the arrivant: a who or what that arrives at the door, monstrous, 
unexpected, and absolute. The absolute arrivant is “not an invader or an occupier, nor is it 
a colonizer, even if it can also become one, [is] not someone or something that arrives, a 
subject, a person, an individual, or a living thing” (Derrida 1993: 34). Rather “it” is an 
absolute hospitality, a yes to the future, a means to an event, a name which allows for the 
irreducibility of the Other. Although absolute, and therefore non-individual and non-
subjective, to acknowledge the arrivant is to recognise a potential locus between 
abstraction and praxis, between absolute hospitality and the means of thinking ethics in 
15 In a discussion of J. M. Coetzee’s Age of Iron, Derek Attridge comments on this aspect of absolute 
hospitality towards the Other: “The longing for unmediated communication, … is driven by a fantasy of 
total union that cannot, in reality, exist between individuals” (Attridge 2005: 93). 
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the happenings of daily life. Without such acknowledgement, both absolute hospitality 
and the ethics of daily life become compromised owing to the negation of the former 
within normative ethical systems in which the ontology of the Said dominates (or even 
eliminates) the possibility of the Saying. 
Yet the praxis of ethics in everyday existence is dependent not only upon the relationship 
of the Same to the Other, but also upon the relationship of the Same and the Other to the 
third, or (to use Levinas’s terminology, the “neighbour of my neighbour”). If this were 
not the case, there would be little or no distinction, and no difference, beyond the 
encounter with the Other, and all encounters would follow the pattern of Same and Other:
“The third would thus protect against the vertigo of ethical violence. For ethics could 
then be doubly exposed to such violence: exposed to undergo it but also to exercise it. 
Alternatively or simultaneously. It is true that the protecting or mediating third, in its 
juridico-political role, violates in its turn, at least potentially, the purity of the ethical 
desire devoted to the unique. Whence the terrible ineluctability of a double constraint” 
(Derrida 1997: 32). The third is therefore both the violation of the first philosophy and 
the opening up of the world of law and principle. Derrida plays with the relationship 
between singularity and universality, that at once fascinates and eludes him: “In and for 
itself, the ethical relationship could not rest in itself … And yet in the one for the other, 
face to face with the other, I am, in a way, facing all others. The introduction of the third 
– justice in Levinas’s sense – is therefore as much the promise and enactment as the 
interruption and violation (Derrida says ‘perjury’) of ethical responsibility” (de Vries 
2001: 186). 
Additionally, for there to be even the possibility of justice, and the subsequent welcome 
of the Other and the third through hospitality, there must also be the possibility of a 
perversion of justice. This is why Derrida claims it is irresponsible to have a good 
conscience, to have no need to compromise or negotiate: this would assumes a bifurcated 
“all-or-nothing” notion of an absolute hospitality. The third therefore provides not only a 
rupture of the absolute hospitality, the “first philosophy” ethics, but in making justice 
possible, it also allows for laws, politics, principles, and ethical imperatives. Just as 
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representation is possible only through the conditions of the iterable, so too are ethics and 
hospitality subject to differing interpretations within different contexts: “what remains is 
to articulate this unconditionality with the determinate (Kant would say, hypothetical) 
conditions of this or that context; and this is the moment of strategies, of rhetorics, of 
ethics, and of politics. The structure thus described supposes both that there are only 
contexts, and that nothing exists outside context …The outside penetrates and thus 
determines the inside” (Derrida 1988: 152-3). Derrida here highlights the aporetic 
challenge of ethical enactment: although ethics as first philosophy remains theoretical,
the encounter with the third that breaks that chain of responsibility to the Other opens up 
the world of law and ethics, which are then interpreted according to the context of the act. 
It is at this point that the postmodern potential for ethics as articulated by Bauman –
ethical thought and action within a morally ambivalent and non-foundational social space 
– becomes significant, through the encounter with the law, the principles, and the politics 
of the everyday. It is at this point that the possibility of postmodern ethics with regard to 
reading textual instances of violence becomes viable, even if the language (and to some 
extent the thought processes) of Levinas and Derrida are so different from those of 
Baumann. Despite the change of register, the influence of Levinas and Derrida on 
Bauman’s argument cannot be underestimated.
1.3 Postmodern Ethics and the Holocaust Narrative
Derek Attridge, in a discussion of the ethical in the works of J. M. Coetzee, claims that 
theories of ethics as asserted by philosophy, politics and religion, becomes embodied and 
concretized in works of literature, that it is the literary texts that “do justice” to the ethical 
impulse: “There is thus an ethical dimension to any act of literary signification or literary 
response, and there is also a sense in which the formally innovative text, the one that 
most estranges itself from the reader, makes the strongest ethical demand … if, however, 
the literary text is an event of signification (which is to say human signification), the 
demands it makes – to respect its otherness, to respond to its singularity, to avoid 
reducing it to the familiar and the utilitarian even while trying to understand it – may be 
ethical in a fundamental, nonmetaphorical sense” (Attridge 2005: 11). He then claims that 
“Otherness, then, is at stake in every literary work” (2005: 12). However, in a 
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postmodern sense, Otherness is not necessarily limited to fictional or literary texts, but is 
apparent in all texts as the potential reader is confronted by the Other in an infinite 
variety of guises and contexts. The Other as represented in textual violence – fictional or 
factual – suggests a complex ethical ambiguity, both in terms of the situation represented 
by the text, as well as the situation of the reader at the moment of the text’s reading. It is 
precisely in reading such texts that the question of Otherness is exposed, as the reader’s
response to the text (either endorsing or rejecting its portrayal of Otherness and 
exteriority through the textual representations of violence) will contribute to both an 
ethical and an aesthetic evaluation of the text, within certain contextual intersubjective 
constraints.   
When the text in question is a representation of violence, particularly when the violence 
is not only direct in nature but also directly influenced by institutional violence, then the
process of (re)interpretation becomes more significant in its bearing on the reader and 
that reader’s encounter with the Other. This is primarily because texts that depict violence 
often portray the dichotomy between the Same and the Other (as victims or perpetrators) 
far more explicitly than other texts. In addition, similar narratives may be employed by 
competing ideologies to support diametrically opposed instances of the Said, even when 
many of such instances are fallacious or expedient. Yet the issue of the significance of 
micro-narratives within and opposed to the dominant narrative discourses remains 
problematic, particularly in cases where the dominant discourse assumes dominion over 
the determination and deployment of the ethical space within a particular society. 
This representation of violence is perhaps most apparent in the literature of the 
Holocaust, where testimony, history, fact and fiction often compete for prominence with 
respect to the objectives of current ideologies, not all of which are necessarily concerned 
with the facts as they were generally perceived to have happened. Bauman highlights this 
appropriation and deployment of memory by criticising the state of Israel which “tried to 
employ the tragic memories as the certificate of its political legitimacy, a safe-conduct 
pass for its past and future policies, and above all as the advance payment for the 
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injustices it might itself commit” (Bauman 1989: xi).16 This analysis may be open to 
contestation; however, the notion of perception and memory is often fundamental to the 
construction of judgment and discrimination: Richard Evans, in an account of the Irving-
Lipstadt libel case, contends that the concluding ruling against Irving could be perceived 
as being grounded less on Irving’s biased historiography, than on the general opinion that 
his agenda was objectionable (Evans 2001). Irving’s historical revisionism is a clear 
example of a micro-narrative which is opposed to mainstream historiography. The micro-
narrative of Holocaust denial claims to prove that the Holocaust did not occur to the 
extent claimed by mainstream historians. Texts are used in attempts to disprove (rather 
than confirm) the events that constitute the public perception of the Holocaust by 
disputing the details contained within selected testimonies, memoirs or historical reports, 
or by extrapolating passages from fictional narratives in order to assert that the textual 
and historical archive of Holocaust history is no more than a fiction. 
This process of (re)interpretation over time, of reading texts according to context and 
discourse, is consequently informed by ethical concerns as much as by social ideology. 
Conversely, political discourse informs the ethical norms prevalent at any one time, and 
as argued above, it is such reliance on the dominance of the ontological Said that negates 
the unconditional responsibility to the Other, thereby suggesting a domain that allows for 
the possibility for violence and even genocide. The Other, denied exteriority, can only be
subsumed into the Same, or, in extreme cases, eliminated. When opposed to the dominant 
discourse, the Other is denied the right to welcome and justice within that discourse, with 
negative consequences for both oppressor and victim: “In actions beyond one’s 
imagination such as the Holocaust, the notion of injustice was played out from an 
egocentric condition. But it was ultimately self-defeating, since the conquerors could not 
be or have meaning without the conquered, the Other” (Werhane 1995: 66). The 
16 This is perhaps most apparent in the current Middle East conflict, where charges of anti-Semitism are 
common against critics of Israel’s military and political policies. Following the Second World War, the 
idea of anti-Semitism has become inextricably combined with the memory of the Holocaust, with the result 
that anyone who is critical of Israel is considered by many to be somehow complicit with the Nazis. Those 
who portray the Palestinian point-of-view of the conflict are frequently attacked both officially and through 
the press in this manner. Israeli Journalist Amira Hass, often critical of her government’s actions in the 
West Bank, writes that “I get messages saying I must have been a kapo (a Jewish camp overseer for the 
Nazis) in my first incarnation” (Pilger 2004: 333) 
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implication of this, that the Nazi regime has become defined primarily in relation to the 
peoples it oppressed and subjugated, suggests that reliance on egocentric aspirations can 
do no more than position the Same and the Other in a more obvious opposition than 
would be the case if these aspirations were less explicit. 
2. Bauman, Ethics and Fragments
To consider an understanding of ethics as a means of investigating issues within the 
context of the concerns raised by the postmodern critiques of representation and society
is not to assume that such an ethics is unconditional. As Bauman points out, “the novelty 
of the postmodern approach to ethics consists first and foremost not in the abandoning of 
characteristically modern moral concerns, but in the rejection of the typically modern 
ways of going about its moral problems … The great issues of ethics – like human rights, 
social justice, balance between peaceful co-operation and personal self-assertion, 
synchronisation of individual conduct and collective welfare – have lost none of their 
topicality. They only need to be seen, and dealt with, in a novel way” (Bauman 1993: 3-
4). The focus of this section will therefore fall on the possibilities suggested by 
postmodern ethics when faced with the ethical ambivalence of the violence of Holocaust 
texts (both from the perspective of the potential reader’s expectations and from the point 
of view of the narrative), and how the process of aesthetic evaluation is affected and 
effected through an innovative ethics that critiques, and in some cases even repudiates, 
the prohibiting and universalizing elements of normative ethics. 
The four Holocaust texts cited above, without regard to their individual historical 
verifiability or literary genre, all have a bearing on this critique. Yet differing perceptions 
of genre affect the potential reader’s reaction to each text, irrespective of common ethical 
concerns. Wilkomirski may have created a fiction in which the verifiability of the 
historical context cited disguises the fictionality of the text, and Wiesel’s Night may be 
deliberately composed of both factual and fictional elements. However, both texts reflect 
the Nazi philosophy that through its very systemisation rejected and ultimately attempted 
to eliminate the Other. Wilkomirski, by highlighting that attempt through the depiction of 
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violence, created an ethical framework for characters who either did not exist in a 
verifiable actuality, or who did not in actuality experience those events. Such a betrayal 
of the expectations of the reader was felt by many of his critics as diminishing the 
genuine suffering of those who did experience the horrors of the Holocaust. Nevertheless, 
the personal events described in the text – although not factual in themselves – reflect the 
actual historical violence of the Holocaust through particularly powerful and familiar 
representations: “Readers find in Wilkomirski’s text essential historical facts that are 
already known or sound plausible. They automatically locate the story within the realm of 
reality. The context and the individual facts scattered within it lend the narrative the 
authority of fact” (Maechler 2001: 279). 
Wiesel’s narrative is also literary rather than testimonial in its representation, yet Night
has not been subject to the same controversy that resulted following the exposure of 
Wilkomirski’s inventions. The ethical response to the Wilkomirski affair therefore seems 
more concerned with the avowed intentions of the author, and the subsequent 
correspondence between the text and the expectations of the potential reader. Such a 
reader may feel horror at the execution of a child as narrated by Wiesel (1960: 76-7), 
while accepting that the description may be invented. However, the probability that such 
an event could have occurred ensures that the description remains powerful and 
disturbing. Yet a description of the death of children in Fragments (1995: 69-71), when 
revealed as fiction rather than proclaimed to be fictional, paradoxically tends to negate 
the power of representation. The implication of this is that many readers, particularly 
those who rely on ethical concerns within a normative system, become more focused on 
an imperative for absolute truth than on the potential for ethical diversity inherent in any 
morally ambivalent representation. Wiesel is known to be a Holocaust survivor; therefore 
any instances of fictionality in his narrative are considered legitimate: verifiable 
autobiographical status appears (in this case) to negate legitimate adverse criticism of the 
text.17 Wilkomirski, on the other hand, was shown to be personally unconnected with the 
17 There has been negative criticism of Wiesel, but this has appeared only occasionally, and mainly on 
certain web-sites (see http://www.counterpunch.org/ and http://www.theonion.com/ Accessed 2 November 
2007). However, mainstream literary evaluations of Night have been overwhelmingly positive, and the 
impact of Wiesel’s writings is reflected his being awarded the 1986 Nobel Peace Prize.
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events; therefore the instances of fictionality in his narrative are considered unjustifiable. 
The imperative for truth can therefore more accurately be acknowledged as an imperative 
for authenticity. It becomes irrelevant to such readers that Wilkomirski may be a 
recognised authority on the Holocaust. The violation of the expectation of authenticity is 
extrapolated into a violation of ethical norms, which in turn results in a negative re-
evaluation of his text.18
By discussing Fragments in terms of a postmodern ethics indifferent to, or critical of, 
claims of absolute authenticity, it is possible to create an awareness of the continuing 
ethical concerns that permeate the textual depictions of violence. Bauman has identified 
the main assumptions of such an ethics as follows: ambivalence; multiplicity of choice; 
aporia; non-universalisation; and the encounter with the Other. By applying each of these 
assumptions in turn to the issues raised in Fragments and the other texts concerned with 
the Holocaust, it is possible to form a hypothesis concerning the relevance of postmodern
strategies to the ethical and aesthetic evaluation of textual violence.
2.1 Ambivalence
Postmodern ethics assumes that all individuals  are morally ambivalent. The bifurcated 
notion of humans as being fundamentally good or fundamentally bad is no more than a 
construct propagated by normative ethical systems, and such efforts “are either 
ineffective or result in exacerbating the evil they wish to disarm. Given the primary 
structure of human togetherness, a non-ambivalent morality is an existential 
impossibility” (Bauman 1993: 10).19 Such ambivalence suggests that the notion of a 
normative ethics that categorises humans, as well as their actions, within pre-conceived 
notions of the ought, is problematical. As discussed previously, Levinas in particular 
rejects this attempt at “interiority”, arguing instead for the primacy of the “exteriority” of 
18 However, the notion of violation in terms of self-misrepresentation is also pertinent to a re-evaluation of 
the aesthetics of the text. After the “death of the author”, authorial self-misrepresentation becomes less 
relevant to textual interpretation, even if (as Foucault argues), the name of the author often remains as a 
guarantor of cultural value. 
19 The notion that such moral systems exacerbate evil is explored by such diverse thinkers as Russell (Why I 
am not a Christian 1996), Holloway (Godless Morality 1999) and Bauman (Modernity and the Holocaust
1989). 
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the Other that does not constrain him or her within the moral expectations of the Same.
This, in effect, negates the ineffectiveness of normative ethical systems in confronting the 
ambivalence suggested by the Other.
However, the assumption of bifurcation is evident in most ethical systems. The “us 
versus them” argument is an obvious rhetorical ploy in many ideological conflicts.20 Such 
argument results in the deliberate exclusion of the Other from any serious ethical 
consideration, and can be seen within micro-systems as well as within larger conflicts. 
For example, Bauman quotes David Roskies’s comments on the bifurcation of oppressor 
and victim as the theoretical study of the Holocaust became entrenched within the 
interests of particular ideologies: “The more the grey was eliminated, the more the 
Holocaust as archetype could take on its specific contours. The Jewish dead were 
absolutely good, the Nazis and their collaborators were absolutely evil” (quoted in 
Bauman 1989: x). To challenge this view often results in a hostile response, as evidenced 
by the virulent criticism of Hannah Arendt when she “was shouted down by a chorus of 
offended feelings when she suggested that the victims of an inhuman regime might have 
lost some of their humanity on the road to perdition” (Bauman 1989: x). In other words, 
Arendt was criticised because she argued against the unthinking bifurcation of good and
evil, of universal victim and universal oppressor. Yet her argument does not diminish the 
event of the Holocaust. Rather, it is to suggest that within the comprehensiveness of that 
history, events occurred that challenge absolutist notions of bifurcation. For example, in 
Fragments, a mother and child are saved by an SS guard from those selected for 
extermination: 
They were standing next to a stacked pile of corpses. The SS men were patrolling 
impatiently up and down.
Then something completely extraordinary happened. A uniform, a young one, came 
slowly up beside Mila’s mother, looked her up and down for a moment, then grabbed 
hold of her and with a single heave threw her on top of the corpses that were next to 
them. Mila was being held tight by her mother’s hand, so she was carried along with 
her.
20 Such an argument is a presumptive informal fallacy of relevance: “In limiting the field, the perpetrator is 
leaving out of the discussion material which could well influence the outcome. The fallacy … is caused not 
by the intrusion of irrelevant material, but by the exclusion of relevant items” (Pirie 1985: 21).
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They lay there, frozen with terror, on the cold bodies. They didn’t understand what 
had happened, or why; it had all happened so fast. But they did understand that now 
there was a way out. (1995: 81)21
This passage is remarkable in that it juxtaposes the direct effects of institutional violence 
– the stacked corpses, the mother and child waiting to die – with the almost inexplicable 
action of an SS soldier who saves them from certain death. This passage does not suggest 
that the SS man was “absolutely good”, yet it also refutes the notion that he was 
“absolutely evil”. Compare this passage with another from Night:
The head of our tent was a German. An assassin’s face, fleshy lips, hands like a 
wolf’s paws. He was so fat he could hardly move. Like the leader of the camp, he 
loved children. As soon as we arrived, he had brought them bread, soup and 
margarine. (Actually, this was not disinterested affection: there was a considerable 
traffic in children among homosexuals here, I learned later).
(1960: 59)22
In this extract, Wiesel’s description challenges the notion that the victims of the 
Holocaust were possessed of an inherent goodness. Both passages reinforce Bauman’s 
insistence that “a non-ambivalent morality is an existential impossibility”. To insist on 
absolutes is to deny ambivalence, and to deny ambivalence is to assume the tenets of a 
normative ethical system (either that of the dominant discourse, or that of a competing 
counter-ethics) without question or critique. The danger of such compliance, particularly 
concerning notions of absolute good and evil, is that it becomes easier to demonise and 
eliminate those who are labelled by the prevailing norm as “evil”. As Adam Morton 
writes in his text, On Evil: “The danger is this. Thinking in terms of evil can give us the 
same attitudes as evil-doers. They often think that their victims deserve what they get, 
that they are worthless scum, inferior beings, or dangerously alien. They often think, in 
fact, that their victims are evil. Thinking in terms of evil can, if we are not careful, make 
us accomplices in atrocity” (Morton 2004: 6).  
21 It is possible that the portrayal of a humane Nazi in this text contributed to its hostile reception. However, 
such portrayals are not limited to fictional texts, and an invented representation in one text does not negate
similar representations in other texts.
22 Similar accounts of the inhumanity of victims towards one another are evident in explicitly historical and 
factual texts (see Mller 1979: 42ff). Again, this argues against ethical bifurcation. 
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2.2 Choice
Bauman insists that ethical phenomena are not deontological, where only one good or 
correct choice is identifiable among numerous inappropriate choices. Such choices are 
non-rational, even irrational. As was seen in the discussion of utilitarianism in the 
previous chapter, the consequences of any act are not foreseeable beyond a certain point, 
and even the most altruistic and seemingly rational of ethical acts may result in negative 
consequences in the longer term, even to the extent of the Other’s becoming subject to, 
and thereby enslaved to, the expectations of the I.23 The idea that there is only one choice 
is often causally linked to the quasi-religious insistence on free will, where the only good 
choice is paradoxically not to choose, since to choose (or rather, to choose independently 
of the dictates of accepted moral practices) implies to choose the incorrect or evil option. 
Again it becomes apparent that the validity of a normative ethics is applicable only within 
a presumption of normality. To make the right choice is generally unproblematic when 
the given options are relatively well defined, and the moral norms and related punitive 
measures of society obvious to all within that society. In terms of the Holocaust, however, 
such norms become virtually meaningless, subsumed beneath the institutional and direct 
violence that governed the lives of the dominant and the marginal discourses alike. 
Chapter 7 of Fragments recounts how the narrator, in order to relieve the intense 
discomfort of a panic-stricken new prisoner in his block, advises him to soil the straw in 
which he is lying rather than to wait for the bucket that serves as a latrine – even though 
to do so is to transgress the regulations set down by those administering the camp: 
“Just go in the straw, right where you are,” a loud voice said suddenly.
At first I was stunned, then I shook – that sounded like my voice. It was.
With horror I realized that I’d said right out loud, really loud, what I only thought I 
was thinking.
Everyone listened tensely. The footsteps went away again. The new boy whimpered 
quietly, but it didn’t sound like pain anymore, it sounded like relief and exhaustion, 
and soon we were all asleep. 
(1995: 63)
23 For example, the motives governing the missionaries in Africa in the nineteenth century may have been 
personally altruistic, but their efforts also proved favourable to those whose interests were more 
exploitative, resulting in an increased misery and destruction that could not have been foreseen by the 
Church. See Pakenham The Scramble for Africa (1991).
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The following morning, when the transgression is discovered by the guards, they demand 
of the prisoners the name of the responsible party. It is at this moment that the narrator is 
faced with his moral dilemma, a dilemma not wholly comprehensible to readers 
unacquainted with the breakdown of moral certainty:
Should I identify myself? Protect the new boy? Should I say it? Yes, I should say that 
I was the cause of it.
I stood frozen, didn’t say a word, didn’t step forward, and knew in despair that my 
fear and cowardice were winning out …
Fear and guilt choked off my breath. I couldn’t stand it any more. I wanted to sink 
into the muddy ground, become invisible.
(64-5)
The narrator chooses to stay silent, and the inmate who followed his advice is exposed 
and executed as a result (“There was a crack of bones, then hard footsteps and the sound 
of something being dragged toward the block in the rear” (66)). The choice faced by the 
narrator is less a matter of normative morality – although the narrator is subsequently 
consumed by guilt and shame – and more a matter of survival. There is no clear right or 
wrong choice. Many readers, from the vantage point of a normal society governed by 
reasoned moral paradigms,24 may claim to be appalled at the actions of the narrator, 
preferring (from their own moral perspective) that he do the “right thing” (as if there 
were only one right thing to do) and sacrifice himself for the new boy – although it is 
likely that both would have been murdered as a result. Yet the ethical ambivalence that is 
intrinsic to every moral choice, even in so-called normal times, cannot be satisfactorily 
answered by applying one’s own particular standards to a context such as the one 
described above. To do so contributes the imposition of moral preference upon the Other, 
and to a refusal to acknowledge the contextual ethical space in which the choices of the 
Other are made. This is not to maintain the relativist position of the potential ethical 
purity of an principled Nazi, but rather to emphasise that the motives governing the moral 
24 To label a society normal in an ethical sense is to imply that the moral decisions to be made are 
consistent with that society’s conventional expectations. Thus, for an educated citizen in ancient Athens, to 
have a male lover was consistent with that society’s paradigms; the same could not be said to be the case in 
present-day middle America, for instance. The decision faced by the narrator above, though, is clearly 
within an ethical situation determined by a micro-narrative unacceptable to the majority of readers in 
contemporary society. Conventional ethics can function satisfactorily only when placed within a relatively 
stable framework of a society where extremes such as the Holocaust have no place.   
222
choices of an individual are determined by both personal circumstance and social 
convention, and are consequently frequently aporetic rather than immediately evident. 
2.3 Aporia 
Because humans are morally ambivalent, the moral choices that are faced, whether acted 
upon or not, are inevitably distinguished by irreconcilable conflicts and contradictions. 
Such choices are therefore aporetic (see Section 2.3 of Chapter 9), and aporia as a 
condition of postmodern reading becomes a condition of postmodern ethics. To make a 
moral choice is to create a chain of consequences, some obvious and others 
unforeseeable. Yet to avoid making a choice is not possible, as to attempt to do so 
constitutes a kind of choice. The contradictions and conflicts that result are liable to be 
simply accepted by those for whom a teleological ethics prescribes a bifurcated 
perception of morality, and who are inclined to categorise individuals and cultures within 
a framework determined by the dictates of the Same. This analysis of human ethical 
thought assumes a calculated transgression by the Other of the ethical norms of the Same, 
that the Other is working within the same moral paradigm as the Same. Yet it is clear that 
those who are considered as transgressors are not necessarily operating within the same 
ethical framework, and may not even consider themselves as transgressors.25 For 
example, the truck driver in The Reader argues that the executioners “don’t hate the 
people they execute, and they execute them all the same … He’s doing his work, he 
doesn’t hate the people he executes, he’s not taking revenge on them, he’s not killing 
them because they’re in his way or threatening him or attacking him. They’re a matter of 
such indifference to him that he can kill them as easily as not” (Schlink 1997: 150). Even 
executioners, habituated to the acts of violence for which they themselves were directly 
responsible, did not necessarily view such acts as the consequences of a moral choice. 
However, indifference must be considered in itself as a moral alternative, particularly 
when informed by ideological concerns that de-personify or objectify the Other (which 
results in an incapacity to sympathise or empathise with the Other), and the consequences 
of choosing indifference cannot be subsequently disregarded. To do so is to ignore future 
25 Although this is not a Levinasian notion, the potential for differing ethical frameworks is consistent with 
a postmodern recognition of an ethical ambivalence of choice. 
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consequences and conflict as a result of the act of indifference, or to acquiesce in a 
system in which killing members of a particular group becomes part of an established 
bureaucratic process.26 As Bauman emphasises, the consequences of a moral choice are 
often impossible to foresee, but both a choice and the implications of its consequences 
cannot be avoided. It is these consequences that are open to scrutiny by later observers, 
yet the ambivalence of the context is often ignored. The representation of such choices, 
particularly within the context of acts of violence, re-affirms this aporetic situation for 
adherents of all ethical systems, and therefore serves both as a critique of, and a warning 
to, the ethical suppositions of potential readers in differing circumstances.
2.4 Universality
To assume a foundational or universal nature of the moral impulse is to assume 
sanctioned authority, which may in turn lead to an oppression of opposing views and a 
denial of ambivalence and aporia. To do so leads once again to a rejection of the ethics of 
the Other, with a simultaneous privileging of the assumed universal ethic. Although such 
a position would not necessarily lead to oppression, in its extreme form the privileging of 
a universal ethic ignores the life-expectations of the Other altogether. This would then 
justify any oppression in terms of the ethics of the oppressor, without regard to those 
beyond the scope of its concerns: the alien, the outsider, the Other in all its forms. 
In Modernity and the Holocaust, Bauman observes that the ethical assumptions of the 
Nazi system excluded any moral consideration for the victims of the genocide, or the 
possibility that the Other might have moral considerations of his or her own. This is most 
vividly apparent in the screening of members of the concentration camp death squads in 
order to eliminate any sadists or over-zealous executioners; Himmler is said to have 
“expressed deep, and in all likelihood genuine, concern with maintaining the mental 
sanity and moral standards of his many subordinates engaged daily in inhumane activity; 
he also expressed pride that, in his belief, both sanity and morality emerged unscathed 
from the test” (Bauman 1989: 20, italics added). To be a Nazi executioner was to keep 
26 See Goldhagen, D Hitler’s Willing Executioners (1997) in which he argues that wilful indifference to 
genocide is equivalent to complicity. Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963) highlights the potential for 
acquiescence in atrocity under the guise of bureaucratic duty .
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one’s morality intact, despite the disagreeable nature of the work. The language used by 
the Nazi guards in the texts cited supports this notion that the denial of exteriority of the 
Other is fundamental to the assumption of moral infallibility within a universalizing 
ethical system. The complete physical and psychological manipulation of the Other 
becomes necessary. For example, in Eyewitness Auschwitz, Filip Mller recounts how, 
dismayed by his own complicity in the murder of his fellow Jews as a member of the 
sonderkommando, he opted to join a group of Jews in the gas chamber. Before the gas is 
released, however, he is dragged out by the SS guard, Kurchuss: 
Kurchuss was the first to recognise me and at once set about me with his truncheon. I 
fell to the floor, stood up and was knocked down by a blow from his fist. As I stood 
on my feet for the third or fourth time, Kurchuss yelled at me: ‘You bloody shit, get it 
into your stupid head: we decide how long you stay alive and when you die, and not 
you.’ ”   
(1979: 114)
Similarly in Fragments, in the incident described above when the narrator has to decide 
whether or not to admit his own complicity, the SS hunt for their victim with the words 
“Whatever swine is responsible, identify yourself” (64). Although the language of abuse 
commonly includes references to animals and sub-human behaviour, the abuse suffered 
by the characters in these texts is governed by the pervasive institutional violence which 
has the effect not merely of insulting, but also of producing a dehumanisation of the 
Other. The attitude of the SS officer who greets the new inmates in Night is described in 
such terms: “He looked us over as if we were a pack of leprous dogs hanging on to our 
lives” (Wiesel 1960: 50). Later, when the prisoner in charge of their block offers words 
of encouragement, the protagonist Eliezer notes with relief that these are “the first human 
words” they have heard at Auschwitz (53). The moral system has divided the Same from 
the Other, and although the Others may seek to retain their ethical commitment in 
contradistinction to the Same, the potential exists for a diminution of the assumed ethical 
values that previously gave direction to both parties. 
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2.5 The Encounter with the Other
The Other, the not-I, becomes the locus of ethical thought and praxis through the 
recognition of the Other as Other. The inclination to act ethically must take as its starting 
point an encounter with the Other, with all the responsibility that this entails. Combined 
with the notions of ambivalence, non-universalizability and aporia, the encounter with the 
Other creates the conditions for a postmodern ethics. Throughout the texts cited above, 
there are encounters with the Other: the Other as oppressor, the Other as victim, the Other 
as fellow-victim. Yet the consequence from a narrative point of view is an emphasis on 
the distortion of the Self, and the denial of the Other. This occurs to such an extent in 
Fragments that the narrator is forced to submit to utter isolation: “Nothing connects to 
anything else anymore. Nothing is in its right place. Nothing has any value … I’m just an 
eye, taking in what it sees, giving nothing back” (87). Similarly, in Night, the deeply 
religious narrator is alienated from the ultimate Other synonymous with God, and this is 
interpreted as the betrayal by God not only of the narrator, but of all His people: “Behind 
me, I hears the same man asking: ‘Where is God now?’ And I heard a voice within me 
answer him: ‘Where is He? Here He is – He is hanging here on this gallows …’” (77).27
This sense of isolation is common to the narrators of all these texts: “Wiesel 
appropriately named this factual account of his experiences Night, for, indeed, it shows 
the profound darkness and utter loneliness into which his spiritual and physical being had 
fallen” (Bialosky 1977: 65). 
Yet these descriptions of a separation from, and an indifference to, the Other also serve 
another ethical purpose, one that is most apparent in representations of violence: the 
demand on the reader to experience that alienation through the representation. It is only 
through such an interaction with the representation through reading that the reader may 
be made aware of the vital importance of future encounters with the Other that will be 
informed by the ethical thought and practice. Even a text such as Fragments, whose 
ethical foundations are questionable in view of the deception attempted by the author, 
27 The ultimate Other, according to Levinas, is derived from encounters with individual Others: 
“Monotheism signifies this human kinship, this idea of a human race that refers back to the approach of the 
Other” (Levinas 1969: 214). This makes Eliezer’s rejection of God even more profound, as it implies a 
negation of his previous and potential encounters with all Others. 
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becomes a locus of ethical praxis owing to its positioning within possible experience.28
Such a framing of the ethical experience is partly the rationale behind considering a text 
that is particularly violent as aesthetically justifiable, even if its topic may be 
objectionable. There is clearly division of opinion as to the ethical possibilities inherent 
in the aestheticisation of violence: the debate over texts such a Last Exit to Brooklyn is a 
case in point, as is the debate over Fragments. Yet the key question to be asked is 
whether the representation – violent as it may seem – allows for an encounter with, and a 
responsibility to, the Other. The answer to this must take as its starting point the Other as 
Other – or put differently, the Other undefined by the dictates of the ontological Same –
without necessarily resorting to the rules and imperatives of normative ethical systems.
Although this rejection of universalizability may imply that it is a purely individual 
matter as to whether or not the encounter with the Other takes place, it is rather the case 
that the way is opened for an inter-subjective ethics that is not dominated by the decisions 
of the Same, yet is shaped by the aporia of responsibility in the face of duty.
In The Gift of Death, Derrida investigates this aporetic relationship between the universal 
and the singular, as suggested by Kierkegaard’s Abraham in the latter’s Fear and 
Trembling. For Abraham to obey God’s command to kill his son Isaac is to transgress the 
universal ethic, to act singularly and without precedent, law or convention. The 
temptation for Abraham is therefore the safety of normative responsibility; yet this would 
signal his irresponsibility: “If decision-making is relegated to a knowledge that it is 
content to follow or to develop, then it is no more a responsible decision, it is the 
technical deployment of a cognitive apparatus, The simple mechanistic deployment of a 
theorem” (Derrida 1995: 24). Derrida, at once following and critically interpreting
Kierkegaard, suggests that normative ethical systems reduce the aporia of decision to the 
certainty of knowledge, and such a reduction suggests a denial of responsibility towards 
the Other: “Kant explains that to act morally is to act “out of duty” and not only “by 
conforming to duty.” Kierkegaard sees “acting out of duty,” in the universalizable sense 
of the law, as a dereliction of one’s absolute duty” (1995: 63). To respond to the call of 
28 “His book is true in the emotionality it evokes, in the density of its horrors; that is perhaps also, why so 
many genuine survivors have found their experiences expressed therein” (Maechler 2001: 278).
227
the Other is singular, in opposition to the universalized call of duty and responsibility. To 
respond to the Other as wholly Other goes beyond normative ethics and responsibility, 
placing each individual in the place of Abraham, faced with the aporia of decision-
making: “I am responsible to any one (that is to say to any other) only by failing in my 
responsibility to all the others, to the ethical or political generality. And I can never 
justify this sacrifice, I must always hold my peace about it. Whether I want to nor not, I 
can never justify the fact that I prefer or sacrifice any one (any other) to the other” (1995: 
70). 
Derrida also recognises that although assigning responsibility to singularities (as opposed 
to the universalizable) is unjustifiable, it is also fundamentally unavoidable, even when 
considering something as seemingly banal as feeding one’s own cat while ignoring the 
potential hunger of all other cats (1995: 71). Yet to recognise the aporia without acting 
purely “out of duty” is to recognise the dichotomy between a singular and a universal 
ethical response. Similarly, Bauman’s notion of a postmodern ethical reading is critical of 
any coercive ethical system that attempts to limit or constrain the aporia facing the ethical 
individual. Such an approach is necessarily suspicious of the humanist belief in a “non-
ambivalent, non-aporetic ethical code” (Bauman 1993: 9). The postmodern moral crisis is 
identifiable in a distrust of moral authorities, suspicion of any assertions of infallibility,
and an ambivalence regarding the instigation and consequences of moral action as 
defined by normative ethical systems. Instead, the staring point is the Other, and it is only 
through the Other that the moral self may be realised. A postmodern ethics of reading 
contributes to a re-establishment of the relationship with the Other that had become 
fragmented through the project of modernity: “A postmodern ethics would be one that 
readmits the Other as neighbour … back from the wasteland of calculated interests to 
which it had been exiled; an ethics that restores the autonomous moral significance of 
proximity; an ethics that recasts the Other as the crucial character in the process through 
which the moral self comes into its own” (Bauman 1993: 84).29
29 This seems to run the risk of once again reducing the Other to the Same; however, this would be the case 
only if the notion of inter-subjectivity was little more than a subjectivity imposed by the Same upon the 
other, rather than, as Bauman insists, being an “autonomous significance of proximity”. 
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3. Postmodern Ethics and the Representation of 
Violence 
There remain various implications of postmodern ethics for the textual representations of 
violence. Firstly, there is the notion of justice and the third. It has been argued that 
Levinas’s ethical theory approaches a potential for practical human interaction through
Derrida’s introduction of the third (particularly in the notion of the arrivant, that third 
who is monstrous, unexpected, and absolute – see Section 1.23 above), and the 
movement away from an ethics focused upon the individual into a social, political and 
cultural sphere in which the ambiguities and aporia of postmodern ethics become 
immediate and relevant. This is most clearly seen in Night, where Eliezer’s encounters 
with human Others becomes projected into his encounter with the divine: “Never shall I 
forget the nocturnal silence which deprived me, for all eternity, of the desire to live.
Never shall I forget those moments which murdered my God and my soul and turned my 
dreams to dust. Never shall I forget these things, even if I am condemned to live as long 
as God Himself. Never” (1960: 45). The intervention of the negating third – the 
neighbour of my neighbour – has replaced the singularity of the initial (and peaceful) 
Other. What this suggests is not a nave acceptance of the third, nor is it a confirmation of 
a relativism that prohibits ethical judgement. What the third does is to create the 
conditions within which a contextual and practical ethics may function, not necessarily
built upon Kantian or other imperatives, but faced with the ambiguity and aporia common 
to individual experiences within the context of differing occurrences and cultural 
contexts. 
This is particularly applicable to any discussion of the ethics of Fragments, in view of the 
non-factual foundations upon which it bases its ethical assumptions. In terms of reader-
response theory, the encounter of Wilkomirski and the Other becomes the encounter 
between the context of the reader and the reading of the text. The representation of 
specific ethical contradictions juxtaposed with the familiar factual background of the 
Holocaust contributes to a reading of the text that becomes in its ethical implications 
more ambivalent and complex than would be the reading of a specifically factual 
representation, such as Eyewitness Auschwitz. The latter evinces moments that are 
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excruciating in their immediacy, and the reader is faced with situations that he or she 
justifiably believes to be historically verifiable, even if these situations still present moral 
ambiguities. In the former text, however, the reader is faced with representations of 
intolerable events that are in all likelihood fictitious, even if probable with respect to the 
expectations of the reader with some knowledge of Holocaust history and testimony. 
Some would feel that the juxtaposition results in a text devoid of both authenticity and 
aesthetic value: a text that will be experienced, as Maechler argues, within “the context of 
familiar historical events, so that the childish inner world is dialectically connected with 
the objective horrors of the Shoah. But once this assumption of authenticity falls away, 
the interior and exterior worlds of Fragments merge seamlessly into one, and all that is 
left is the world of trivialities” (2001: 282). 
Nevertheless, upon closer investigation, it is clear that the situations are not trivial, and it 
cannot be denied that the actuality of the Holocaust as a multi-faceted set of events is 
verifiable, even when presented in fictional form. The fictional form of a text such as 
Night does not suggest insignificance, nor do the inventions of Holocaust novels such as 
The Reader invite accusations of inconsequence. The ethical problems that characterise 
the controversy surrounding Fragments exist primarily because of the modification of the 
perceptions initially fulfilled in the reader prior to the revelations of the textual invention; 
that is, ethical disapprobation is a consequence less of the textual representation of 
violence than of the unexpected and therefore unwelcome transformation of the status of 
the represented Other, combined with the extra-textual deception perpetrated by the 
author. The encounter with, and representation of, the Other with which the reader can 
identify and empathise – the child Wilkomirski – together with the implementation of the 
violence of the Nazis, creates an undemanding and comfortable atmosphere within which
the ethical implications of the Holocaust can remain clear within a normative ethical 
evaluation of the situation. 
Yet, when the notion of the Other becomes destabilised, and when the child Wilkomirski 
is revealed as a fictional character, that impression is disturbed, and replaced with a null 
reference to the external world. This serves to negate the sense of actuality within which 
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individual empathy, framed by the expectation of verifiability, may function (yet this is 
not problematical within avowedly fictional texts). The result is a transfer of the ethical 
connotations from the reading of the text to the context of its composition. It is not 
implausible to assert that if Wilkomirski had from the outset proclaimed his text to be 
largely fictional (just as Wiesel makes no claims to unqualified historical truth in Night), 
rather than endeavouring to portray the experiences in the text as an accurate chronicle, 
then the critical and ethical reaction would have remained focused upon the text rather 
than upon the author. The aporia that necessarily exists between ethics and law becomes 
subject to normative ethical rules in the case of Fragments. There arises an irrational 
confusion between what is represented and the behaviour of the author: rather than being
permitted to concentrate upon the potential for ethical evaluation that the depictions of 
violence in the text demand the reader is directed instead into an aesthetic judgement 
founded upon moral imperatives which act to exclude considerations of the 
representational function of the text. Such confusion leads to a (re)evaluation of the text 
that is contrary to postmodern notions of iterability, ambiguity and responsibility to the 
Other (hospitality). The result is likely to be a conventional and normative response to a 
monolithically conceived text, as opposed to a pluralist reading of an iterable text. 
Therefore, the potential of postmodern ethics, even in (and perhaps particularly in) an 
ambiguous and aporetic text such as Fragments, permits the reader to enter into an ethical 
dialogue with a representation of violence that cannot be categorised, bifurcated and 
rendered safe by the normative processes of traditional ethical systems. The 
representation of violence challenges such assumptions, and although the reader is faced 
with anxiety and doubt, it is through recognising and confronting such ambiguity and 
aporia that the potential for postmodern ethics may be individually realised. The extent to 
which the text is a representation of the ethical, whether this be overt or implicit, is 
combined with the ethical context of each reader, thereby effectively amalgamating 
potential ethical and aesthetic evaluations of iterable texts such as Fragments, Night, 
Eyewitness Auschwitz and The Reader. By recognising the possibilities of ambivalence, 
choice, aporia, non-universality, and the encounter with the singular and wholly Other, 
the potential reader is paradoxically able to exceed the particular and to embrace the 
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general – paradoxically, since the postmodern ethical encounter is often considered as 
being inextricably linked to the singularity of situations or contexts. However, is must be 
acknowledged that such a reading can be achieved only at a price. As Derrida writes in 
The Gift of Death, “as soon as I enter into a relation with the other, with the gaze, look, 
request, love, command, or call of the other, I know that I can respond only by sacrificing 
ethics, that is, by sacrificing whatever obliges me to respond, in the same way, in the 
same instant, to all the others” (Derrida 1995: 68). Yet by transcending the duties and 
impositions that are accepted by normative ethics in particular situations, the reader is 
able to confront the universal in a manner that will allow for a re-integration into the 
singular, and is thus more effectively equipped to confront the ambiguities of the ethical 
implications of singular instances of the textual representation of violence.
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CHAPTER 11
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
1. Summary
The preceding discussion took as its point of departure various hypotheses regarding 
representation and the reception and evaluation of texts.1 Firstly, it was assumed that a 
textual representation, until read and interpreted within certain verifiable contextual 
frameworks, cannot immediately be construed as either fictional or factual, and therefore 
has only potential value and meaning. However, any reading necessarily initiates an 
interaction between reader and text, which then makes possible critical attention and 
interpretation. Furthermore, the text may be considered as iterable, contingent and 
contextual, as well as subject to infinite (re)interpretation and (re)evaluation through 
infinite future readings in an infinite variety of situations and contexts. The person who 
interprets and evaluates the iterable text is any potential reader, that is, any person within 
a specific historical and temporal context who, through the act of experiencing a text, 
arrives at a singular meaning for that text (even though there will be multiple meanings 
for multiple readers through time, as well as within the same epoch). Although a text is 
presumed by a potential reader to be either factual or fictional, such boundaries become 
unsustainable when the factual narrative is found to be reliant upon fictional strategies, as 
well as when the fictional text becomes reliant upon a reader’s acknowledgement of 
extra-textual actualities that frame its reference to a deferred reality. 
A textual representation of violence is the iterable depiction of an act of direct or indirect 
intentional harm, perpetrated against a person or property. Just as there are various types 
of violence – such as the direct, psychological, cultural and institutional – so there are 
also various ways of representing that violence. Certain texts represent direct violence, 
1 Throughout this study, the conclusions reached regarding representation, ethics and violence are 
contingent. Just as a postmodern ethical response to a representation of violence will be open-ended, and 
therefore capable of accommodating ambiguity, so too will any corresponding conclusion remain open to 
modification. 
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which is necessarily informed by cultural and institutional violence. These texts depict 
violence in ways that are graphically descriptive and often disturbing to the reader. Other 
texts are composed in more figurative, and therefore aestheticised, language. In such 
narratives, the reaction of the reader to the representation of violence is often less 
immediately visceral, since the linguistic register places less emphasis on reference and
the actuality of the violence described in the text. Nevertheless, whatever the degree of 
aestheticisation, any representation of violence (factual or otherwise) presupposes ethical 
considerations, whether those considerations are concerned with the occurrences and 
persons represented in the text, the reader’s responses to those occurrences and persons,
or the implications that the representation has for social and individual responses to 
existing circumstances. Yet a satisfactory ethical response to an ambiguous instance of 
textually represented violence is frequently constrained by the limits of normative ethical 
systems. It is at this point of intersection between the representation of an ambiguous 
instance of violence, and the potential reader’s response to that representation, that a
postmodern ethical response is most pertinent.
2. Conclusion: The Potential of Postmodern Ethics
An example of such ambiguity can be found in the play Lear, by the English dramatist,
Edward Bond.2 Bond defends the excessive violence to be found in the play, arguing 
from an ethical standpoint that representations of violence are not only unavoidable, but 
even necessary for an authentic response to actual circumstances: “I write about violence 
as naturally as Jane Austin wrote about manners. Violence shapes and obsesses our 
society, and if we do not stop being violent we have no future. People who do not want 
writers to write about violence want to stop them writing about us and our time. It would 
be immoral not to write about violence” (Bond 1972: v). Bond notes that the 
representation of violence has been a ubiquitous feature of writing throughout history. 
2 Lear, a re-interpretation of Shakespeare’s King Lear, imagines Lear as a tyrannical king of England who 
has built a huge wall to keep put his enemies. He is subsequently deposed by his ruthless daughters, who 
are in turn deposed by the Stalinist figure of Cordelia. Blinded by his daughters and exiled by Cordelia, 
Lear attempts to dismantle a part of his wall, knowing that he will be shot. The play has been hailed as a 
“myth for our age, expressing what Bond calls ‘pessimistic optimism’” (Patterson 2007: 231). 
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Whether factual or fictional, or any combination of the imagined and the actual, examples 
are readily available from all historical periods, and in all genres. 
These representations often confirm Bond’s point about violence “shaping” society. The 
siege of Troy as envisaged by Homer in The Iliad is an early instance of institutional and 
psychological violence, and the specific description of the climactic battle between 
Achilles and Hector in Book 22 is clearly a representation of direct violence. Yet 
differing interpretations of that violence result in differing socio-ethical assumptions. The 
representation of violence in this poem strongly influenced Ancient Greek notions of 
heroism and just war for many centuries. For example, at the time of Alexander the Great 
many Greeks considered Homer’s poems “as a source of ethical teaching, and from what 
is known of political life in Alexander’s Athens, the combative code of the Iliad had in 
no way been outgrown … Homer’s Achilles sums up the doubts and conflicts of to 
philotemo, a hero’s emulous struggle for glory; the ideal is a lasting one, and against the 
perspective of Macedonia it would have made living sense” (Fox 2004: 62-3). Yet the 
ethic of this “combative code” of violence is inverted by Shakespeare in Troilus and 
Cressida, where the struggle between Homer’s protagonists is cynically transformed into 
duplicity when the cowardly Achilles orders his followers to murder the unarmed and 
conceited Hector. In this play, the reader is compelled to observe how characters 
“brutalise themselves in order to survive in a brutal world. The irony, or rather the 
tragedy, lies in the fact that in so doing, they earn the esteem of their society” (Dollimore 
1989: 41). 
Just as Shakespeare re-interpreted the violence represented in Homer’s poetry, so too 
does Bond’s ultra-violent rewriting of King Lear reposition the original “so that we now 
have to use the play for ourselves, for our society, for our time, for our problems” 
(Patterson 2007: 231). The representation of violence is therefore integral to the ethical 
assumptions of the society in which the texts were written, and in which they are read.
When Bond writes that “it would be immoral not to write about violence”, the point of 
his argument is that to dismiss the textual representation of violence is to ignore the 
actuality of violence in the world. Furthermore, his assertion that the future is threatened 
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by that same violence places his utterance (and his play) firmly within an ethical tradition 
that confronts the existence of violence and its effects, rather than seeking to avoid such 
pressing topics. If it is immoral, as Bond claims, not to write about violence, it would
therefore be immoral not to read about violence, given the proviso that any potential 
reader needs to be equipped to respond ethically to the representation. To read a text is, in 
one sense, to write or rewrite it (even if the initial writer reads it in a different sense from 
subsequent readers). Consequently, Bond’s argument that there is a compelling moral 
pressure to write about violence is equally pertinent to the morality of reading about 
violence. “One must then, in a single gesture, but doubled, read and write” (Derrida 181a: 
64). 
To read such texts morally is clearly not a call for censorship or suppression – to be one 
of those “who do not want writers to write about violence” – but rather to recognise the 
ethical implications of the texts, and to respond to those situations both in terms of the 
reader’s contextual positioning, and the contextual positioning of the representation (and 
of the characters who are integral to that representation). Such recognition allows the 
potential reader to respond more fully to the aesthetic representation of the text, while the 
aestheticisation of the violence in turn informs the ethical response to the text. The most 
obvious example of the interaction between ethical and aesthetic considerations, as 
emphasised in Chapters 9 and 10, is the Holocaust narrative. These texts reflect the 
actuality of an extreme ethical failure of society. This failure is made evident through the 
representation of institutional, cultural, psychological and the direct use of violence
against an Other who has been excluded from any significant ethical concern. It is this 
exposure of ethical failure that is perhaps the most significant contribution to a 
postmodern response to the textual representation of violence. However, this is not to 
suggest that a potential reader evaluating a text through notions of postmodern ethics is 
confronted with differing aporias from those faced by a reader working within the tenets 
of a normative system. Rather, a reader with postmodern ethical notions in mind is better 
able to evaluate those aporias when dealing with the multiplicity of variable implications 
suggested by differing contextual frameworks. 
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Although postmodern ethical thought cannot claim to alter the fact of violence and its 
influence on readers, spectators, victims and perpetrators, whether textually or in 
actuality, what it can achieve is a heightened awareness of the social (and individual) 
possibilities implied by the experience of reading a representation of violence. A 
potential reader’s sensitivity to these implications can then increase awareness of, and 
sensitivity to, the actuality of violence in society. The importance of cultivating such an 
awareness and sensitivity to the destructive power of violence is considerable, 
considering the continuing pervasiveness of actual violence in the world today. The 
attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001, and the brutal response of the USA in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have, in a sense, defined the opening years of the twenty-first 
century as a period of continuing conflict and atrocity.3 In his book on violence, 
Wolfgang Sofsky argues that “the twentieth century began with the highest of hopes, and 
ended in many parts of the world in pain and despair … it would run counter to all 
historical experience to believe that the worst, the ‘unimaginable’, could not happen 
again. It is therefore essential to dispel all deceptive idealistic images once and for all” 
(Sofsky 2002: 61, 63). To argue that postmodern ethics could significantly reduce the 
prevalence of actual violence is perhaps one such idealistic image. Yet an awareness of 
its potential could contribute towards individual sensitivities towards the foreseeable 
consequences of such violence for the Other, whether in the actual world, or as a textual 
representation. To treat fellow human beings as merely “Others”, thus denying them 
those attributes which are most commonly and creatively associated with being human, is 
to run the risk of the “unimaginable” envisaged by Sofsky. 
In Chapter 2, Section 3, some consideration was given to the representation of an instance 
of violence from Antjie Krog’s Country of my Skull. The exploration in this text of the 
testimonies brought before, and the findings of, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission include disturbing, graphically descriptive depictions of similar instances of 
anger and aggression. Yet despite this surfeit of violence, the last sentences (written just
3 Robert Fisk’s study of the Middle East, The Great War for Civilization (Fisk 2006), discussed in Chapter 
7, Section 2, is an important account of the “unimaginable” violence that the twenty-first century has 
inherited from the twentieth. 
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two days after 11 September 2001) argue persuasively for the recognition of the Other, 
for the ethical need for “Being-for”:
How do we become released into understanding, into becoming whole among others? 
How do we make whole? How close can the nose curve to tenderness; the cheek to 
forgiveness? … We have to hear each other’s scalp and smell each other’s blood and 
baled belonging. We have to learn the deepest sound of each other’s kidneys in the 
night.
We have to become each other, or for ever lose the spine of being.
(Krog 2002: 293)
Krog’s sentiments are echoed by the postmodern ethics of Bauman: “one must assume 
that moral responsibility – being for the Other before one can be with the Other – is the 
first reality of the self, a starting point rather than a product of society” (1993: 13). Yet 
Bauman is not quite as idealistic as Krog – she argues that in order to become moral, we 
have to become each other; he argues that any such imperative is not practical, and that 
we should be wary of normative ethical systems: “Our collective moral responsibility, 
much as the moral responsibility of every man and woman among us, swims in the sea of 
uncertainty. Uncertainty was always the home ground of moral choice, though modern 
moral philosophy … did [its] best to deny it in theory and repress it in deed” (1993: 222). 
Although Bauman clearly articulates his distrust of normative systems, he also reminds 
the reader that the dead remain dead, and that the atrocity and prejudice and hate that 
have existed in history continue to exist today (1993: 224). Nevertheless, an acceptance 
of postmodern ethical uncertainty, combined with a flexibility of moral outlook, allows 
an individual to respond positively to the poetic idealisation of Krog’s appeal to “become 
each other”, whilst simultaneously accepting the necessarily contingent nature of that 
notion. Such aspirations could at least motivate some readers to develop sensitivities 
which work against the potential for extreme violence predicted by Sofsky. 
A final example serves to illustrate this possibility. At the conclusion of Bond’s play, 
Lear repudiates the repression and violence that had characterised his reign, and that 
characterises the present governance of Cordelia. In doing so, he knowingly confronts the 
inevitability of his own execution, in what seems to be an inconsequential gesture of 
defiance against the indifference of society to the violence that has become
238
commonplace. The stage direction at this point reads simply “The workers go quickly and 
orderly. One of them looks back” (Bond 1972: 88). This spontaneous act of looking back, 
of noticing and bearing witness to the suffering of another, encapsulates that “first reality 
of the self, a starting point” identified by Bauman as essential to any assumption of 
postmodern moral responsibility. 
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